R. I believe that I have now fully grasped your opinion concerning the Science of Knowledge, and that, historically, I know quite well what you mean. Moreover, when I accept the mere similarity of your science with the demonstration of a mechanical work of art, I can think the possibility of it quite well, and in a general way. But as soon as I reflect on the necessary distinction of both, and the characteristic differences of their several objects, a science like the one you describe appears to me to be utterly impossible.
The conception of the systematic connection of the manifold in a work of art with the view to produce a prearranged result has been in the mind of the artist long before the work of art existed; which work has indeed been produced only after this conception and according to it. We others do nothing but reconstruct that conception of the artist, or reinvent his work of art. Hence, it is here very significant to say, that there is a systematic connection in the manifold. This systematic connection is in the conception of the artist, and of all those who think as artists.
But tell me, does your assertion of a systematic connection in the manifold of consciousness signify likewise, that this consciousness has been prepared by some artist according to the conception of such a connection, and that the teacher of the Science of Knowledge only reinvents this conception? Where is this artist? And how and in what manner has he produced consciousness?
A. Supposing it is not to signify this, and that the comparison is not to be extended so far? Supposing that ambiguous proposition is to signify no more than the following: we may view—amongst other manners of viewing—the manifold of consciousness as systematically connected, or there are two ways of viewing the determinations of consciousness: one immediate way, by immediately surrendering ourselves to them, and thus finding them as they present themselves; and another way, through mediation, or by systematically deducing them as they must necessarily present themselves in consequence of this systematic connection? In which case the latter view could be realized only after actual consciousness had already existence, and on no account in advance of the existence of consciousness. Nor could the latter view exist for any but such as with arbitrary freedom might take hold of it. Hence, the teacher of the Science of Knowledge, and he alone, would be the artist of consciousness, if there were any artist in this case. He would be, as it were, the reinventor of consciousness without there being any first and original inventor and any prior conception of consciousness, according to which he could have produced his invention.
R. If I understand you correctly, I am to seize it in the following manner: there is a consciousness as the fundamental determination of my life, as sure as I am myself. This consciousness appears to be a connecting manifold. What sort of a consciousness it may be, I know only by entertaining it, and on this stand-point I cannot properly ask any further questions. At the same time, however, it is likewise possible that this manifold can be systematically deduced as necessarily precisely as it is, if consciousness is to be at all. This view, this deduction, and the systematic connection which results in the deduction, exist only for him who grasps this view, and, absolutely for no one else; and other questions are not asked at all on this stand-point.
A. You express it correctly.
R. Well, let it be; although here again I rather seize your opinion historically than comprehend it, and although I have still many questions to ask.
But to proceed; the artist, who traces out this conception of a mechanical work of art, reduces, in this conception, the manifold to the unity of a result. The work of art is to serve this or that purpose; and the manifold and the way in which it works together involve, in the conception of the artist, the conditions under which alone the work of art can serve this purpose; and this unity exists in advance of the work of art and even prior to the conception of the manifold. The latter conception arises only through that of the unity, and exists only for its sake, being determined through it. Precisely such a manifold is needed, because precisely such a purpose is to be achieved.
Such a conception of the unity appears, therefore, to me as inseparable from that of a systematic connection. Hence, the teacher of the Science of Knowledge probably possesses the conception of such a unity, of such a purpose and result of all consciousness, to which he reduces the manifold as conditions of the same.
A. Undoubtedly.
R. This unity he cannot first discover in the system, but must possess it before he commences his systematic deduction, precisely as the artist must first know what purpose his work of art is to serve before he can hunt up the means wherewith to attain it.
A. Unquestionably; the teacher of the Science of Knowledge must possess the conception of the unity in advance of the system.
