those motives,' 'we must look within to find the moral quality,' 'the external performance has no merit,' 417, 575; but 'no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there is in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality,' 479 (cf. 518. 523).
B. Passions (q.v.) are moral or immoral according as they are exercised or not with their natural and usual force, 483-4; before society exists, morality=the usual force of the passions, e.g. selfishness and partiality are virtuous, 488 (cf. 518); 'every immorality is derived from some defect or unsoundness of the passions, which must be judged of in great measure from the ordinary course of nature in the constitution of the mind,' 488; 'all morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions,' 532 (cf. 547, 552, 581).
§ 7. Doctrine of necessity not only harmless to morality but essential to it, 409-412 (cf. 375) (v. Necessity, Will); moral philosophy, 175, 282; abstruse speculations in morals carry conviction owing to the interest of the subject, 453.
Moral and natural—beauty, 300; evidence, 404, 406; obligation, 545 (v. Natural).
Moral and physical, 171.
Moral obligation, 517, 525, 547, 569 (v. Obligation).
Motion—Cartesian theory of God as prime mover, 159; cannot be real if we accept the modern distinction between primary and secondary qualities, 128 f.; or matter, the cause of our perceptions, 246 f.; 'we find by comparing their ideas that thought and motion are different from each other, and by experience that they are constantly united,' which are 'all the circumstances which enter into the idea of cause (q.v.) and effect,' 248.
Motive.
§ 1 (v. Necessity, § 400 f.). Actions have a constant union with motives, temper, and circumstances, 400, hence an inference from one to the other, 401; desire of showing liberty a motive of action, 408; force not essentially different from any other motive, 525; the influencing motives of the will, 413 f.; reason alone can never be a motive to the will, 414 f.
§ 2. 'When we praise any actions we regard only the motives that produced them' (v. Character), when we blame a man for not doing any action we blame him as not being influenced by the proper motive of that action, 477 (cf. 483, 488, 518, where a virtuous motive appears aa a usual passion on any occasion): 'the first motive that bestows merit on any action can never be a regard to the virtue of that action but must be some other natural motive or principle,' 478 (cf. 518); 'no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there is in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its
