possible to show their universal obligatoriness and effect on action, 465-6 (cf. 496); property a moral not a natural relation, 491.
Religion—and philosophy, 250; 'errors in religion are dangerous. those in philosophy only ridiculous,' 272; a cause of the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty, tho' that of necessity is not only harmless buteven essential to it, 409 f.; a 'blamable method of reasoning' to condemn a doctrine because it is dangerous to religion, 499 (cf. 241, 271 f.); based on miracles. 474.
Repentance—and forgiveness require doctrine of necessity, 412.
Resemblance (v. Relation)—a source of association, 11; a source of philosophic relation, 14; a demonstrable relation, discovered by intuition, 69, 70, 413, 463: between an impression and an idesa enlivens the latter, 99, 110 (cf. 142 f., 163 f.); illustrated, from pictures and ceremonies, 100; not a source of belief because it does not compel the mind, 107; but assists belief, and want of it destroys belief, 113; used in all arguments from cause and effect, 142; in analogy, 142; produces a new impression in the mind, 165; independent of and antecedent to the operations of the understanding, 168: the most fertile source of error, 61; of our perceptions at different times=constancy, and makes us consider our resembling impressions as individually the same, as one single identical impression, 199: this belief the result of another resemblance, viz. between the act of mind in contemplating an identical object and in contemplating a succession of resembling objects, 202, since 'ideas which place the mind in the same or a similar disposition are very apt to be confounded, 203, 204 n, 253 f. (v. Identity, Error); we can never argue from existence of perceptions to their resemblance to objects, 217; an impression must resemble its idea, 232; depends on memory, 261, and produces notion of personal identity (q.v.), 253 f., 261; impressions associated only by resemblance, 283, 343; between cause and object of pride not sufficient to produce it, 304-5; a cause of sympathy, 318, 320; identity of impressions produces a stronger connexion than the most perfect resemblance, 341.
Resistance—right of, not based on origin of government in consent, 549; passive obedience an absurdity, 552; impossible for philosophy to establish any particular rules to tell when resistance is lawful, 562; more often lawful in mixed than absolute governments, 564.
Respect—and contempt, 389; a mixture of love and humility, 390.
Responsibility—requires doctrine of necessity, 411.
Revolution—the English, 563.
Riches—311; esteem for the rich, 357, arises chiefly from sympathy with the imagined satisfaction of the owner, 359-362 (cf. 616).
Right—animals incapable of relation of right, 326; implies an antecedent morality, 462 n, 491.
