PUBLIC LAW 108–105—NOV. 5, 2003
117 STAT. 1203
as it did. There plainly was such a basis to support section 4(e) in the application in question in this case.’’. Id. at 653. (10) Katzenbach’s highly deferential review of Congress’ factual conclusions was relied upon by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia when it upheld the ‘‘bail-out’’ provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973c), stating that ‘‘congressional fact finding, to which we are inclined to pay great deference, strengthens the inference that, in those jurisdictions covered by the Act, state actions discriminatory in effect are discriminatory in purpose’’. City of Rome, Georgia v. U.S., 472 F. Supp. 221 (D.D.C. 1979) aff’d City of Rome, Georgia v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156 (1980). (11) The Court continued its practice of deferring to congressional factual findings in reviewing the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I) and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II). At issue in the Turner cases was Congress’ legislative finding that, absent mandatory carriage rules, the continued viability of local broadcast television would be ‘‘seriously jeopardized’’. The Turner I Court recognized that as an institution, ‘‘Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to ‘amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data’ bearing upon an issue as complex and dynamic as that presented here’’, 512 U.S. at 665–66. Although the Court recognized that ‘‘the deference afforded to legislative findings does ‘not foreclose our independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law,’ ’’ its ‘‘obligation to exercise independent judgment when First Amendment rights are implicated is not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace Congress’ factual predictions with our own. Rather, it is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.’’. Id. at 666. (12) Three years later in Turner II, the Court upheld the ‘‘must-carry’’ provisions based upon Congress’ findings, stating the Court’s ‘‘sole obligation is ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.’ ’’ 520 U.S. at 195. Citing its ruling in Turner I, the Court reiterated that ‘‘[w]e owe Congress’ findings deference in part because the institution ‘is far better equipped than the judiciary to ‘‘amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data’’ bearing upon’ legislative questions,’’ id. at 195, and added that it ‘‘owe[d] Congress’ findings an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative power.’’. Id. at 196. (13) There exists substantial record evidence upon which Congress has reached its conclusion that a ban on partialbirth abortion is not required to contain a ‘‘health’’ exception, because the facts indicate that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman, poses serious risks to a woman’s health, and lies outside the standard of medical care. Congress was informed by extensive hearings held during the 104th, 105th, 107th, and 108th Congresses and passed a ban on partial-birth abortion in the 104th, 105th,
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