491); universal, of virtue not explained by those who derive morality from reason, '’tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it,' 465-6; impossible to will an obligation, 517, 523, 524; a new obligation supposes new sentiments to arise, and 'the will never creates new sentiments,' 518; obligations do not admit of degrees, 529; though we imagine them to do so, 531.
§ 2. Interest the natural obligation to justice (q.v. § 3), the sentiment of right and wrong the moral obligation, 498; of promises (q.v.), not natural, 516; when an action or quality of the mind 'pleases us after a certain manner we say it is virtuous, and when the neglect or non-performance of it displeases us after a like manner we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it,' 517; there is only a natural obligation to an act when it is required by a natural passion, but there is no natural inclination leading us to perform promises as there is leading us to humanity and the natural virtue, 518, 519 (cf. 546); interest the first obligation to performance of promises: afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs and creates a new obligation, 522, 523; the fact that force invalidates promises shows they have no natural obligation, 525; obligation of allegiance, 541 (v. Government, § 2); there is a separate interest and therefore a separate obligation in obedience to the magistrate and the performance of promises, 544; and also there is a separate moral obligation in each, 546; there is a moral obligation to submit to government because every one thinks so, 547; the natural obligation to allegiance ceases when the interest ceases, but the moral obligation continues owing to the influence of general rules, 551; the strength of the moral obligation varies with that of the natural, 569, 573.
Occasion—and cause, no distinction between, 171.
Occupation—and property, 505 f.
Original—and secondary impressions, 275-6; distinguished from natural, 280, 281; whether virtue founded on original principles, 295; original constitution of the mind=nature, 368 (cf. 372); original instinct of the mind to unite itself with the good, 438.
'Ought' not distinguished from 'is,' nor explained by popular morality, 469.
Passions.
§ 1. Are secondary impressions (q.v. § 1) or impressions of reflection, i.e. they proceed from some original impression of sensation, 'either immediately or by the interposition of its idea,' 275 (cf. 7. 119); reflective impressions are calm or violent; the passions of love, joy, pride, and their opposites belong to the violent class, though the division is not exact, 276; divided into direct and indirect: the direct, e.g. desire, aversion, grief; joy, hope, fear, despair, security, arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure;
