except those of sight and touch, exist and yet are nowhere, are neither figured nor extended, 236, e.g. the taste of a fruit has no local conjunction with its colour or shape except to our fancy, 238; thus the materialists are wrong who conjoin all thought with extension, 259; but on the other hand extension is a quality of certain perceptions, e.g. this table is only a perception, 239; 'the very idea of extension is copied from nothing but an impression, and consequently must perfectly agree to it. To say the idea of extension agrees to anything is to say it is extended,' thus there are impressions and ideas really extended, 240.
External—opposed to internal, 166, 167; objects (q.v.) opposed to internal actions, 464; opposed to internal motives, principles, or qualities, 411 f.; no idea of external existence (q.v.) as something specifically different from ideas and impressions, 67 (cf. 188, 211 f.); when an impression is external to our bodies it is not external to ourselves, 190; for our limbs are themselves only impressions: also impressions which are not in extension, e.g. sounds, smells, etc., cannot be external to anything, 191; 'no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately and without the interposition of an image or perception,' 239.
Fact, matter of—truth=agreement 'to real relations of ideas or to real existence and matter of fact,' 458; understanding either compares ideas or infers matters of fact: its objects either relations of objects or matters of fact, 463 (cf. 413); (cf. Cause, § 7); morality does not consist in any matter of fact which can be discovered by the understanding, 468; when you look for the morality of an act, you can only find approbation or disapprobation in yourself: 'here is matter of fact, but it is the object of feeling, not of reason,' 469.
Faculty—fiction of, 224.
Fame—love of, 316 f., explained by sympathy, 316, assists moral approbation of justice, 501 (v. pride, § 2).
Family—a source of pride, 307, beginning of state, 486, patriarchal, not origin of monarchy, 541.
Fancy—and belief (q.v.), 140, 624; illusion of, in the miser, 314.
Feeling.
§ 1. (v. Belief, § 4; Appearance); belief only a certain feeling: there is nothing but the feeling or sentiment to distinguish fact from fancy, and this feeling is only a greater firmness of the conception of the object, 624; it is not distinguishable from the conception, 625, 627; an idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea: this feeling we all a superior force, vivacity, firmness, solidity, and steadiness, 629; ideas distinguished not only by force and vivacity, they really feel different, 636; it is wrong to suppose that those actions of the mind are the same which produce not a different sensation, 417.
