III.
THE ATTACK BY STRATEGEM.
Son the master said:—
Now by the laws of war, better than defeating a country by fire and the sword, is to take it without strife.
Better to capture the enemy’s army,[1] intact, than to overcome it after fierce resistance.
Better to capture the "Ryo," the "Sotsu," or the "Go," untouched, than to engage them first.
To fight and conquer one hundred times is excellent; but better still, and the supreme art, is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
Wherefore, the most skilful warrior outwits the enemy by superior strategem; the next in merit isolates the enemy from other states; next to him is he who engages the enemy’s forces; while to besiege the enemy’s citadel is the worst expedient.
A siege should not be undertaken if it can possibly be avoided. For, before a siege can be commenced, three months are required for the construction of stages, battering rams, and the preparation of siege engines; then a further three months are required in front of the citadel, in order to make the “kyoin (距闉)."[2] Wherefore, the general angered, his patience exhausted, orders his men to the assault before the time is ripe. Thus one third of them are killed to no purpose, because the attack was ill-timed.
Therefore the master of war causes the enemy’s forces to yield, but without fighting; he takes possession of his fortress, but without besieging it; he overthrows his government, but without lengthy fighting; and with his army intact takes the enemy’s kingdom. Without tarnishing his weapons he gains the complete advantage.
This is the assault by strategem.
By the rules of war, if ten times as strong as the enemy, we can crush him; with five times his strength we may attack him on all sides; with double his numbers, attack from two sides. If equal in strength we must exert ourselves to the utmost, and fight; if inferior in numbers, skilfully evade him; if altogether inferior, offer no chance of battle. A determined stand by inferior numbers is admirable; but they can but become captives.
The warrior is the country’s support. If the warrior is loyal and wholehearted in his endeavours, the country is of necessity strong; if he is divided in his allegiance, then is the country weak.
Now the army is ever fearful that its prince and civil counsellors may err in these three ways, namely:—
Ignorant that the army in the field is unable to advance, to order it to go forward; or, ignorant that the army cannot retreat, order it to retire.
This is to tie the army as with a string.
Ignorant of the management of armies, to forget their complexity, and dictate inflexible rules for their guidance,
This is to perplex the soldiers.
Ignorant of the situation of the army, to interfere in its dispositions.
This is to fill the soldiers with distrust.
If the army be perplexed and distrustful, then do neighbouring princes conspire and the army is confounded.
This is to offer victory to the enemy.
Knowledge of these five matters bring victory:—
He conquers who knows when to fight, and when not to fight; who understands the employment of large and small numbers; whose Government and people are of one mind and of one desire; who, ever prepared, chooses the enemy’s unguarded moment for his attack; who, possessing ability, is not interfered with by his prince.
Whosoever understands these five matters, is on the path to victory. It has been said that he who knows both sides has nothing to fear in 100 fights; he who is ignorant of the enemy, and fixes his eyes only on his own side, conquers, and the next time is defeated; he, who not only is ignorant of the enemy, but also of his own country’s requirements and resources, is invariably defeated.
- ↑ The Chinese army (軍) consisted of 12,500, the "Ryo" (旅) of 500, "Sotsu" (卒) of 50, and the "Go" (伍) of 5 men.
- ↑ The "Kyoin" was a large tower or work constructed to give command over the interior of the enemy's fortress.
High poles were also erected, from the top of which, archers, each encased in an arrow proof box and raised by a rope and pulley, shot at the besieged.