R. The artist arbitrarily thinks this purpose, and produces it through his thinking, since the existence of the work of art, as well as its form, depends altogether upon the artist. But since the teacher of the Science of Knowledge does on no account produce consciousness, (it existing independently of him and existing thus precisely as it is, even by your own confession,) it is not well possible, that the artist can produce this unity through free thinking, since the manifold, which exists actually, and without the co-operation of the philosopher, must likewise relate itself to that unity, independently of the philosopher. Neither can he, as has already been said, find that unity in his systematic deduction, for the unity is presupposed as condition of the possibility of the deduction. Nor can he find the unity through perceptions in actual consciousness, for only the manifold, and not the unity, occurs in actual consciousness. How, then, and in what manner is he to arrive at this unity?
A. It suffices, if you assume that he arrived at it through some happy chance. He guesses this unity. This, of course, gives him only an assumption, and he must take the risk of building his system upon it entirely on the assumption that he has guessed correctly.
If the investigation shows, finally, that all the manifold of consciousness can really be reduced to that assumption, as to its unity, but only then, has he proved by this very reduction that his presupposition was correct. The presupposition has been proved by the fact, by the establishment of the system.
R. Well, grant even this. But again: The artist knows in advance of his conception the necessary and unchangeable laws of his mechanism, those laws, upon which he calculated in his combination of the manifold for the achievement of a certain result. He knows, likewise, the materials and their qualities, out of which he proposes to form the manifold, and upon the unchangeableness whereof he also bases his calculation in his conception. Now, if the comparison is to hold good, the philosopher must also have, in advance of his deduction, a knowledge of unchangeable laws, according to which the manifold of consciousness produces the presupposed unit-result, and moreover—unless I am very much deceived—also, a knowledge of a material component of consciousness, which is already determined by these laws.
Let me, for the present, assume merely the first. But how does the philosopher obtain the knowledge of these laws? Does he, perchance, hit upon them by a lucky guess, until they prove themselves correct by the fact that the manifold of consciousness can be explained according to them from the presupposed chief result; similarly as the fact, that precisely this result is the ultimate result of these laws, proves the result to be correct?
A. You make fun of the Science of Knowledge, but with rather more profundity than is usual. No; the Science of Knowledge does not proceed in this manner, for that were to proceed in a most vicious and self-evident circle.
I am very content to keep to the comparison once adopted. Let the teacher of the Science of Knowledge be the artist who builds up the art-work of consciousness, which however exists already, as he cheerfully admits; which he, therefore, only re-invents, and yet invents altogether, since he never looks at the existing artwork during the operation.
But the great distinction is this: the artist who produces a mechanical work operates upon dead matter, which he puts in motion, while the philosopher operates upon a living something, which moves itself. He does not so much generate consciousness as that he rather causes consciousness to generate itself under his observation. Now, if consciousness operates according to laws, it doubtless will generate itself according to these laws, and the observing philosopher will thus discover these laws at the same time; although his final object was not to obtain a knowledge of these laws, but of their total result, consciousness.
R. What! A consciousness, which generates itself, and which yet is not the actual consciousness of which we all have possession?
A. Of course: for actual consciousness does not systematically generate itself, its manifold being connected by mere chance. That consciousness which generates itself under the observation of the philosopher is merely an image of actual consciousness.
R. An image which generates itself? I utterly cease to understand you, and I am sure I shall not understand you until you have given me a short sketch of your procedure.
A. Very well. The presupposition, from which we start, is this: that the final and highest result of consciousness, or that to which all its manifold is related as the condition to the conditioned, or as the wheels, springs, and chains in the watch are related to the hand, is nothing else than clear and complete self-consciousness, as you and I and all of us are conscious of ourselves. I say, you and I and all of us, and thereby exclude, in conformity with a previous remark, all that is purely individual, which cannot enter our system at all according to our presupposition. That, which you ascribe to your self alone, and not to me, or I only to me and not to you, remains excluded; except that you do so ascribe something exclusively to your self and I to my self and each one to his Self.
Now, this result—that complete self-consciousness is the highest and final result of all consciousness—is, as we have said, a mere presupposition, which awaits its confirmation from the system. From this self-consciousness, in its fundamental determination, the deduction begins.
