The Guilt of William Hohenzollern/Chapter 11

by Karl Kautsky

CHAPTER XI
THE CONSPIRATORS AT WORK

WILLIAM'S INSISTENCE

How the harmless conversation on “the political situation” held at Potsdam on July 5th worked on the Austrian Government was already manifested by the latter in the Council of the Ministry for Common Interests, held on July 7th, the protocol of which has now been published (Red Book, 1919, pp. 25–38).

Berchtold began by declaring that the moment had arrived to make Serbia for ever incapable of doing mischief. On this question he had been in touch with the German Government, and the latter had promised their unreserved support in a war with Serbia.

“He was clear that military action against Serbia might lead to war with Russia.”

But better have it now than later on, for Russia's strength in the Balkans was always growing.

Tisza agreed that there was a possibility of a war with Serbia, but he was neither in favour of a war under all circumstances nor of a declaration of war without diplomatic preparation.

“He would never agree to a surprise attack on Serbia without previous diplomatic action, as it seemed to be contemplated, and as it was unfortunately also discussed by Count Hoyos in Berlin.”

So it appears that in Berlin it had even been discussed whether war should be declared on Serbia without any ultimatum. Tisza prevented that. He knew too well that such a proceeding would at the very outset put Austria in the wrong. He wanted an ultimatum—and one that could be carried out. If Serbia were to accept it, a great diplomatic success would have been obtained, and with that one could be content.

After a long discussion it was finally concluded:

“(1) That all present desired as speedy a settlement as possible of the case at issue with Serbia, whether by peace or war.

“(2) That the Ministerial Council was willing to adhere to the view of the Hungarian Premier, according to which mobilization should not take place until concrete demands had been made on Serbia, and an Ultimatum presented.

“On the other hand, all present, with the exception of the Hungarian Premier, are of opinion that a mere diplomatic success, even if it involved a humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless, and that in consequence the demands on Serbia should be of so far-reaching a character that their rejection was to be anticipated; so that the way would be made clear for a radical settlement by military action.”

This pretty scheme was the result of the discussion of the “political situation” held in Potsdam on July 5th. It was at once reported to Berlin, in Tschirschky's message of July 8th, in which, among other things, he wrote:

“Count Berchtold said, in case the Emperor agreed to make demands on Serbia, he would advise him by all means to draw up these in such a way as to preclude their acceptance.”

So that Berlin was informed upon this subject from the beginning.

William did not merely approve this policy—he urged its speedy execution; a fact proved by his annotations on Tschirschky's reports from Vienna.

The latter reports on July 10th:

“[Strictly private.]

“With regard to his audience of yesterday with H.M. the Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl, Count Berchtold gives me the following information:

“H.M. the Emperor discussed the state of affairs very calmly. He first expressed his warm thanks for the position taken by our Most Gracious Sovereign and the Imperial Government, and declared he was entirely of our opinion that one must now [Underlined by William.—K.] come to a decision [As His Majesty's Memorandum is about fourteen days old that will take a long time! It was evidently drawn up as a basis for the actual decision.—W.] in order to put an end to the intolerable state of affairs with regard to Serbia. On the significance of such a decision, Count Berchtold adds, His Majesty is quite clear.

“The Minister hereupon informed the Emperor of the two methods of procedure which were here in question with regard to the approaching action against Serbia. His Majesty had suggested that perhaps this opposition could be bridged over. On the whole, His Majesty was rather inclined to the opinion that concrete demands should be made on Serbia. [Very much so, and unambiguously!—W.] He, the Minister, would not fail to appreciate the advantages of such steps. They would thereby avoid the odium of taking Serbia by surprise, an odium which would fall on the Monarchy, and Serbia would be placed in the wrong. These measures would also make a neutral attitude easier both for Rumania and for England.

“The drawing up of suitable demands on Serbia is at present the chief concern here. [They have had plenty of time for that!—W.] Count Berchtold said he would like to know what Berlin was thinking on the subject. He thought that among other things an agency of the Austrian Government could be established in Belgrade to keep an eye upon the Great Serbian intrigues and possibly see to the breaking up of associations and the dismissal of some [All.—W.] of the compromised officers. The time allowed for reply must be the shortest possible, probably forty-eight hours. Of course, even this short time would be sufficient in Belgrade to get instructions from St. Petersburg. [Hartwig is dead!—W.] If the Serbians should accept all the demands presented to them, that would be a solution which would be ‘very disagreeable’ to him, and he was thinking what demands could be presented which would be completely impossible for Serbia to accept. [Evacuate the Saniak! Then you will have a row at once! Austria must by all means get this back at once and so prevent the union of Serbia and Montenegro and Serbia's reaching the sea.—W.]

“In conclusion, the Minister again complained of the attitude of Count Tisza, which made it difficult for him to take energetic measures against Serbia. Count Tisza maintained that one must proceed in a ‘gentlemanlike’ manner. [Against murderers, after what has taken place?—W.] This, however, was a very difficult course to take when such important interests of State were in question, and especially against such an opponent as Serbia.

“The Minister would willingly follow the suggestion of the Imperial Government, to start at once to tune up public opinion at home through the Press against Serbia, about which Count Szögyeny has telegraphed. This, however, in his opinion, must be done with caution, so as not to alarm Serbia prematurely.

