contrary to reason or truth, since they are original existences and not representative, 415, 458; they can only be contrary to reason so far as accompanied by some judgment, and then it is not the passion but the judgment which is unreasonable; '’tis not contrary to reason to prefer any acknowledged lesser good to any greater,' 416.
B. Calm passions or desires often confounded with reason because they produce little emotion, e.g. benevolence, and love of life, and general appetite to good and aversion to evil considered as such,' 417 (cf. 437); calm passions often determine the will in opposition to the violent; '’tis not the present uneasiness alone which determines men;' 'strength of mind'='prevalence of the calm passions above the violent,' 418; calm passions to be distinguished from weak, violent from strong; a calm passion is one 'which has become a settled principle of action,' 419 (cf. 631); the affections and understanding make up human nature and both are requisite in all its actions, 493; our passions often refuse to follow our reason, 'which is nothing but a general calm determination of the passions founded on some distant view or reflection,' 583.
C. Desire and direct passions, 438; 'arise from good considered simply, and aversion is derived from evil,' 439; 'besides good and evil, or in other words pain or pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse and instinct which is perfectly unaccountable,' e.g. desire of punishment to enemies and happiness to friends, hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites; 'these passions strictly speaking produce good and evil, and proceed not from them like the other affections,' 439.
§ 4. Passions praised and blamed according as they are exercised with their natural and usual force, 483; our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course ofonr passions, 484; in the condition of man before society, selfishness and partiality are the usual passions and therefore praiseworthy, 488; 'every immorality is derived from some defect or unsoundness of the passions,' 488; a natural passion or inclination towards an act constitutes a natural obligation to do it, 518; 'all morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions,' 532; praise and blame nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love and hatred, 614 (v. Moral, § 1).
§ 5. Personal identity as it concerns our passions to be distinguished from personal identity as it concerns our thought and imagination, 253; philosophy of our passions distinguished from strict philosophy in the matter of 'power,' 311.
Patriarchal theory of origin of government, 541.
Patriotism—306; anti-patriotic bias explained, 307.
Perception.
§ 1. Divided into impressions and ideas (q.v.), 1; simple and
