The argument that these Councils possessed exceptional power in an exceptional time was, according to Bossuet,[1] refuted by the Councils themselves. No doubt the Assembly of Constance declared its mission to be the termination of the Schism, and the union and reformation of the Church in its head and members—a temporary work. But it also affirmed that it was the duty of all men of whatever rank and condition, even papal, to submit to the authority not only of this Council, but also of every other General Council lawfully assembled. Thus the supremacy of the Council is asserted to be not a mere temporary expedient to solve exceptional difficulties, but an inherent characteristic of the Universal Church in this representative form of self-expression.
Bellarmine's second main argument against the Council of Constance was that Pope Martin V. never confirmed its decrees. This involved two points: a speculative theory of the nature of papal confirmation; and also a question of fact. Bossuet replied to the speculative theory that confirmation of the acts of a Council did not imply what Bellarmine supposed; for Popes have often confirmed the acts and decrees of their predecessors, which certainly on Ultramontane principles could not be interpreted as imparting to them a validity not possessed before. Confirmation merely meant acceptance, assent. Beyond it lay the further enquiry: What is the inherent value of a Universal Council's decree apart from papal acceptance? Bossuet would answer that question one way, Bellarmine another. And in so doing each would have his followers; for each represented schools of thought within the Roman Communion.
Then as to the question of fact:
- ↑ Works, t. xxi. p. 551.