“The Minister of War is going away on leave to-morrow, and Freiherr Conrad von Hötzendorf will also go away from Vienna for a time. This is being done, as Count Berchtold told me, on purpose [Childish!—W.], so as to prevent any cause of alarm. [Much the same as at the time of the Silesian Wars. ‘I am opposed to Councils of War and deliberations, since the more timid party always gets the upper hand’ (Frederick the Great.)—W.]”

One can see from William's marginal comments his approval that it should be made impossible for Serbia to submit, but also his impatience that Austria is not yet attacking. Finally, on July 13th, the inert mass of Austria seems to be in motion. Tschirschky reports:

“The Minister [Berchtold.—K.] is now himself convinced that what is now required is action of the speediest kind. [Doubly underlined by William.—K.] He hopes to settle with Tisza to-morrow as to the wording of the Note to be presented to Serbia, and would then submit it on Wednesday, July 15th, to the Emperor at Ischl, upon which its transmission to Belgrade could take place without delay, and consequently before the departure of Poincaré to St. Petersburg.”

As chance would have it, just at this time the President of the French Republic was paying the Tsar a visit in his capital. The Note was to be dispatched to Serbia before Poincaré started (he left Paris on the evening of July 15th).

But, for all that, the Austrians were not able to shoot so quickly. Meanwhile Berchtold and William first noted down the triumph of having converted Tisza to their views.

Tschirschky telegraphed on July 14th, “strictly private”:

“Count Tisza called on me to-day, after his conference with Count Berchtold. The Count said: Up to now he had always been the one who had urged the necessity of caution, but every day had confirmed his opinion that the Monarchy must come to an energetic decision [Absolutely!—W.], to prove that it had vital energy, and to put an end to the untenable state of things in the south-east. The language used by the Serbian Press and the Serbian diplomats was, in its presumption, positively unbearable. ‘It has been difficult for me,’ said Tisza, ‘to bring myself to advise in favour of war; but I am now convinced of its necessity, and will be responsible to the utmost of my power for the maintenance of the greatness of the Monarchy!’

“Fortunately complete agreement and determination now prevail among the authorities here. His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph—as Baron Burian, who recently spoke with His Majesty at Ischl, reports—is considering the situation very calmly, and will certainly see things through to the very end. Count Tisza added that the unconditional attitude of Germany to the Monarchy was decidedly of great influence for the firm stand of the Emperor [of Austria].

“The Note to be addressed to Serbia is not to-day to be drawn up in its final wording. This will not be done till Sunday (July 19th). With respect to the date of presenting it to Serbia, it has to-day been decided rather to wait till after the departure of Poincaré from St. Petersburg—that is, till the 25th. [What a pity!—W.] Then immediately after the expiration of the time allowed to Serbia, in case the latter should not unconditionally accept all demands, the mobilization would take place. The Note will be so drawn up that its acceptance will be practically impossible. [Doubly underlined by William.—K.] It would be a matter not only of demanding assurances and promises, but of deeds. In drawing up the Note, in his opinion, care must be taken that it is intelligible to the general public —especially in England and that Serbia is clearly and plainly put in the wrong.

"Baron Conrad at the last conference had made a very good impression on him. He spoke calmly and very positively. In the near future one must certainly be prepared to hear people again complain that we are undecided and hesitating here. It is, however, of little importance if they know in Berlin.

"At the close Tisza pressed my hand warmly and said : ' We will now unitedly look the future calmly and firmly in the face.' [A man, after all! W.]"

One can see how completely untenable the opinion is that William was the innocent victim of Berchtoldian perfidy. The two confederates were worthy of one another. And like master, like man. On July 18th the Secretary to the Embassy, Prince zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, as representative of the absent Tschirschky, reported from Vienna to Jagow:

"Yesterday I was with Berchtold, who told me that the Note in question is to be presented in Belgrade on the 23rd. As I reported yesterday, Berchtold hopes that the Austrian demands, about which he did not go into detail, will not be accepted by Serbia. He is, however, not quite sure, and from his statements and from those of Hoyos I have the impression that Serbia can accept the demands. To my question as to what was to happen if the affair should peter out in this manner, Berchtold thought that when it came to carrying into practice the separate postulates a considerable latitude could be exercised. If a final clearing-up of the relations with Serbia is really desired here, a thing which is imperative, as Count Tisza has shown in his speech recently, it is certainly mysterious why one should not have formulated such demands as would make a breach with Serbia unavoidable. If the matter comes to nothing, like the shooting at Hornberg, and stops at a so-called diplomatic success, the idea already prevailing in this country, that the Monarchy is no longer capable of any exhibition of strength, will be strongly confirmed. The consequences that this will have at home and abroad are very obvious."

The representatives of German diplomacy in Vienna were thus not quite satisfied with Berchtold, and had not complete confidence in him. Not, however, because he had urged on war, and they had warned against it, but because they feared that "the Monarchy" was no longer capable of any "exhibition of strength," and the whole business, instead of ending with a rattling good war (mit einem frisch-fröhlichem Krieg) would end with a bloodless diplomatic victory.

Unfortunately the fears which the Secretary to the German Embassy expressed to the German Secretary of State with regard to their Austrian ally were completely without foundation.

AUSTRIA'S HESITATION

After the German Government had, on July 5th, given its blessing to the war planned by Austria against Serbia, it insisted on attacking as quickly as possible. It was, however, no easy matter to stir Austria out of her easy-going ways.

