you can say that Leo followed the legates of Agatho; he preferred to let sleeping dogs lie. But we are not bound, says Bellarmine, to follow Leo, We may follow Agatho. For you see that whether Honorius erred is, after all, a question of fact: and in questions of fact even Popes may differ.
This theory appeared congenial to some in the sixteenth century. But then it received an unexpected application, being utilised by the Jansenists to justify their treatment of papal decisions with respectful incredulity. Whether certain doctrines were or were not contained within the pages of Jansenius's great book was not a question of faith but of fact. Consequently it was enough to adopt towards any papal assertions on the subject an attitude of external deference while maintaining unchanged one's inward convictions.
This application opened the eyes of papal theologians to the dangerous character of the theory. It became, says Turmel,[1] almost invariably abandoned among defenders of Papal Infallibility.
But, after all. was the Universal Council mistaken in the intepretation it placed upon the theological contents of Honorius's letter? Upon this question Roman writers have been sharply divided. This was the defence set up for him by his immediate successor, but obviously not accepted by the long line of his successors who condemned him; nor by the Ecumenical Council which pronounced its judgment upon him; nor by the two other Ecumenical Councils which followed.
Honorius's successor, Agatho, indeed asserted that his See had never deflected from the way of truth, and that the Roman Pontiffs had obeyed the injunction laid upon Peter to strengthen his brethren. This language
- ↑ Turmel, Hist. Théol. Positive, p. 32.
