At the time when the District Court for the Southern District of Florida was established, the act of 1803 [1] governed appeals from the District to the Circuit Courts, and from the Circuit Courts to this court. No appeal in admiralty could be taken directly from the District Court to this court, except when, as in the case of the Southern District of Florida, the District Court exercised the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court as well as that of the District Court.
If this state of the law had undergone no change at the date of the decree of condemnation in this case, the allowance of an appeal to this court would have been quite regular.
But the effect of the act of July, 1862, [2] was to vest in the Circuit Court for that circuit the whole appellate jurisdiction exercised by other Circuit Courts in respect to decrees in admiralty. It left the original jurisdiction in admiralty of the District Court, untouched.
It was in virtue of this original jurisdiction that the District Court had cognizance of the case of the Lucy. The appellate jurisdiction of the case was vested by the act in the Circuit Court.
It follows that, when the decree was pronounced in August, no appeal could be taken to this court, but only to the Circuit Court, and that the allowance of an appeal to this court was a nullity.
This objections to the jurisdiction is decisive; but, if it were otherwise, the fact that no transcript of the record was filed at the next term, would be fatal to the appeal. [3]
No consent of counsel can give jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction depends on the Constitution and the acts of Congress. When these do not confer it, courts of the United States cannot exercise it.
We cannot take cognizance of a case not brought before us in conformity with the law.
The case at bar, therefore, must be DISMISSED.
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This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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