This was entirely contradictory to the rules of Prussian militarism, which places the greatest value on swiftness of movement. It, however, also threatened to ruin the diplomatic conception of the situation, which was that Europe should be confronted with accomplished facts before it was well aware what had happened, while it would be difficult for Serbia to come to an understanding with the Powers and for the Powers to come to an understanding with one another. Consternation and confusion were to make it possible to fish in troubled waters, and to lessen the danger of the Powers uniting against the impious disturbers of the peace.

This is the reason for the short time-limit which was to be given the Serbians for answering the Note.

Under the circumstances it appeared to be dangerous to delay sending off the Note, as every day of hesitation might bring new incidents, might expose the aims of the conspirators, and so bring them to nought. The insistency of Germany, after she had once given her consent to the war, is therefore quite intelligible.

But the delay on the part of Austria is not so intelligible. It may partly be attributed to the inveterate Austrian slovenliness, and partly perhaps to the delay, arising from this, of the preparations for war which had begun in Austria immediately after the decisions of Potsdam. On July I2th Jagow telegraphed to Tschirschky:

"Strictly confidential instructions for Count Berchtold.

"According to secret intelligence, Russia and Serbia have obtained confidential information that Austria-Hungary is quietly strengthening her garrisons on the Serbian and Russian frontiers."

Thus not only on the Serbian frontier, but also on the Russian, Austria was making preparations for war.

This is of great importance in view of the discussions with regard to the various mobilizations. Mobilization is the most important, the most conspicuous and the ultimate act of preparation for war, but it is not the only one. There are also movements of troops, assembling and transport of munitions of war, and recall of officers on leave. Means of transport and similar things can be placed in readiness before the mobilization is announced. The latter will take place the more rapidly and effectively, the better the rest of the preparations for war are carried out. The Central Powers in this respect were able, on the outbreak of war on July 24th, to be far ahead of the others, because ever since the 5th they had counted on the possibility of war with Russia.

In spite of this, Austria was much more behindhand than was agreeable to the German war-politicians. After all, she finally declared war on Russia only on the 6th of August, notwithstanding that she had ordered the general mobilization as early as July 3ist. To add to this, differences of opinion arose between the statesmen of the dual State of Austria- Hungary, which was so little a homogeneous entity that its politicians knew no other name for it than "the Monarchy."

Berchtold, as far back as July 5th, had got permission for the war from Potsdam, but only on July 14th could Tschirschky report that Budapest, too, had given its unreserved consent. And only then did the Ministers in Vienna begin to attempt to come to an understanding with one another with regard to Serbia. It is remarkable that before this even Berlin had not felt the need of being clear as to the object of the war which had already been approved of, and the opening of which was being urged on.

Not till July I7th did Jagow telegraph to Tschirschky:

"As Your Excellency is aware from reading the Memorandum of Count Hoyos with reference to his conference with the Under-Secretary of State, Count Hoyos has here declared that Austria must proceed to a complete partition of Serbia.

"Count Berchtold and Count Tisza have remarked in this connection that this declaration only expressed the personal view of Count Hoyos, and they therefore have expressly not identified themselves with it; on the other hand, they have not apparently explained themselves any further as to their territorial plans.

"For the diplomatic treatment of the conflict with Serbia, it would not be unimportant to know from the beginning what the ideas of Austro-Hungarian statesmen are as to the future conformation of Serbia. This question will be of essential influence on the attitude of Italy, and on the public opinion and attitude of England.

"That the plans of the statesmen of the Monarchy of the Danube may be influenced and modified by the march of events can be looked upon as self-evident; nevertheless, it should be assumed that the Vienna Cabinet, after all, has in its mind a general picture of the aims striven after, not forgetting the territorial aspects of the question. Will Your Excellency be so good as to try in conversation with Count Berchtold to get enlightenment in this matter, but at the same time to avoid giving the impression that we wish to place hin drances in the way of Austrian action or prescribe limits or aims for it. What we really want is some guidance as to whereabouts the road we are on is likely to lead us."

This is certainly a most remarkable document.

Only think! On July 5th the German Government sanctions the war against Serbia, aware that it may turn into a World War. Since then it urges for a speedy attack, and on the 17th the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Vienna timidly inquires whether he "could have some guidance as to whereabouts the road" of the war "was likely to lead them."

And he asks this, not in order that he may frame his own decisions accordingly—for Austria always had, and has still, a free hand—but merely to be able to "deal with" Italy and England correctly from the diplomatic standpoint.

In this matter Berlin never got a clear answer from Vienna, for the simple reason that there they did not themselves know "where the road was likely to lead them." The two Central Powers unchained the most frightful of all wars without even being clear as to the aim and object of its origination.

The answer was to be given in Vienna on July 19th in a Ministerial Council for "Joint Affairs " on "the approaching diplomatic action against Serbia," in which was to be stated the object of the war which it was determined to force on. In that sitting Count Tisza formulated the demand that the action against Serbia should not be attended with any plans of conquest in favour of the Monarchy. They must limit themselves to rectifications of the frontier required on military grounds. He asked for a unanimous decision on this point. As a Magyar, he wished for no increase in the number of Serbians in the Monarchy.

