The court cites other cases of land sales by United States marshals in support of this. Moody's Heirs v. Moeller, 72 Tex. 635, in which the sale was at the United States court house just across the street from the county court house; Sinclair v. Stanley, 64 Tex. 72; Casseday v. Norris, 49 Tex. 613; Jenners v. Doe, 9 Ind. 461. Mr. Freeman, in his work on Executions, § 289, vol. 2, says of these cases that although a view that such sales were voidable only would be reasonable, the weight of authority sustains them.
With respect to goods and chattels, however, the sale at the place fixed by statute has not been regarded as so essential as compliance with the requirement that the officer selling them shall have the goods in view of the buyers. Freeman on Execution, § 290, vol. 2; and yet, the authorities are divided on the question whether a departure from this requirement renders the sale of personalty void. We do not feel called upon, however, to inquire and decide which is the better view, because we think that under § 916, in respect to sales of personalty, the federal court house was a proper place for holding the sale.
Section 914 requires that the proceedings in common-law cases in the federal court shall conform to those of state courts "as near as may be." Section 916 gives the judgment creditor remedies on common-law executions "similar" to those of the state court. These qualifying words recognize the necessity for some play in adapting the state procedure to the practice of the federal courts. Certain things must be changed. The officer issuing the writ of execution must be the United States clerk, the officer executing it must be the marshal, and not the sheriff, the name of the court must be different; and it is but a reasonable and obvious consequence that the place of the proceedings generally shall be at the federal
