The De Witts were murdered in 1672, and the whole administration was forthwith transferred to the hands of the Prince of Orange. This was indeed inevitable. The party of the De Witts was paralysed by the outbreak, the people insisted on the elevation of the Prince of Orange to his ancestral dignities, and the condition of the Republic, menaced at once by two powerful enemies, Louis of France and Charles of England, required that the administration of affairs should be strengthened. It was fortunate for Holland, that, though the means by which the young Stadtholder was raised to his dignity are as indefensible as could be conceived, the resolution and patriotism of William were as conspicuous and as unyielding as those qualities were in the most distinguished of his race. He had not indeed the military genius of Maurice his great uncle, or Frederic Henry his grandfather, but for unshaken fortitude and persistent love of his country, he was a counterpart of his great-grandfather, William the Silent, and he was, besides, with better opportunities perhaps, the shrewdest diplomatist which the house of Orange has ever produced.
William had been trained in habits of reserve and prudence. Since the premature death of his father and mother, his bringing up had been in the hands of those who were distinctly opposed to the pretensions of his family. For twenty years, the government had been an aristocratic republic, which had taken every possible means to weaken the influence of the Orange party. It was necessary for William to be cautious and reticent in the highest degree, to be wary and self-reliant, to study the characters of those who were opposed to his elevation, and to cautiously win the friendship of those whom he might hereafter trust and employ. In his youth he had been too openly friendly with Zulestein, and the jealousy of the existing government removed this person, in whom he afterwards put absolute trust, from his company. William had indeed to learn the art of war, and to do the best he could in striving to secure his country's independence against the able generals who were trained in the armies of Louis. He was never their match in battle, but there was no ruler of Holland, who so rapidly minimized or retrieved defeat and loss. William instantly rose to the occasion, while his country was administered by the chief of the municipal aristocracy. William was ready to join them in suing for peace. But as soon as he became Stadtholder, though only twenty years of age, he encouraged the States to refuse the terms which Louis and Charles proposed, as discreditable and ruinous to resist to the last, to consider how great their resources still were, to seek for allies who would co-operate with them in thwarting French ambition, and rather than yield, in the last extremity to transfer themselves and their fortunes, to the Eastern Empire which they had founded. Louis and Charles, who had striven to secure for William the rank and position which he had now reached, found that he was resolute in maintaining the independence of that country, which they had hoped by his means to humilate or dismember.
The Dutch had opened the dykes, and at great loss and sacrifice had effectually barred the progress of the French. William took the field at once, and though he was unable to achieve the purposes with which he commenced his campaign, he was able to show that his army was capable of active resistance to his powerful enemy. But even in the first winter, when the French troops tried to attack the Hague by marching over the ice, the success of the attempt was only frustrated by a sudden thaw. More than once the peculiar geographical position of Holland saved it from what appeared to be imminent destruction.
Though as a general William was very moderately successful, he never lost the confidence of his countrymen. They early appreciated his patriotism and sagacity, and constantly explained his failures by the fact that the boldness of his projects was in excess of his powers. Beyond this, several of the European Powers, though they had no great liking for the Dutch, were alarmed at the aggrandisement of France, and assisted Holland. This was the case with Spain, with Brandenburg (soon to be the kingdom of Prussia), and afterwards the Scandinavian kingdoms.
The Dutch believed, and with some reason, that the accession of the English king's nephew to the highest office in the Republic, which Charles had always demanded, would disarm English hostility. But Charles was in the pay of France, and was entirely incapable of gratitude or honour. It was necessary, however, for Charles to keep his parliament in good humour, they being utterly disinclined to the war, and to yield to them in a matter on which he was exceedingly reluctant, the political proscription of the Catholics, before he could get any pecuniary assistance from them. He was able to furnish a fleet, which in conjunction with that of France, seemed likely to be able to overwhelm the Dutch on sea.
The Dutch, under the command of De Ruyter and Tromp, fought two naval battles with the combined English and French fleets, on June 7th and June 14 1673, in which a slight advantage was on the side of Holland. On August 21st another battle equally undecisive was fought. But in more distant regions, and in privateering, which was the most powerful and common kind of naval warfare at the time, the Dutch were far more successful, little damage being done to their trade, and much loss being suffered by English merchants.