Count Berchtold was of a different opinion. He thought it was only with certain reserves that he could associate himself with this conception of the matter. He was also of the opinion that Austria-Hungary should annex no territory belonging to Serbia, but, on the other hand, should assign as large pieces as possible to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, and possibly also to Rumania. Serbia must be so reduced in size " that she would no longer be a source of danger." The situation in the Balkans might, however, change. It might be " that at the end of the war it will no longer be possible for us to avoid annexation."

One can see that the views which Count Hoyos had unfolded in Berlin on July 5th were not only his own personal views, but were just as much those of Count Berchtold.

Count Tisza, however, did not admit the reservations of Count Berchtold. Count Stiirgkh thought that, even if the occupation of Serbian territory were out of the question, security could be obtained by the deposition of the dynasty, by a military convention, or by other suitable measures. As the Minister of War showed himself to be willing to guarantee the limitation of the annexation to strategic rectifications of the frontier and to the permanent occupation of a bridge-head across the Save, it was unanimously decided by the Ministers assembled:

That immediately at the beginning of the war it shall be declared to the Foreign Powers that the Monarchy is not waging a war of conquest, and has no intention of incorporating the kingdom with her own territory. Strategic rectifications of the frontier which may be necessary, as well as the diminution in size of Serbia in favour of other States, or a temporarily necessary occupation of Serbian territory, are naturally not excluded by this resolution" (Red Book of 1919, pp. 65-67).

Of the whole of this programme the Powers were, as a matter of precaution, only informed of the first sentence, that "the Monarchy is not waging a war of conquest." The sentences following were suppressed, and these, in reality, contained the disclaimed programme of Count Hoyos, and also did not exclude the reservation of Count Berchtold, which he had so finely clothed in the words: "At the end of the war it may no longer be possible for us to avoid annexation."

Tisza, strange to say, was quite in agreement with this arrangement. His object for waging war was not the conquest but the annihilation of Serbia. Such, then, was the direction in which the war was "likely" to lead, according to the intentions of the guiding spirits of the Austrian State.

In what direction it really led was explained to the Imperial Chancellor immediately before this, on July 16th, by Prince Lichnowsky in an admirable exposé which may be quoted here in its entirety.

Lichnowsky wrote:

"From Count Berchtold's standpoint it is quite comprehensible that he should aim at restoring his position, which was badly shaken by the Peace of Bucharest, and also the influence of the Monarchy in the Balkans, which was diminished through the defection of Rumania, by making use of the present comparatively favourable opportunity for a passage-of-arms with Serbia. The military authorities in Austria, as is well known, have for a long time been insisting on the need of strengthening the reputation of the Monarchy by a war. Once it was to be against Italy, in order to drive out her irredentism; another time it was to be against Serbia, who by warlike achievements à la Prince Eugene was to be forced to renounce her evil ways and be taught better manners. I can quite understand, as I have said, this standpoint of those in control of the Austrian State, and in their position would perhaps have used the Serbian disturbances even earlier than they did to give the South Slav question a Habsburg solution.

"The first thing to be presumed for such a policy, however, would be a clear programme, which rests on the recognition that the present state of things with regard to public and international justice within the Serbo-Croatian family of nations which assigns one part of this nation, split up only by religion and not by race, to the Austrian State, another part to the Hungarian State, a third to the Joint Monarchy, and finally a fourth and a fifth to independent kingdoms is permanently untenable. For the endeavour to maintain the sacred status quo under all circumstances for reasons of convenience has often enough, and just lately at the recent Balkan crisis, led to a complete collapse of the political house of cards built on these foundations.

"In the first place, I now doubt whether there has been drawn up in Vienna a plan on a great scale which alone would afford the basis of a permanent regulation of the South Slav question. I mean Trialism, with the inclusion of Serbia. From my knowledge of the conditions there, I do not even believe that they are in a position to proceed to a constitutional re-shaping of the Monarchy on such lines. For to do this it would be necessary to overcome the opposition of Hungary, which would resist to the uttermost the cession of Croatia and Fiume. And Vienna never produces the strong personality alone capable of carrying out such a programme. They only seek there to satisfy the needs of the moment, and are glad when the many political difficulties, which are never extinguished, as they arise from the heterogeneous nature of the component factors of the Empire, are so far pushed aside that there is a prospect of dragging on a few months longer.

"A military castigation of Serbia would hence be of no value towards a satisfactory solution of the so extremely difficult South Slav Question. The most it could do would be to revive the Eastern Question, which has been settled with so much difficulty, merely in order to afford a moral satisfaction to Austria.

"Whether Russia and Rumania will idly look on at this, and leave Austria a free hand, Your Excellency will be in a better position to judge than I am. From the impressions I have received here, but especially from the confidential conversations which I have had with Sir Edward Grey, I believe that I was right in the opinions I recently represented in Berlin with regard to the intentions of Russia towards us. Sir Edward Grey assures me that no one in Russia has any desire to wage war against us. The same was said to me by my cousin Count Benckendorff. A certain anti-German feeling recurs there from time to time; this is connected with the Slav movement. Against this tendency, however, there stands opposed a strong pro-German party. Neither the Tsar nor anyone in high authority is anti-German, and since the settlement of the Liman question no serious discord has arisen. On the other hand, Count Benckendorff openly admitted that there exists a strong anti-Austrian feeling in Russia. No one, however, has any desire to conquer parts of Austria, such as, for instance, Galicia.

