94. Also on January 4, when Co-Conspirator 2 acknowledged to the Defendant’s Senior Advisor that no court would support his proposal, the Senior Advisor told Co-Conspirator 2, “[Y]ou’re going to cause riots in the streets.” Co-Conspirator 2 responded that there had previously been points in the nation’s history where violence was necessary to protect the republic. After that conversation, the Senior Advisor notified the Defendant that Co-Conspirator 2 had conceded that his plan was “not going to work.”
95. On the morning of January 5, at the Defendant’s direction, the Vice President’s Chief of Staff and the Vice President’s Counsel met again with Co-Conspirator 2. Co-Conspirator 2 now advocated that the Vice President do what the Defendant had said he preferred the day before: unilaterally reject electors from the targeted states. During this meeting, Co-Conspirator 2 privately acknowledged to the Vice President’s Counsel that he hoped to prevent judicial review of his proposal because he understood that it would be unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court. The Vice President’s Counsel expressed to Co-Conspirator 2 that following through with the proposal would result in a “disastrous situation” where the election might “have to be decided in the streets.”
96. That same day, the Defendant encouraged supporters to travel to Washington on January 6, and he set the false expectation that the Vice President had the authority to and might use his ceremonial role at the certification proceeding to reverse the election outcome in the Defendant’s favor, including issuing the following Tweets:
a. At 11:06 a.m., “The Vice President has the power to reject fraudulently chosen electors.” This was within 40 minutes of the Defendant’s earlier reminder, “See you in D.C.”
b. At 5:05 p.m., “Washington is being inundated with people who don’t want to see an election victory stolen . . . . Our Country has had enough, they won’t take it anymore! We hear you (and love you) from the Oval Office.”
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