Seton-Watson, later editor of the New Europe, and Tardieu and Berthelot, later right-hand men of Clemenceau, to convince the Entente that in the guilt for bringing on the war Austria-Hungary's share was not at all a modest one—a fact now amply confirmed by the official German and Austrian revelations in 1919.
It was under such circumstances that the journal, the New Europe (London), became the organ of a new policy—it helped much to revolutionize the war aims of the Entente. These were transformed from the preservation of Austria-Hungary (even though deprived of certain territories) to that of the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the founding of a new liberal European order.
To this day few publicists have been able to grasp the importance of this movement. The details, justly or unjustly, have obscured the big feature.
In this development Dr. Beneš played an important if not the decisive role, achieving lasting diplomatic fame in two events.
Through Colonel Štefaník’s friendship[1] with Berthelot of the French Foreign Office, Beneš negotiated the specific mention of the Czechoslovaks in the famous Allied Note of January 10, 1917, in which the Entente replied to President Wilson that, among other war-aims, they counted as one "the liberation of the Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, and Czechoslovaks, from foreign rule." This was the first great success in diplomacy for the Czechoslovaks. They had obtained international recognition.
Hardly had this victory been won than secret negotiations between France and Austria, begun in March, 1917, threatened to upset it. The Czechoslovaks were assisted in wining ultimate victory by several factors. They organized three armies which for their size rendered extremely valuable services to the cause of the Entente on more than one front. Moreover, the secret Austro-French negotiations, already mentioned, led to no result. They could not lead to a separate peace between the Entente and Austria alone.
- ↑ Conversation with Beneš.