"Whether, in view of this feeling, it would be possible to move the Russian Government to take the attitude of a passive onlooker on the Austro-Serbian passage-of-arms, I have no means of judging. What, however, I believe I can say with certainty is, that there is no chance in case of war of influencing public opinion here against Serbia, even if there should be conjured up the bloody shadows of Draga and her lover, whose removal has long been forgotten by the public here, and hence belongs to those historical occurrences with which, so far as non-British countries are concerned, people here are in general much less acquainted than the average third-form schoolboy in Germany is.

"Now I am far from suggesting that we should throw over our alliance or our ally. I consider the league that has established itself in the sentimental life of both Empires to be necessary, and with regard to the many Germans living in Austria to be the natural form of their attachment to us. It is for me only a question as to whether it is advisable for us to support our comrades in a policy, or rather to guarantee a policy which I look upon as a wild one, since it will lead neither to a radical solution of the problem nor to the crushing of the Great Serbian movement. If the Austrian police and the Bosnian provincial authorities let the Heir to the Throne drive through 'an avenue of bomb-throwers' I can see in this no sufficient reason to risk the famous 'Pomeranian grenadier' in promoting the huzzar-policy of Austria, merely in order to strengthen Austria's self-consciousness, which in this case, as the era of Aehrenthal has shown, considers its supreme task to be its entire liberation from the leading-strings of Berlin.

"If, however, it is proposed to decide our policy by the consideration that as soon as the Great Serbian movement has received its death-blow, Austria Felix, relieved of this anxiety, will be grateful to us for the assistance we have rendered, I cannot suppress the question whether the national movement in Hungary was stamped out when the revolt was overthrown by the help of the Tsar Nicholas, and by the constant requisition of the gallows after the Hungarian subjugation at Vilagos under direction of the Imperial General Haynau, and whether the rescue of Austria by the Tsar really laid the foundation of cordiality and confidence between the two empires."

Thus Lichnowsky wrote on July i6th. Of course, all his Cassandra warnings had the usual result. They were absolutely unheeded.

Meanwhile Poincaré's departure to St. Petersburg had taken place before the Note to Serbia was dispatched. As we have already seen, therefore, it was determined to delay handing it in till Poincaré had left St. Petersburg. With regard to this matter Tschirschky reported on July 14th:

"After Count Tisza had left me, Count Berchtold invited me to call on him in order to inform me, in his turn, as to the result of to-day's conference. To his great joy agreement on all sides had been attained as to the tenor of the Note to be presented to Serbia. Count Tisza received his (the Minister's) views in a gratifying manner, and had even increased the severity of some of the points. At all events, it was evidently impossible, owing to technical considerations, to present the Note in Belgrade before the 16th or the 18th.

"It had unanimously been held advisable in to-day's conference to await in any case the departure of M. Poincaré from St. Petersburg before steps were taken in Belgrade [A pity! W.]; for, if possible, it was to be avoided that in St. Petersburg, in a whirl of champagne-sentiment, and under the influence of MM. Poincare, Isvolsky and the Grand Dukes a fraternization should be celebrated, which would thereupon influence the attitude of the two Powers, and possibly consolidate it. It would be a good thing if the toasts could be got over before the Note was presented. Thus the presentation of the Note should take place on July 25th.

"Count Berchtold, as Count Tisza had done before him, urgently and repeatedly requested me not to leave my Government in any doubt that the fact of the presence of M. Poincaré in St. Petersburg was the sole reason for the delay in presenting the Note in Belgrade, and that they could rest completely assured in Berlin that there was no question of hesitation or irresolution here."

These continued assurances, that Berlin could rely on Vienna's determination to fight, are very remarkable.

In the Vienna Cabinet Council of July 19th Berchtold also declared that he was against any unnecessary postponement,

"As they are now beginning in Berlin to get nervous, and news as to our intentions has filtered through to Rome, so that he could not answer for undesirable incidents if the matter were spun out any further. Conrad von Hötzendorf was urging the necessity of haste. The Minister of War declares that everything is ready for mobilization!"

Thus it was desired to present the Note as soon as possible, but not before the French President had left Russia. It is amusing to see with what care his travelling route is now studied, and one of the two conspirators communicates to the other his observations of the movements of the unsuspecting wanderer.

On July 17th it is reported from Vienna that the Note will be presented on July 23rd, as on that day Poincaré is to leave St. Petersburg. From now, however, the very hour of his departure became important.

On July 21st the Admiral's Staff of the Navy informs Jagow that the departure from Kronstadt is fixed for the 23rd at ten o'clock at night. On the same day Jagow telegraphs to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg the question:

"At what o'clock on Thursday is the departure of the President from Kronstadt arranged for?"

On the 22nd Jagow telegraphed to Vienna:

"Had inquired of Count Pourtales as to the programme of Poincaré's visit. He says that the President leaves Kronstadt at eleven o'clock at night. By Central European time this would be nine-thirty. If steps are taken in Belgrade tomorrow afternoon at five, they would thus become known in St. Petersburg while Poincaré is still there."

To this Tschirschky replied on the 23rd :

"Austrian Government thanks you for the information. Baron Giesl has been instructed to delay by one hour the presentation of the Note."

Thus it was that the Note was presented on the 23rd at six o'clock in the evening.

We see from all this the nature of the anxieties that troubled the Austrian and German Ministers on the verge of the outbreak of the World-War.