R. In its fundamental determination? What does that mean?
A. In regard to that, which in it is not at all determined by any other consciousness, and which can, therefore, not be found in the deduction, but from which, on the contrary, the deduction must proceed. The presupposition is, that the manifold of consciousness contains the conditions of complete self-consciousness. Nevertheless, there may be somewhat in this self-consciousness which is not conditioned by anything else. This somewhat is to be established, and from it the deduction proceeds.
R. But how do you find it?
A. Likewise, only by a happy hit, but as somewhat, which when once found, needs and requires no further proof, but is immediately self-evident.
R. Abstaining for the present from all inquiry as to this immediate self-evidence itself, tell me, what is it in this somewhat which is thus immediately self-evident?
A. That it is the absolutely unconditioned and the characteristic of self-consciousness.
R. I shall not be able to understand you, until you tell me what this unconditioned and characteristic of self-consciousness is, which is thus self-evident.
A. It is the Ego-hood, the subject-objectivity, and nothing else whatsoever, the positing of the subjective and of its objective, of consciousness and of the object of consciousness as one and the same, and as absolutely nothing but this its identity.
R. I know from various sources, that people generally consider you very incomprehensible, and, moreover, very ridiculous in your views on this first point, which you must, nevertheless, hold to be altogether clear and comprehensible, since all your reasoning starts from it. Be good enough, therefore, to furnish me some means by which I can make it clearer to those others, in case they should ask me about it; unless, indeed, such an explanation belongs rather to the Science of Knowledge proper, and not to a mere statement of its nature.
A. It certainly belongs to this statement, for it is the previously mentioned common point of the Science of Knowledge and of actual consciousness, from which the former rises above the latter. Whosoever is to receive a perfectly clear conception of this science must know the point from which it starts, and this conception is the very thing which our statement proposes to create.
But what people say about not having understood us on that point belongs to the absolutely incomprehensible; for every child, that has but ceased to speak of itself in the third person and calls itself "I," has already realized that point, and can, therefore, understand us.
I shall have to repeat what I have said already several times. Think something: for instance, the book you hold in your hand. You can doubtless become conscious of the book as the object of your thought, and of yourself as the thinking. Do you appear to yourself as being one and the same with the book, or as another?
R. Doubtless, as another, I shall never mistake myself for the book.
A. Is it necessary, in order that you do not mistake yourself—the thinking, for the thought—that the thought should be a book, and this particular book?
R. By no means. I distinguish my self from every object.
A. Hence, in the thinking of this book you can abstract from all that which makes the present object of your thinking a book, and this particular book; and you can reflect solely upon the fact, that in this thinking you distinguish yourself—the thinking—from the thought.
R. Undoubtedly; and in replying to your question, whether I distinguish my self from the book, I reflected only on that fact.
A. Hence, you distinguish every object from yourself as the thinking, and no object exists for you except through and by means of this distinction.
R. Precisely.
A. Now, think your self. You doubtless can become conscious in this case, also, of a thinking and a thought. Do both continue separate in this thinking of your self, and form a duality?
R. No; for in thinking myself, I am the thinking, for otherwise I should not think; and at that same time, I am the thought, for, otherwise, I should not think myself, but some other object, as for instance, this book.
A. Well, you have now certainly thought yourself, i.e., you, this particular individual, Caius, Sempronius, or whatever may be your name. But you, doubtless, can abstract also from these particular determinations of your personality, precisely as you were able to abstract from the particular determinations of this book; and can reflect only upon the uniting of the thinking and the thought, as, in the other case, you reflected upon the dirempting of both. Nay, you actually did so when you told me that in the thinking of your self, the thinking and the thought unite for you. It is, therefore, in this uniting of the thinking and the thought, which in the thinking of an object always dirempts, that you discover the Ego, and hence, the essential characteristic of the Ego,—of that much abused, pure Ego, concerning which our modern philosophers have for years puzzled their brains, and do still assert that it is a psychological—write psychological—deception, and an infinitely laughable affair altogether.
R. Perhaps they thought that such a pure Ego, such a reuniting, and, in itself returning thing was concealed somewhere in their souls, like a blade in a knife, and kept looking for it, but could not find the blade; whereupon they concluded that those who pretended to have seen it had deceived themselves.
