The rule of court need not be in writing, but may exist in the general practice of the court. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 ; Logan v. Goodwin, 104 Fed. 409; Citizens Bank v. Farwell, 56 Fed. 570.
The form of the marshal's return shows that he was acting under the Mississippi Code of 1892, and is convincing evidence that it was the custom of the court to use the statute in force at the time the officer acted.
The decisions of the state courts construing their own statutes are binding upon the federal court even though it might be said that such state statutes when adopted by the federal courts become pro hoc federal statutes.
The writs and levy and sale thereunder are all void and of no effect and subject to collateral attack.
At common law, stock in a corporation could not be levied upon, and it is only by statutory authority that this can now be done; the statute must be literally and strictly followed. 17 Cyc 944, 945; Cook, Corporations, vol. 2, 6th ed., § 480; Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 ; Miss. Code, 1892, § 3467.
There is a sharp difference between the real interests of a person in a corporation and the stock certificate or indicium of ownership of the share or interest. Section 3467, Code 1892, especially draws this distinction, and does not provide for the sale of the stock certificate. The distinction is plainly drawn in the Jellenik Case, supra. See Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N.Y. 193.
The Code of 1871, § 849, also makes this distinction, for it requires that demand be made upon the company, in which the debtor is supposed to own a share or interest, for the amount and value of said share or interest belonging to the debtor, which provision precludes the idea that the stock certificate itself could be sold as such.
A sale made by the marshal of the United States of personal property or real estate in front of the federal