A FALSE CALCULATION

It had been intended to make swiftly a surprise attack, so as to confront Europe, before she was properly conscious of how things stood, with a fait accompli, to which its submission would be most speedily obtained. In this way it was hoped, by a simultaneous surprise-attack and declaration of war, to preserve the world's peace.

This was a singular kind of peace-policy, and yet the German White Book of July, 1919, still dares to assert the peaceful intentions of the Imperial Government.

These peaceful intentions are supposed to be shown by the fact that the possibility of a war with Russia was considered, but the probability of a general war was not reckoned with.

The Government even hoped that Russia would again allow herself to be intimidated, as in former Balkan crises, when taken completely by surprise, faced by a fait accompli, and no hope of the other party giving way. For the rest, they trusted to luck.

On July 28th Baron Beyens reported from Berlin:

"In Vienna, as in Berlin, despite the official assurances but recently exchanged between the Tsar and Poincaré concerning the complete equipment of the armies of the Dual Alliance, it was firmly believed that Russia was not in a position to wage a European war and would not dare to involve herself in so terrible an adventure. The disquieting internal situation, revolutionary machinations, inadequate equipment, poor transport facilities—all these grounds would compel Russia to look on impotently at the execution of Serbia. The same poor opinion was held, if not of the French Army, yet of the spirit prevailing in the Government circles of France. ...

"The opinion that Russia was not equal to a European war prevailed not only in the heart of the Imperial Government but was also held by the German captains of industry specializing in armaments. The most competent among them, to adduce an example, Herr Krupp von Bohlen, assured a colleague of mine that the Russian artillery was far from being good and complete, whilst the German had never been better. 'It would be madness for Russia to declare war on Germany in these circumstances,' he added."

This communication of Beyens is confirmed by Szogyeny's report given above concerning his conversation with William on July 5th, which, in turn, is corroborated by what Tirpitz tells of July 6th in his "Reminiscences":

"According to the statements which he (Kaiser Wilhelm) made to my official representative on the morning of July 6th in the Park of the Neues Palais at Potsdam, the Kaiser considered an intervention of Russia for the protection of Serbia improbable, as the Tsar would not protect the regicides, and Russia at the time was unfit for war, both financially and in a military respect. Furthermore, the Kaiser assumed somewhat optimistically that France would put the brake on Russia, in view of the former's unfavourable financial position and lack of heavy artillery. Of England the Kaiser did not speak. Complications with that State were not thought of at all." (Page 209.)

The same opinions are expressed by Jagow in a letter to Lichnowsky on July 18th:

"The more determined Austria shows herself, the more energetically we support her, Russia is all the more likely to keep quiet. In Petersburg, of course, there is sure to be a bit of a row, but fundamentally Russia is not ready to strike now. Nor will France and England desire war now. In a few years, according to all competent authorities, Russia will be ready to strike. Then she will crush us with her numbers; then she will have built her Baltic fleet and her strategical railways. Meanwhile, our group will be growing weaker and weaker. Russia knows this very well, and, therefore, absolutely desires peace for a few more years. I willingly believe your cousin Benckendorff, that Russia does not want a war with us now. Sasonow gives the same assurance. But the Government in Russia, which to-day is still a friend of peace and, to a certain extent, pro-German, becomes increasingly weaker and Slavonic feeling more and more anti-German. ... I desire no preventive war. But when battle offers we must not run away."

So Jagow does not believe that Russia, at the moment, can and will wage war. He does not want to force a preventive war exactly, but if it does come, it will really be a piece of good fortune for the German Empire and its allies.

This was, in those days, a widespread opinion, not only in Austria, but also in Germany. Immediately after the outbreak of war, Herr Paul Rohrbach, a Pan-German magnate, and likely to be familiar with the German General Staff's line of thought, made this statement:

"For us—i.e. for Germany and Austria-Hungary —the chief anxiety was that by a temporary, apparent yielding on the part of Russia we might be morally compelled to wait until Russia and France were really ready."^[1]

It is characteristic of the eagerness for war among these circles that when it actually broke out it was received, not with anxiety or with grief as a fearful catastrophe, but with jubilation as a deliverance.

On June 7th, 1915, the King of Bavaria stated:

"Russia's declaration of war was followed by that of France, and when the English then fell upon us I said:

"'I am glad, and I am glad for this reason, that now we can settle accounts with our enemies and that now, at last, we will obtain a direct outlet from the Rhine to the sea.'"

Such was the desire for peace of the reigning German princes on the outbreak of the war. But it is certain that all were not so stupid and wanton as to long for war. The arbitrators at the Foreign Office "risked" it, to be sure, but hoped that events would take the turn they did in 1909 and 1913, when Russia drew back owing to inadequate equipment. They did not consider that, this time, the Russian Empire was subjected to a particularly severe test: she was required to evacuate all her political strongholds in the Balkans and to hand them over entirely to Austria.

Meanwhile, by taking prompt action, leaving Russia no time to come to an understanding with her friends, Russia might soonest be brought "peaceably" to her knees. Should she, however, offer unexpected resistance the best prospects of success, also in a military sense, were to be found in leaving the enemy as little time as possible to make preparations.

THE HOODWINKING OF EUROPE

In all circumstances public opinion had to be lulled to sleep until the moment had arrived. This was not so simple. Foreign countries were to be reassured, while, simultaneously, the home population was to be worked up into the mood for war, which was absolutely indispensable if their actions were not to be crippled from the outset. And, on the other hand, neither of the two allies seems to have really trusted the other. Each scented "slackness" in the other, unless energetically goaded by the Press.