A. Very probably. But how did you discover this uniting?
R. In thinking myself.
A. Do other people also think themselves?
R. Doubtless, unless they speak without thinking, for they all speak of themselves.
A. In thus thinking themselves, do they proceed in the same manner in which you proceed?
R. I believe so.
A. Can they observe this their procedure, just as you have observed yours?
R. I do not doubt it.
A. Hence, if they do it in thus thinking themselves, they will doubtless also find that uniting of the thinking and the thought; but unless they do it, they will not find it. Such is our statement. We do not speak of the finding of something which lies ready made before them; but of the finding of a somewhat which is first to be produced by free thinking. The Science of Knowledge is not psychology; and psychology itself is nothing. But at present I wish you to give me a decided answer as to whether you seriously hold, that I and all other rational beings, in thinking our Self, do proceed precisely as you do, i.e. that in this thinking of our Self we hold the thinking and the thought to be one?
R. I not only assume this, but I assert it to be absolutely certain, and I hold an exception to be utterly impossible. The thought of an I (Ego) does not occur except through such proceeding, and this proceeding is itself the thought I. Hence everyone who thinks himself must proceed in that same manner.
A. But I beseech you, dear reader, do you then think into my soul and into the soul of all rational beings; or, assuming that you can do so, have you then actually surveyed and thought into the soul of all rational beings, and been thus authorized to assert something of their souls?
R. By no means; and yet I cannot withdraw what I have asserted. Nay, in becoming thoroughly conscious of my self I find that I can assert still more; that I can assert further, that each of all other rational beings must assert the same out of his own consciousness in relation to all the others.
A. How do you get at these assertions?
R. If I become very conscious of my self, I discover that my procedure in thus thinking my self is immediately accompanied by the irresistible and inflexible conviction, that neither I nor any other rational being can ever proceed otherwise.
A. Hence, through this procedure you prescribe a law for yourself, and for all rational beings; and thus you have at the same time an illustration of the immediate evidence which I mentioned before. But now let us get back to our argument. This fundamental and characteristic determination of self-consciousness, the philosopher discovers outside and independent of his science. It cannot be proved in the science itself, nor, indeed, can it be proved as a proposition in any manner. It is immediately self-evident. Nor can it be proved as fundamental proposition of the Science of Knowledge in any other way than by the fact itself, i.e. by showing that the required deduction is actually possible from it. The manner of proceeding in this deduction is as follows: In the thinking of my self, says the teacher of the Science of Knowledge, I proceed as has just now been stated. Now let us see whether another procedure may not connect with that first one, thus giving us a new fundamental characteristic of consciousness, and a third procedure, perhaps, with that second, &c, &c, and let us continue this until we have arrived at the completely determined self-consciousness, and have thus obtained a systematic deduction of the whole?
R. I again do not understand you. You ask me whether another procedure—doubtless another determination of consciousness—may not connect with the first one? But how can it connect, and with what? I, at least, in that thinking of my self am conscious of nothing else but the identity of the thinking and the thought.
A. Nevertheless you abstracted, at my request, and according to your own observation, from many other things, which you thought at the same time you were thinking your self. This was very proper; and to take this Other up again in the same confusion in which it occurred in your consciousness, would not advance the Science of Knowledge. However that may be; even in that very observation in which you seized the thinking of your self, there occurs something else, and you will find it as soon as you look a little closer at it. For instance: does not this thinking of your self appear to you as a transition from another condition to this particular condition?
R. It really does so appear to me.
A. Do you believe that it must appear so to every other person who looks at it closely?
R. I certainly do believe it when I make myself clearly conscious of it; and I even assert that it must so appear to all others. There is the same immediate evidence here which we discovered before.
A. In precisely the same manner does this second appearance, if you but examine it closely, connect with another one, and that one, under the same condition, with a third one, and in this manner the Science of Knowledge advances step by step, until all the manifold of consciousness has been exhausted, and terminated in the completely deduced determined self-consciousness.
