us to judge as well as to breathe and feel,' 183; compels the sceptic to assent to the existence of body, 187; determines the object of pride, 286-8; not opposed to habit, for 'habit is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force from that origin,' 179; inconstancy of human nature, 283; opposed to interest and education as origin of virtue, 295; nature=the original constitution of the mind, an arbitrary and original instinct, 368 (cf. 280-1); =that which is common to or inseparable from any species, 484.
§ 3. The state of Nature, a philosophic fiction, 493; like the poetic fiction of a golden age. 494; in a state of nature no property and no promises, 501; man's very first state and condition may justly be esteemed social, 493; Laws of Nature, 484, 520, 526, 543 (v. Justice, § 1); not abolished by laws of nations. 567.
Necessary—connexion (v. Cause), § 6 A, § 9 C, § 10.
Necessity—and Liberty of the Will, 400 f.
§ 1. Operations of external bodies necessary and determined by an 'absolute fate:' this necessity only a determination of mind produced by constant union, 400 (cf. 165); our actions have a similar constant union with our motives and circumstances, and therefore a similar necessity, 401; nor does the acknowledged capriciousness of human actions remove the necessity, for (1) contrary experience either reduces certainty to probability or makes us suppose contrary and concealed cause, the apparent chance or indifference only being due to our ignorance, 404 (cf. 130, 132); (2) madmen are generally allowed to have no liberty, though there is no regularity in their actions, 404; moral evidence implies an inference from actions to motives, 404; also the easy combination of natural and moral evidence, 406; Liberty thus can only=chance, 407.
§ 2. Three reasons for the prevalence of the doctrine of Liberty. (1) Confusion between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference, 407 (cf. 609); (2) a false sensation or experience of the liberty of indifference: the necessity of an action is not a quality in the agent but in the spectator (cf. 165): and liberty is only an absence of determination in the spectator's mind, and=indifference, which is often felt by the agent but seldom by the spectator, 408; false experiment on part of agent to prove his liberty, 408; a spectator can generally infer our actions from our motives and character, and when he cannot it is due to his ignorance. 408; (3) religion, 499 (cf. 271, 241). 'I do not ascribe to will that unintelligible necessity which is supposed to lie in matter, but ascribe to matter that intelligible quality … which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will,' 410.
§ 3. Further, this kind of necmsity essential to religion and morality, without it there could be no law, no merit or demerit, no responsibility, 411 (cf. 575); no distinction between ignorantly and