This occasioned many an edifying statement. Thus, on July 18th, Jagow telegraphed to Tschirschky:

"To-morrow the Norddeutsche will publish some comments on the Austro-Serbian dispute, which are couched in intentionally mild terms in consideration of European diplomacy. This markedly semi-official organ must not sound a premature alarm. Please see that this is not falsely interpreted as German deviation from determination shown there."

Before this already, on July 15th, Berchtold sent the following message to Szögyeny in Berlin:

"From this to us also undesirable delay it is not difficult to explain the attitude of our semi-official Press.

"Momentarily, we must, on the one hand, prevent any weakening of public opinion, now favourable to our policy, in the Monarchy, and, on the other hand, we must not allow thoughts of mediation to spring up with other Powers owing to a language on the part of our Press by which the situation is systematically accentuated."

The regulation of the tone of the Press was followed by other "sedatives," the principal of which was the departure of the military chiefs. We have already seen that the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff were sent on leave to Austria for the express purpose of hoodwinking Europe.

To this William remarked that it was childish. This is not quite comprehensible, for he himself went on furlough, too, at that time. Here we must return to the mysterious conferences held by Wilhelm before he started on his Scandinavian trip. These were held with the greatest secrecy possible, so as to prevent premature alarm. The rigorous secrecy is evidenced by the concluding sentence of the Bussche notes of August, 1917: " Thoroughly reliable source" It was, therefore, not a question of a fact generally known in Government circles, but of one known only to the trusted few.

Had the public learned anything of a war council, the cat would have been out of the bag immediately; then all the world would have known what had been hatched at these conferences. Just as, after the Kaiser's interview with Bethmann, the meeting with the military chiefs became unavoidably necessary in view of the Kaiser's imminent departure on his trip to the North, so the anxious concealment of that meeting was not less necessary.

His trip to the North had been planned beforehand. Its postponement might have aroused suspicion. Now it became a means to lull Europe into security. How could any idea of the gravity of the situation arise when the German Emperor and his Fleet had gone on a cruise to the North!

On July 7th he started on his journey, from which he did not return until the 27th. While at sea he remained, of course, in constant touch with Berlin. These endeavours to hoodwink Europe produced some peculiar fruit. Thus, on July 11th, Count Wedel, one of the Kaiser's suite, telegraphed from Bergen:

"On submitting the customary congratulatory telegram drafted by the Foreign Office for the King of Serbia's birthday to-morrow, His Majesty commanded me to inquire of your Excellency whether such a telegram appears necessary and harmless at the present moment"

To this Jagow replied:

"As Vienna has not yet taken any steps whatever in Belgrade, the omission of the customary telegram would be too remarkable and might give rise to premature uneasiness. Recommend, therefore, its dispatch."

So upon the dear cousin, whom they had declared a bloodthirsty murderer, all the blessings of Heaven were hastily called down in the tenderest terms, before the dagger was plunged into his back.

However delightful this pleasure-cruise before the opening of the great slaughter might have been, it finally got on Wilhelm's nerves as the decision drew near. The Imperial Chancellor wanted to keep him away as long as possible, so that Europe might remain quiet and not get wind of what was afoot. William, however, began to fear that the burning fuse might cause a premature explosion, leaving him and his Fleet a prey to the English on the Norwegian coast or giving Russia a free hand in the Baltic. He urged that they should return.

On July 18th, Jagow asked Count Wedel for an exact statement of the Hohenzollern's course, adding:

{{quote|"As we wish to localize eventual conflict between Austria and Serbia, we must not alarm people by premature return of H.M.; on the other hand, the All Highest must be within reach should unforeseen events necessitate important decisions (mobilization) for us also. Cruising in the Baltic might, perhaps, be contemplated for last days of trip."

On July 19th, William orders the Fleet to keep together until the 25th, so that it "may be able to carry out quickly the command to cut short the journey."

Bethmann, who at this critical juncture was at Hohenfinow instead of in Berlin (also to calm Europe's nerves ?), thereupon telegraphed to the Foreign Office on the 21st:

"H.M.'s Order for the Fleet to keep together until 25th makes me fear that as soon as Ultimatum is rejected remarkable Fleet movements might be ordered from Balmholm (where the Kaiser then was). On the other hand, in the event of a crisis, wrong station of the Fleet might prove disastrous!"

Bethmann, therefore, asked for the view of the Admiralty Staff. The latter answered on July 22nd, that in the event of England declaring war, "an attack upon our Fleet by the English Navy was to be counted upon with certainty."

Jagow sent a reassuring telegram to the Imperial Chancellor, stating that England was quite peaceable and was allowing her Fleet, which had been assembled for manœuvres, to disperse.

On the 23rd the Imperial Chancellor then telegraphed to Count Wedel, the Austrian Note would be delivered "this afternoon," the Ultimatum would expire on the 25th, and that, for the time being, Germany would say the whole affair did not concern her.

"Only the intervention of other Powers would draw us into the conflict. It is not to be supposed that this will happen at once, or that England especially will immediately decide to intervene: the very fact that President Poincaré, leaving Kronstadt to-day, will visit Stockholm on the 25th, Copenhagen on the 27th and Christiania on the 26th, arriving at Dunkirk on the 31st, is likely to delay all decisions.