Hence, in a certain respect, it is the teacher of the Science of Knowledge himself who generates his system of consciousness, which system, nevertheless, in another respect, generates itself. The teacher merely furnishes the occasion and condition of that self-generation. But while he is thinking and construing; what he intended to think and construe, something else, which he did not intend to produce, joins it with absolute necessity, and accompanied by the evident conviction, that it must appear in the same manner to all rational beings.
It is only the origin and first starting point of his system which the teacher of the Science of Knowledge generates with absolute freedom. From this starting point he is led, but not driven, onward. Each new link, which arises in his construction of the previous link, he must again construe with full freedom, whereupon a new link will again arise to connect with it, and with this new link he proceeds in the same manner. Thus his system is gradually built up. Here, therefore, in this connecting of one manifold with another, those laws of consciousness which you were inquiring about, manifest themselves. His final object is the apprehending, not of these manifolds, but merely of their result.
R. I remember having heard that people say: Your system is correct and logical enough if your fundamental principle is once admitted. How is this?
A. Unless the significance of the whole system, as well as of its fundamental principle, is utterly misapprehended and taken in a sense in which it is incorrect, and can therefore never be proved; in other words, unless that system and its fundamental principle are viewed psychologically, the demand for the proof of the fundamental principle can mean only the following:
Firstly, opponents may demand a proof of our right not to philosophize in the manner in which they do, and to philosophize in the manner in which we philosophize. This demand is very properly rejected, from the natural reason, that every one has the undisputed right to carry on whatever science he chooses. Let them consider, if they so please, our Science of Knowledge as some new, particular, to them unknown, science, just as we are very willing to consider their philosophies to be whatsoever they assert them to be. It is only when we say that their philosophies are nothing at all, as we really hold, and shall tell them at the proper place, that they may properly require proof from us. But this proof is completely and decisively established only in our whole Science of Knowledge, and hence they will have to study that science after all.
Secondly, they may demand that the fundamental principle of that Science shall be proved as such fundamental principle of the system in advance of the system itself, which demand is absurd.
Finally, they may require us to demonstrate the truth of the content of that proposition through an analysis of the conceptions which it involves. But this would show that they have no conception of, or capacity for, the Science of Knowledge, which is never based upon conceptions, but always upon the contemplation of immediate evidence. Hence, in this case, we could only turn our back on them, unwilling to waste time upon them any further.
R. But I fear very much that the latter is the very point which is obnoxious to them. If every one can appeal to his contemplations and require others to entertain them, without properly establishing his proof by conceptions, why he may assert whatever he chooses. Every stupidity will remain unpunished, and a door will be opened to all sorts of imaginary theories. This is what they will say, I fear.
A. Nobody can prevent them from saying it; let all, moreover, who are like them believe them. But you, my readers, who are unprejudiced, and to whom—although you are resolved not to enter upon the study of philosophy itself, and not to elevate yourself to the contemplation peculiar to this science—I am to furnish a conception of philosophy: to you I can describe the nature and possibility of contemplation from other easier examples.
You assume, I suppose, that a rectilinear triangle is completely determined by two sides and the included angle, or by one side and the two adjoining angles; i.e. that if these are given, precisely such lines must be added as will constitute a triangle?
R. I do assume it.
A. Do you not fear that a case may occur when such will not be the case?
R. I have no such fear.
A. Do you not fear, then, that some other rational being, understanding your words, may, nevertheless, deny this assertion?
R. I do not fear that either.
A. Have you then tested that proposition in all possible cases of triangles, or have you asked all possible rational beings whether they assent to it?
R. How could I?
A. Then tell me: how do you get at that conviction which you assume to be valid for you in all possible cases without any exception, and, moreover, for all possible rational beings without any exception?
R. I will take the first instance, wherein we presupposed two sides and the included angle. If I am clearly conscious of myself, I get at it in this manner: I draw in my imagination some particular angle with two sides, and close the opening between the lines by a straight line. I discover that absolutely only one straight line can close this opening; that this line rests on either side in a certain inclination towards the two given sides, thus forming two angles; and that it can touch them absolutely in no other inclination.
