Page:Treatise of Human Nature (1888).djvu/688

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A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE.

promises, the exact performance of which is the effect of government, not its source, 543; there is a separate interest and obligation in obedience to the magistrate and performance of promises, 544; allegiance and performance of promises have thus a separate foundation and a separate moral obligation, 545; government would be necessary in all large societies were there no such thing as a promise, and promises would be obligatory were there no such thing as government, 546; this is also the popular opinion, 547; magistrates themselves do not believe their authority to rest on a promise: if they did, they would never be content to receive it tacitly, 547; subjects believe they were born to obedience, 548; dwelling in its dominions not consent to a government, 548; according to this view there would be no allegiance to an absolute government which yet is as natural and common a form as any, 549; this theory of consent really only proves that our submission to government admits of exceptions, 549; the conclusion is just, but the principles erroneous, 550; the natural obligation ceases when the interest ceases, but the moral obligation continues owing to the influence of general rules, 553; but in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, 552.

§ 3. The objects of allegiance, i.e. our lawful magistrates, at first fixed by convention and a specific promise, 554; afterwards by general rules invented in our interest, 555, viz. those of (a) long possession, 556; (b) present possession, 557; (c) conquest, 558; (d) succession, 559, (e) positive laws, 561; rigid loyalty akin to superstition: controversies in politics generally trivial and insoluble by reason, 561; the English Revolution, 563; resistance more often lawful in mixed than in absolute governments, 564; in no government a right without a remedy, 564; influence of imagination in politics, 565-6.

Habit (v. Custom)—is nothing but one of the principles of Nature, and derives all its force from that origin, 179.

Heroism—nothing but a steady and well-established pride and self esteem, 599.

History—credibility of, 145; links in, are all of same kind, and so the transition easy, the ideas lively, and belief strong, 146; and poetry, 631.

Hobbes—on cause, 80.

Hope—and fear, 440 f.; caused by mixture of joy and grief, 441.

Humility—perfect sincerity in, not to be expected, 598.

Hypothetical arguments, 83.

Ideas.

§ 1. Origin and classification of, 1 f.; derived from impressions from which they differ only in vivacity, 1 (cf. 106, 629); Locke's