Meanwhile the ambition of Louis was consolidating European enmity against France. The Kings of Sweden and Denmark espoused the cause of the Provinces. Spain made vigorous efforts on behalf of the Netherlands, and therefore on behalf of Holland, and even the Emperor of Germany entered into an alliance with the States. There can be no doubt that not a little of this jealousy of France was due to the diplomacy of William. Louis was compelled to abandon the conquests which he had made in the Provinces, though in doing so he inflicted as many insults and as much injury as he could on the people whose towns he temporarily occupied. The consequence was that the parts of Holland which had suffered most supplied the most ardent partizans for the future of the Stadtholder.
The English Parliament was determined to put an end to the war with Holland, which Charles, in order to secure French bribes, was anxious to carry on. They refused to vote supplies unless the Dutch were obstinately set on war. The Dutch soon became aware of this feeling, and instantly took advantage of it, by approaching Parliament through the king. Despite the reluctance of Charles, Parliament, on learning the Dutch proposals, absolutely refused to make any further grants, addressed the king in favour of peace, and enforced their action by threatening his ministers with impeachment. Charles was forced to give way, and again employed Sir William Temple in negotiating a peace with Holland. A few days sufficed to complete the negotiations. It is not unlikely that the treachery of Charles and the hatred of James to the Dutch made this nation disposed to assist that expedition, which fourteen years later expelled the male Stewarts from the English throne. The evacuation of Holland by the French, and the alliance with Holland, compelled the two Bishops of Munster and Cologne, who had captured some towns in Holland, to sue for peace and restore their conquests.
The Prince of Orange got all the credit of these indirect successes. The States made the office of Stadtholder hereditary in his descendants, invited him to contract a marriage, and made him handsome gifts of money, the Dutch East India Company settling a portion of their profits on him and his heirs. The prudence of the Prince was shown again in the resolute way in which he insisted that those parts of the United Provinces which had been occupied and evacuated by the French, should be restored to all their ancient privileges. This policy conciliated these restored States to the Prince, and they now vied with each other in conferring the largest powers on the Stadtholder. William took advantage, perhaps naturally, of this good feeling, and remodelled the constitution of the recovered States of Utrecht Guelderland, and Overyssel in his own political interests, which were after all those of Holland. William became more absolute in these States than he was in any other part of the Republic. His policy in war and peace was alike beneficial.
The French king saw that Charles was unable to prevent the peace which Temple negotiated, and he determined to avenge himself on Spain. Now at this time Spain still possessed the Netherlands and a frontier on the eastern side of France. These Louis attacked successfully. The Stadtholder, now Commander-in-chief of the Spanish contingent as well as of the Dutch troops, encountered Condé and the French forces at Seneff, where a desperate struggle took place, lasting from morning to midnight. Though William was not victorious here, he was not defeated, and actually gained some of the advantages of victory by the capture of one or two important places.
In 1675 attempts were made to bring about a peace, and Sir W. Temple was again sent to Holland to sound the Stadtholder and the States. It was on this occasion that a proposal was made to William, to bring about a marriage between himself and Mary, the oldest daughter of the Duke of York. But William showed no inclination to close with the offer, and was not particularly anxious to put an end to the war.
In point of fact the Prince had been offered by one of the States whose interests he had defended, the title of Duke of Guelderland, with the hereditary but limited sovereignty over that state. But the other provinces, though they had given the Stadtholder almost unlimited power, took alarm at the suggestion that he should in any part of the Republic step out of the position of the First Minister of Holland into that of a hereditary sovereign. It is true that they had made his rank and office hereditary, and had given him ample powers, but still as long as he was Stadtholder only, what they had given they could revoke. If he became, however, a king or sovereign, his position and theirs would be totally altered, and in their eyes for the worse.