A. But your arbitrarily drawn angle was surely a determined angle, of so and so many degrees. Or did you draw a general angle?
R. How could I? I can only describe determined angles, though I may neither know nor intend their size. The mere description makes the angle determined for me.
A. In like manner the presupposed sides were determined, were of a certain length. Hence, granting you a number of other objections, you might certainly say in this particular case: "under the presupposition of this determined angle and of these determined sides, the triangle can be closed only by the one straight line which I draw, and only by the one possible pair of angles which arise in my construction." For you must confess that no more than this is contained in your internal perception, which evidently proceeds from determined presuppositions. You may certainly try the same experiment with other triangles, and may be able to make the same assertions concerning them wherever actual perception shall warrant you in doing so; but you never can cover with your present assertion all these cases which you have not yet tested; least of all can you extend it so boldly and recklessly to the infinity of cases which you cannot possibly exhaust by actual experiment.
Had you not better, therefore, correct your expression, and restrict your assertion to those cases which you have experimented upon?
R. If I observe myself correctly, and look clearly into my consciousness, I shall not do so on any account. I cannot consent to limit the universal validity of my assertion.
A. Perhaps you take the many cases in which you have found your assertion to be correct, and extend them to universality, judging by analogy, habit, association of ideas, or whatever you choose to call it, that it will always prove valid?
R. I do not believe it. A single experiment is sufficient, and is as efficient as a thousand to impel my universal assertion.
A. Seriously, I also do not believe it; and that talking of arbitrarily raising the occurrence of a great number of cases to universality appears to me to be the utterance of absolute unreason.
But now, dear reader, permit me to be somewhat intrusive, for I shall not allow you to escape until you have given me a clear account of the manner in which your procedure in the construction of a triangle can account for the universal validity of your assertion, which you are not willing to abandon.
R. I evidently abstract in the universality of my assertion from the determinateness of the angle and of the two sides which I presupposed and closed by the third side. That I did so abstract is simply factical, and appears from the mere analysis of my assertion.
Hence, I also must have abstracted in my construction of the triangle, and in my observation of that construction, upon which observation my assertion based itself, from that its determinateness; only I did not become very clearly conscious of having done so, for, if I had become so conscious, the conclusion would surely have indicated what was contained in the premise. But when I abstract from all determinateness of the angles and of their sides, no angles and sides of any kind remain as given objects, and hence nothing remains as object of my observation, or—if you denominate the observation of a given and actual exclusively perception, as I believe you do—no perception of any kind remains. But since there must remain an observation, and something for that observation, as otherwise I could not make any assertion at all, this remainder can be nothing else than my mere drawing of lines and angles. Hence it must be this which I really observed; and this presupposition agrees very well with what I am actually and clearly conscious of in that proceeding. "When I began to describe my angle I did not at all intend to describe an angle of so and so many degrees, but merely to describe an angle in general, and sides in general. It was not through my intention that the angle and the sides became determined, but through necessity. When I came to the actual description, they certainly became determined in precisely that manner; but God only knows why they happened to become determined precisely as they did.
Now, this consciousness of my drawing of lines, which lies beyond all perception, is doubtless what you call contemplation.
A. Precisely.
R. Then, in order to discover the ground of my universal assertion, it is necessary that this contemplation of my construction of a triangle should be immediately connected with the absolute conviction, that I can never construe a triangle differently. If this were so, then I should in that contemplation take hold of and embrace, at the same time, and with one glance, my whole faculty of construction, and this by means of an immediate consciousness, not of this determined constructing, but absolutely of all my constructing in general, as such. Hence the proposition: these "three parts of the triangle determine its other three parts," would signify simply, my constructing of the former three parts determines my construction of the other three parts; and hence the universality, which I posited, would not arise from a gathering up of the manifold into a unity but rather from the deduction of the infinite manifold out of the unity, which I seize at one glance.
