Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power,” the covenants would be unenforceable. Id., at 19. Here, there is more. S. B. 8’s formidable chilling effect, even before suit, would be nonexistent if not for the state-court officials who docket S. B. 8 cases with lopsided procedures and limited defenses. Because these state actors are necessary components of that chilling effect and play a clear role in the enforcement of S. B. 8, they are proper defendants.
These longstanding precedents establish how, and why, the Court should authorize relief against these officials as well. The Court instead hides behind a wooden reading of Young, stitching out-of-context quotations into a cover for its failure to act decisively. The Court relies on dicta in Young stating that “the right to enjoin an individual … does not include the power to restrain a court from acting in any case brought before it” and that “an injunction against a state court would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.” 209 U. S., at 163. Modern cases, however, have recognized that suit may be proper even against state-court judges, including to enjoin state-court proceedings. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 243 (1972); see also Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522, 525 (1984). The Court responds that these cases did not expressly address sovereign immunity or involve court clerks. Ante, at 8–9. If language in Young posed an absolute bar to injunctive relief against state-court proceedings and officials, however, these decisions would have been purely advisory.
Moreover, the Court has emphasized that “the principles undergirding the Ex parte Young doctrine” may “support its application” to new circumstances, “novelty notwithstanding.” Stewart, 563 U. S., at 261. No party has identified any prior circumstance in which a State has delegated an enforcement function to the populace, disclaimed official enforcement authority, and skewed state-court procedures
