The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Alexander - The Idea of Value
The distinction between judgments which are mere statements of fact and "normative" judgments is commonly regarded as ultimate, but this is because the notion of value has not been properly analyzed. To do this is the object of the present paper. Those who maintain that the distinction between fact and value is ultimate, confuse the practically invaluable with the theoretically unique. Ideals are but the formulation of desires. Only in one respect can they be regarded as unique: they are systematic wholes. But this results from the systematic character of society itself and of the individuals who compose it. Thus "Sollen" is a form of "Seyn." The goodness of the good act is the approval of it by the good man. Destroy the good man, and the moral order perishes too. We call those good who promote the efficiency of society, and help to maintain the equilibrium of forces which society represents. The growth of standards and their application is a purely natural process. Fact and value, then, do not stand opposed to each other. Value is the mere expression of the fact that a solution has been found of the problem how to reconcile certain sentiments into an organized whole. Pleasure is an important test of value, but is not for that reason to be regarded as determinative of the latter. Both pleasure and value are dependent upon character. What will give a man pleasure depends upon his character; pleasure is a function of character, not character of pleasure. Character is the determining cause of our ideals, and on it the idea of value is founded.