A. But you assert this proposition in its universality to be, moreover, universal for all rational beings?
R. Certainly; and I can just as little abandon this claim to universal validity for all, as I could abandon the universal validity of all. In order to ground it, I must assume that in this immediate contemplation of my procedure, I contemplated this my procedure not only as that of this particular person (myself) but as the procedure of a rational being in general, with the immediate conviction of its absolute certainty. That contemplation would thus be the immediate self-comprehension on the part of reason of its manner of acting, comprehended thus at one glance; and again this universal validity for all persons would not be the result of a gathering up the many into a unity, but rather of the deduction of the infinitely many persons from the unity of one and the same reason. It is to be comprehended how this contemplation, and it alone, grounds immediate evidence, necessity and universal validity of all and for all, and hence grounds all science.
A. You have excellently comprehended yourself, and I only wish that you could make all those readers, of whom you are the representative, comprehend the matter with equal clearness.
You can now judge for yourself what significance belongs to the objection, that we base our science upon contemplation, and how far those who do raise such an objection can have any claim to scientific culture.
Now, if I tell you that the Science of Knowledge is based upon that very contemplation, which you have just proved and described as the condition of geometry, but based upon it in its highest abstraction, and that the Science of Knowledge has for its object to establish the whole series of this contemplation; nay, that in its highest abstraction it even proceeds from this contemplation; if I tell you that this contemplation for itself,—and hence, universal reason itself, grasping itself in its only central point, and forever determining itself therein,—is the very first link in the chain of the Science of Knowledge, and is that very reason which grasps and comprehends itself therein as reason, and hence is that very pure Ego, described previously, but in the highest significance of the word Ego: then, you will find it very natural, if you have any knowledge of the literature of our age, why our learned men of the latter half of the eighteenth century found it impossible to discover that pure Ego in themselves. It will also be immediately clear to you, what sort of people those persons must be, who want to go even beyond the fundamental principle of the Science of Knowledge i.e. beyond the absolute self-contemplation of reason, and who really believe that it is possible to go beyond it.
R. The Science of Knowledge, therefore, starts from that pure Ego, or from contemplation in its highest purity, and with every further step of that science a new link connects with the previous links, the necessary connecting whereof is proved in that very contemplation.
A. Precisely in the same manner in which geometry proceeds, where each new proposition adds something new to the proposition previously established, the necessity of which something new, is proved also, only in contemplation. In fact, such must be the method of every real progressive science which does not turn around in a circle.
R. I have been told that you develop your whole science out of the presupposed conception of the Ego, as out of an onion; that all you do is to analyze that conception, and to show that all other conceptions which you establish are contained in it beforehand, however dimly, and that such a conception is called fundamental conception, and the proposition, which announces it, fundamental proposition.
A. I suppose you were very good natured to allow people to tell you such nonsense.
R. I believe I see clearly now, how you proceed to establish your science; and I also see upon what you ground your claim to the universal validity of your science, namely, upon contemplation, which, being the contemplation of the manner of acting of all reason, is therefore valid for all reason, i.e. for all, who, like you, will cause reason to generate that science in them. In short, the product of your science is to be attained, from your assumed presupposition, only in the manner in which you attain it, precisely as the triangle, when those three parts thereof had been presupposed, could also be closed by only one straight line and two determined angles. If you really can prove in contemplation, what you assert you can prove, I have no further objection to your statement; provided, you will content yourself with stating the product of your science to be merely a product of your imagination, and nothing else, just as the oft-mentioned triangle is also nothing but such a product. But it appears to me from what you have said before, that you do not content yourself with this. You are not satisfied to establish your product, as in itself existing and agreeing with itself; you go beyond it. You assert it to be, moreover, a picture of true actual consciousness, as it exists without the co-operation of philosophy, or of that consciousness which we all possess. This consciousness, you now assert, has the same manifold which the result of your system contains and in the same relation. But I confess that I do not well understand what you do assert on this subject, nor how you will ground such further claims.
A. Nevertheless, you admit that geometry has an application to actual consciousness in life, and consider it, like the Science of Knowledge, to be a picture of a part of your consciousness. Explain and give me your reasons for this claim. Perhaps it will also explain our claim.
