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tion, «Who is friend and who is foe?» In other words, the Soviet was forced to explain the sense of the Revolution. The first answer was a fermentation within the Soviets, reflecting the people's questioning mind, and this fermentation ended in the cleavage of the Soviet forces. Materially the split manifested itself in the first «coalition government», headed by Kerensky.
This second question was made more vital, insistent, by the Kornilov attempt. It grew more and more obvious to the people that the «coalition government» was merely am expression of the old order under a new name. In response to the growing popular unrest, the rift in the Soviet deepened; whatever elements irresistibly tended to the right were pushed out by popular pressure upon the left and the result was the July insurrection. The Soviet thus emphasized the popular interpretation of the sense of the Revolution: It is not merely a political revolution, but an economico-social revolution, and whoever thwarts its course is the people's enemy.
But if indeed this is the historical sense of the Revolution, then arises a third question: By whom and How shall the issues of the Revolution be promoted and realized in life? Of course by the People, and by the power which expresses the People by the Soviets. Such was the categorical answer given by the October uprising, which forever put an end to the policy of coalition and allian-
