107 STAT. 1574 PUBLIC LAW 103-160—NOV. 30, 1993 (c) FISCAL YEAR 1994 LIMITATION.— Amounts appropriated under section 103 for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force (or otherwise made available for procurement of aircraft for the Air Force for fiscal year 1994) may not be obligated for procurement of C-17 aircraft (other than for advanced procurement) until— (1) each limitation and requirement set forth in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (f) of section 134 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2335) has been satisfied; and Reports. (2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report on the C-17 acquisition program that contains— (A) the results of the special Defense Acquisition Board review of the program, to include specific changes to requirements recommended by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC); (B) a discussion of the corrective actions to be taken by the Air Force with regard to such program; (C) a proposed resolution of outstanding contractor claims and any requested legislation relating to those claims; (D) a discussion of the corrective actions to be taken by the contractor with regard to such program; and (E) the findings and recommendations of the special Defense Science Board group resulting from the investigation of the program by that group. Reports. (d) FISCAL YEAR 1995 LIMITATION.— The Secretary of Defense may not obligate any funds that may be appropriated for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1995 that are made available for the C-ll aircraft program (other than funds made available for advanced procurement) until the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a report containing a review (based on an analysis by a federally funded research and development center) of the airlift requirements of the Armed Forces. The review shall reflect consideration of each of the following: (1) The changes in total airlift recjuirements of the Armed Forces resulting from the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union that eliminate any mcg'or trans-Atlantic airlift requirement for Europe. (2) The change in airlift requirements of the Armed Forces from requirements for airlift of large quantities of outsize cargo for renforcement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces to requirements for airlift in connection with such lesser regional contingencies and humanitarian operations as Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Restore Hope. (3) The potential contribution that planned strategic sealift improvements can make toward— (A) reducing the total demand for airlift; and (B) changing the type of cargo that airlift aircraft must carry. (4) The declining demand for the conduct of airlift operations in austere airfield environments. (5) The trade-off between purchasing the type of additional capability that the C-17 aircraft can provide and purchasing and using additional support equipment that would increase the cargo airlift capacity of alternative cargo aircraft.
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