In scientific geometry, you draw the line, wherewith you close your arbitrarily imagined angle with its two sides. Now, you find in your field a triangle with an angle determined in itself and two sides determined in themselves. You measure them. Do you need to measure the third one likewise?
R. On no account; for by making use of the unchangeable relation of this third side to the other two, which relation is well known to me, I can discover its actual length through mere calculation.
A. Its actual length! What do you mean by that?
R. If I took my measure and measured it as I have measured the other two sides, I should find its length to be precisely what my calculation states it to be.
A. You are firmly convinced of this?
R. That I am.
A. And you are ready to apply the same procedure to all possible triangles, which you may find in the field, without fear of meeting with some triangle which will form an exception to the rule?
R. I have no such fear, and it is impossible that I should have it.
A. What, then, may be the ground of this, your firm conviction, of the correctness of your calculation in ascertaining the length of the third side independently and in advance of its actual measurement?
R. If I observe myself closely, I must proceed about in this manner:
If two lines and their included angle are presupposed, this angle can be closed by only one possible determined side, i.e. a side which has a determined relation to the other two sides. This is valid for the imaginary construction of the triangle, and becomes immediately clear and certain through contemplation.
Now, I treat the actual triangle according to the laws of the merely imagined one, and with the same certainty, precisely as if it were likewise involved in that contemplation. Hence, I factically presuppose, that the right to make this application is, indeed, contained in that contemplation. I consider the actual line as one, which has, as it were—I say as it were—arisen through my free construction. How the actual line may have originated, I do not ask at all, for at least its measuring is a reconstructing of the existing line, and hence, I am compelled to assume, that it is altogether the same as if it were an original constructing of it through my free imagination.
A. You have described very accurately the nature of the claims of the Science of Knowledge to validity in actual consciousness. Precisely, as in the original construction of the triangle, the third side was found to be determined by the other two and their angle, so, according to the Science of Knowledge, is the original construction of consciousness a certain somewhat, determined through another. But these determinations are pure creations of imagination, and, by no means, actual determinations of consciousness; just as the lines of the triangle are also purely imaginary.
But now, an actual determination of consciousness enters, precisely as you found an angle and two sides in the field, and you may be just as firmly convinced, that this actual determination contains all the others, which in the Science you have discovered to be inseparable from it, as you were convinced in the case of the actual triangle. The determinations of actual consciousness, to which you are compelled to apply the laws of that consciousness, which you constructed with freedom, appear to you now also, as it were, like results of an original construction, and are judged by you as such. Whether such an original construction of consciousness did really precede consciousness, is not asked at all; indeed, such a question is senseless.
At least, the judging is a reconstructing, precisely as measuring is a reconstructing for the geometrician. This judging must agree with an original constructing, which is to be presupposed, as it were, of the object of the judgment, and will assuredly agree with it, if the judgment is correct, just as the measuring of the line must agree with the calculation, if made correctly. This, and nothing more than this, is what the claim of the Science of Knowledge to a validity outside of itself and for actual consciousness in life, is to signify, and in this manner, the claim to such validity is based, like the whole science, upon the same immediate contemplation.
Thus, I believe, that I have given you a sufficiently clear conception not only of the object of the Science of Knowledge in general, but also of its procedure and the grounds of this procedure. This science constructs the entire common consciousness of all rational beings absolutely a priori, in its fundamental characteristics, precisely as geometry constructs absolutely a priori the universal modes of limiting space on the part of all rational beings.
That science begins with the simplest and most characteristic determination of self-consciousness, namely, its self-contemplation or Egohood, and proceeds, on the presupposition that the completely determined self-consciousness will be the final result of all other determinations of consciousness, until this result has been reached; each link of its chain connecting with a new link, and accompanied by the immediate contemplation, that this new link must connect with the previous one in the same manner in the cases of all rational beings whatsoever.
If you posit Ego=A, you will find in the constructing of this A, that inseparable therefrom, a B connects with it, and in the contemplation of the constructing of this B, you will likewise find that a C connects with it, and so on, until you have arrived at the last link of A, namely, at completely determined self-consciousness.