no real bond perceived by understanding between perceptions, 259; yet the different perceptions which constitute the mind are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, and influence one another, 261; there is no satisfactory theory to explain the principles that unite our successive impressions in our thought or consciousness, 636 (v. Mind § 1).
Peripatetic fiction of sympathies and antipathies in nature, 224.
Person—(v. Identity, § 4, Mind). The object of love and hatred 'some other person of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious,' 329 'some person or thinking being,' 331; easy to pass from idea of another person to idea of self, but not the reverse way except in sympathy (q.v.), 340.
Philosophy (v. Scepticism).
§ 1. 19, 76, 78, 143, 165, 282; experimental and moral, 175: moral and natural, 282; contradictory phenomena to be expected in natural philosophy but not in mental, since 'the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known,' 366 (cf. 175); speculative and practical, 451; compared to hunting, 451; strict philosophy rejects the distinction between power (q.v.) and the exercise of it, but 'in the philosophy of our passions' there is room for it, 311; used as equivalent to 'reason,' 193; and religion, 250 (cf. 272); character of a true philosopher, 13.
§ 2. Philosophical opposed to natural relation, 14, 69, 73 f., 170 (v. Cause, § 6. C); 'unphilosophical probability,' 143 f. (v. Cause, § 8. D).
§ 3. A. Ancient, 219 f.; its fiction of substance or matter, 219; peripatetic, its distinction between substantial forms and substance, 221, 527; ancient, employs principles of imagination which are changeable, weak, and irregular, 'nor so much as useful in the conduct of life,' 225, 227.
B. Modern, 225f.; bases its belief in body (q.v.) or external objects on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, 226; but by this system, 'instead of explaining the operation of external objects we utterly annihilate them and reduce ourselves to the most extravagant scepticism concerning them,' 228.
C. The opinion of true philosophers much nearer to that of the vulgar than is that of the false, 223; philosophers who 'abstract from the effects of custom and compare ideas' discover that there is no known connexion between objects, 223; false philosophers arrive at last by an illusion at the same indifference which the people attain by their stupidity, and true philosophers by their moderate scepticism, 224; all except philosophers suppose that those actions of the mind are the same which 'produce not a different sensation,' 417.
D. Philosophic fiction of 'state of nature,' 493.
