which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will, 410.
Matter of fact-the conclusion of all reasoning from cause and effect, 94; opposed to relations of ideas, 463 (cf. 413); (v. Fact).
Memory—and imagination, 8 f., 108, 117 n (cf. 265, 370 n, 628); has no power of varying order and position of simple ideas, 9; but this property not perceivable by us, so the difference between it and imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity, 85; ideas of, equivalent to impressions, 82, 83; attended by belief, 86; the system of impressions or ideas of memory is real, and is contrasted with that system which is the object of the judgment, 108; assurance derived from, almost equals that of demonstration or knowledge, and superior to that derived from arguments from cause and effect, 153; a source of belief in continued and distinct existence of perceptions, 199, 209; not only discovers but produces personal identity, 261, though from another point of view the converse is true, 262; 'of all faculties has least vice or virtue in its several degrees,' 370 n; though extremely useful yet is exerted without any sense of pleasure and pain, and so has no merit while the judgment always has, 613.
Merit (v. Moral)—implies something constant and durable in the man, and thus requires the doctrine of necessity, 411; depends on motives (q.v.), 477 f.
Metaphysics, 31, 32, 190.
[Method]—of agreement and difference, 300, 301, 311, 332.
Mind (v. Identity, § 4).
§ 1. A. 'Is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations (cf. 636) and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity or identity,' so there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind, nor in conjoining an object to the mind, 207 (v. Identity, 251 f.); 'is a kind of theatre: there is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different:' but the comparison of the theatre must not mislead us, for 'they are the successive perceptions alone which constitute the mind,' 253; compared to a republic or commonwealth, 261; 'the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, and influence one another,' 261.
B. Is like a string instrument, the passions slowly dying away, 441 (cf. 576); only qualities of the mind virtuous or vicious, 574; some 'durable principles of the mind required for virtue or vice, 575; the minds of all men similar in their feelings and operations, 576; has the command over all its ideas, and so belief cannot be an idea, 624; 'it is almost impossible for the mind to change its character