William was astonished and annoyed at the almost universal resistance which the project met with, and in responding to some of the States, he could not conceal his irritation, while he thought it prudent to disclaim any intention of accepting the offer. But at the same time, as he saw how important he was to the States in time of war, this rebuff made him more than ever disinclined to peace. He saw that a Stadtholder, when the war was over would be a very different person from a commander-in-chief holding the strings of a European alliance, and he probably thought besides that the continuance of the war would weaken Louis and strengthen the allies. The war was therefore continued, despite the efforts and good offices of Temple. It was carried on with varied success, but, on the whole, to the advantage of France, which kept making conquests in the Netherlands, on the Spanish frontier, and even in Holland, though at great cost to itself. The French even fought on sea with the Dutch in the Mediterranean, a battle in which De Ruyter lost his life. There are few of the naval heroes of Holland whose patriotism it so lofty, and whose courage and conduct are so conspicuous as those of De Ruyter were. There is none whose deeds are more copiously commemorated in the historical picture galleries of Amsterdam. The death of De Ruyter, ascribed to the insufficient fleet which he was bidden to command, diminished for a time the popularity of the Stadtholder.
Events were now constraining all parties to desire peace, though for a time only Sweden and the Republic expressed their desire for it. The latter found its commerce slipping into the hands of the English. The Navigation Act had injured them not a little; the continuance of the war, and the successes of the French privateers, had harmed them still more. At this time the English East India Company was making rapid strides. The profits of its trade were very great; the interests which it embraced were very numerous and very powerful, and large private fortunes were rapidly accumulated from the profits of its stock. Besides, the States were really bearing the greater part of the expenses of the war, for while the cost of their own armaments was great, they were subsidising the allies. The taxation of the Hollanders was enormous and oppressive, and nothing but the thrift and parsimony of the people enabled them to bear the load which was put on them. But William, like Maurice, was anxious to prolong the war. He insisted that the renewal of the Treaty of the Pyrenees should be made the first condition of peace, which meant that Louis should relinquish all his conquests. At last William was almost alone in his opinion.
The King of France saw, as he thought, an opportunity of breaking up the alliance by making peace severally with the combatants. He offered to the emperor the boundaries of the peace of Westphalia, to Holland the restoration of the only Dutch town which was now in his possession. He resolved, on the other hand, to enlarge his frontier at the expense of Spain, and to recover for Sweden, whose alliance he had purchased, all that she had lost in Northern Germany. The Prince of Orange, seeing his countrymen bent on peace, felt constrained to go with them, but determined to make one more effort before he finally yielded.
His anxiety was to induce the King of England to enter anew into that alliance with Holland which had been negotiated by Sir W. Temple after the first war with England. He therefore informed this minister that he was anxious now to effect that marriage with Mary, the daughter of the Duke of York, which he had declined so coldly a few years before, and with this view visited England. Charles wished the peace to precede the marriage, but William with some show of reason alleged, that such a line of action would make him suspected of postponing public considerations to his own private wishes. Danby, afterwards Duke of Leeds, persuaded Charles to give way, and the Stadtholder and Mary were married in 1677. She was the only respectable Stewart.
In London, William and Charles discussed the terms on which peace should be granted, and Charles engaged himself to declare war against both France and Spain if the terms were not accepted. Louis, who it was thought, would reject these terms at once, knew the mind of the English king better than William did, and affected to treat on this basis, with the object of prolonging the negotiations. In England popular feeling against France rose so high, that Charles was forced to call his parliament together to accept a grant from them, and enlist an army.
The Dutch determined, however, to accept such terms as, leaving a sufficient number of towns in the Spanish Netherlands, between the French conquests and their own frontier, and restoring to them all which they had lost, would put an end to the war. Upon this basis a truce of six months was agreed to, which was afterwards prolonged. The Emperor, the Elector, and the King of Denmark, who had been carrying on the war at the expense of Holland, were indignant at the States for not allowing themselves to be ruined. After some appearance of activity on the part of Charles, the Dutch agreed to peace with France.
The Stadtholder was exceedingly dissatisfied with what had occurred. He thought and thought correctly, that if Charles had been firm, the peace of 1678 might have been founded on the lines of the treaty of the Pyrenees, and the neutral territory between Holland and France have been extended to its old limits. He saw that the treaty of Nimeguen had left the French far stronger than they were before, and he predicted that another war would shortly be waged, in order to maintain what is called the balance of power in Europe. In his anger, even after the peace was signed, he attacked Luxemburg, the French general in his camp near Mons, and fought a battle there. But Louis, who had obtained all the solid advantages which he desired, took no offence at this breach of faith. William, however, cherished the utmost suspicion of the French monarch, and there can be no doubt that his dissatisfaction at the peace of Nimeguen led to those two long and costly wars which were so destructive, and which entirely humiliated the house of Bourbon.