"English Fleet, according to Admiralty Staff reports, is to disperse on the 27th, and repair to home ports. Any premature recall of our Fleet might cause general uneasiness, and be regarded as suspicious, especially in England."

But William has no confidence in the maintenance of peace. On the 25th he gives the order to the Fleet to hold itself in readiness for immediate return home. Bethmann conjures the Kaiser to wait still. This causes an outburst of wrath on the part of the Kaiser. The Chancellor's telegram with William's additions runs:

"The Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy informs me that Your Majesty has, in view of a Wolff telegram [Unheard of! W.], given orders to the Fleet to prepare immediately for the homeward journey. [Incredible imputation! Never entered my head!!! On my Ambassador's report of the mobilization in Belgrade ! This may entail Russia's mobilization, will entail Austria's! In this case I must have my forces on land and sea together. In the Baltic there is not a single ship!! Moreover, it is my custom to take military measures, not according to a Wolff telegram, but according to the general situation, and this the civilian Chancellor (Civilian underlined by the Kaiser.—K.) has not yet grasped. W.]

"Meanwhile, Admiral von Pohl will probably have submitted to Your Majesty the reports of Your Majesty's naval attaché in London, and of the confidential agent of the Navy in Portsmouth, according to which the English Navy is taking no noticeable measures whatever [Doesn't need to! It is already prepared for war, as the Review has just shown, and has mobilized! W.], but is carrying out, according to plan, the dispersal previously arranged.

"As the reports hitherto received from Your Majesty's Ambassador in London also show that Sir E. Grey, for the present at least, is not contemplating a direct participation of England in a possible European War, and will use his influence for the localization, as far as feasible, of the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict, I venture most humbly to recommend that Your Majesty does not order a premature return of the Fleet for the time being." [When Russia mobilizes my Fleet must be already in the Baltic, so it is going home.—W.]

On July 26th, Bethmann once more besought his Imperial master "to remain in Norway for the present, as this would materially facilitate England's proposed intermediary action in Petersburg, which is now visibly vacillating." To which William remarks:

"From what is that (Petersburg's vacillation) to be inferred? Not from the material submitted to me."

And even before this, in reply to the desire that he should remain in Norway, he said:

"There is a Russian Fleet! In the Baltic there are now five Russian torpedo-boat flotillas making instructional cruises, all or part of which could be stationed before the Belts in sixteen hours, blocking the way. Port Arthur should be a lesson! My Fleet has marching orders for Kiel, and thither it goes!"

One sees William reckoned with the immediate outbreak of the world-war after the delivery of the Ultimatum to Serbia. He therefore steamed home at full speed, in spite of Bethmann-Hollweg. He begins his active intervention in the war policy by snubbing his own Chancellor, "most humbly daring to recommend," as if he were a bootblack, addressing him as a creature who has not yet grasped the general situation. Military superiority thinks it is treating the Chancellor with especial contempt when it addresses him as a "Civilian Chancellor" who has not the slightest influence upon military measures.

On the other hand, the telegram bears witness not only to the submissiveness of Bethmann, who behaves less like a civilian Chancellor than a civilian serf, but also to the shortsightedness and mustiness of his policy, which imagined it could deceive the English, for a few days at least, as to the dangerous character of the Austrian Ultimatum by leaving the Kaiser longer on the Norwegian coast.

Moreover, his calculations based on Poincaré's journey also proved to be mistaken. He had hoped it would delay all decisions on the part of the Entente, and leave Austria a free hand in respect of Serbia beyond July 31st. But Poincaré was in just as great a hurry to get home as William, and, in view of the threatening situation, rightly so. He cancelled his visits and arrived in France on July 29th.

Simultaneously, Austria had been pursuing no less zealously the policy of hoodwinking Europe. The Austrian diplomats, however, treated the matter more bluntly. Since the disclosure of their forgery tricks against Serbia, their reputation for truth was quoted almost as low as the Austrian krone is to-day. They did all honour to this reputation by making the most reassuring asseverations concerning their conciliatory intentions immediately before the delivery of their Ultimatum, which was purposely couched in such brutal terms as to appear unacceptable.

Dumaine, the French Ambassador in Vienna, reported on July 26th:

"Herr Schebeko (Russian Ambassador in Vienna) has suddenly returned from a journey to Russia. He had started on this journey only after Count Berchtold had given the assurance that the demands addressed to Serbia were highly acceptable."

On July 23rd the acting Foreign Minister in Paris, M. Bienvenu Martin, reported to the French Ambassador:

"M. Dumaine, whom I had charged to direct the attention of the Austrian Government to the uneasiness that has arisen in Europe, was assured by Baron von Macchio, in reply to his question, that the tone of the Austrian Note and the terms laid down therein were calculated to effect a peaceful solution. I do not know how far credence may be given to these assurances, considering the usages of the Imperial Chancellery."

The usages of diplomacy are in no country distinguished by excessive sincerity. But a perfidy so short-sighted as to assert to-day something whose utter falsehood it must itself reveal to-morrow, implies not only such shamelessness but also such stupidity as—Oxenstierna notwithstanding is out of the common.

After such preparation of public opinion the ultimatum was delivered to Serbia on the evening of July 23rd.

1. "German Policy and the War," Dresden, Verlag "Das grösser e Deutschland" (pp. 82, 83).