The Theory of Mind of Roger Bacon/Preface
PREFACE.
The following study pretends to be no more than a contribution toward an eventual formulation of the Philosophy of Roger Bacon. It is neither a literary nor an historical study, but rather a critical presentation of certain aspects of his Philosophy.
The time has hardly come when one can undertake seriously to write of the Philosophy of Roger Bacon. Such a work presupposes materials in a very different form from that in which we have them. Further, there is presupposed a study of our Author’s sources, with the purpose of making clear the influence of his predecessors in the shaping of his thought. And, finally, a better account of the life of Bacon is desirable, to indicate the influence of his contemporaries upon his philosophical and scientific activities.
It was my hope at the outset to be able to make this a literary and historical, as well as a critical study, and founded upon a preliminary examination of my Author’s works and sources and life; but with the realization of the requirements involved, this hope quickly faded. It is possible therefore merely to indicate where the life and works and sources, so far as discussed, may be found.
For the fullest discussion of these subjects, the reader is referred to Emile Charles’ Monograph, “Roger Bacon, sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines, d’apres des textes inedits,” published in Paris, 1861. Bacon’s life is treated pp. 1 to 53, and some further suggestions as to his personality 97 to 110, and 306 to 310; his works pp. 54 to 96, cf. 334 to 416; and for an admirable attempt to indicate his sources, see pp. 311 to 322 (also 97 to 288, passim). Charles’ work has not been superseded; nor, as such, is it likely to be. At once its advantage and its disadvantage lie in it its broad scope and its fairly free play of the imagination. It should be added that Charles does not confine himself to the unedited works (suggested by the title), and that his citation of sources is inadequate.
In J. S. Brewer’s “Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera quaedam hactenus inedita,” London, 1859, is to be found (Introd. pp. lxxxv. to xcix.) an account of Bacon’s life (English translation from Wood’s “Hist. et Antiq. Univ. Oxon.,” Oxford, 1674, pp. 136ff); and in the same Introduction (pp. xxviii. to lxxxiv., cf. c.) a scholarly discussion of Bacon’s works, especially of value for orientation in his general literary activity and philosophy.
In John Henry Bridges’ (deceased, 1907) edition of “The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon,” Oxford, vols. I and II 1897, vol. III 1900, will be found a table of the few known facts of Bacon’s life (Introd. p. xx.), and a short description of that life (ibid. xxi. to xxxiii.); but he gives little that is new concerning the works of our Author. He gives, however, a very serviceable orientation in Bacon’s general philosophical scheme (ibid, xxxvi. to xcii.). In “Essays and Addresses,” by the same Author, posthumously published, London, 1897, will be found (pp. 159 to 168) an interesting sketch of our Philosopher’s life and work. As for sources, much material of great value is to be found in the footnotes of his edition of the Opus Majus.
In Robert Steele’s edition of the “Metaphysica Fratris Rogeri,” London, Alex. Moring Limited, is given (Preface) some further material, especially concerning the Metaphysics (sic) of Bacon. The same Editor has published Parts One and Two of the “Liber Primus Communium Naturalium Fratris Rogeri,” Oxford, Clarendon Press.
In “The Greek Grammar of Roger Bacon,” edited by Nolan and Hirsch, Cambridge, 1902, some material is presented that bears on the life, with especial reference to his contemporaries (Introd. xxxviii. to lxv.).
For bibliographies, the reader is referred to Delorme’s art. in “Dictionnaire de Theologie catholique,” t. II, ff. 8 to 31; and to Robertson’s art. in the “Dictionary of National Biography,” vol. II, pp. 374 to 378, ed. 1885, as well as Vogl: D. Physik Roger Bacons, Inaug. Diss., Erlangen, 1906.
The materials on which this study is chiefly based are the published works of Bacon as contained in the Brewer and Bridges editions above described; the latter contains the Opus Majus and the De Multiplication Specierum, while the former contains the Opus Tertium, Opus Minus, Compendium and the appended De Secretibus Artis et Naturae. Further, I have referred, here and there, to the editions of Steele above described, and to the printed (English Historical Review, July 1897) MS. (4086) found by Gasquet in the Vatican Library. In no case have I used any but published material. My references to the various works are as follows: Brewer, “Br. . . .”; Bridges, “I, or II, or III. . . .”; Steele, “M. . . .” for the Metaphysics, and “C. N. . . .” for the Communia Naturalium; Gasquet, “Ep . . . . “ for the self-denominated “epistola praeambulans.” I have taken these sources at their face value, as representing words actually penned by my Author; in no instance have I found serious difficulties of text so far as concerned my theme. The corrections of text, as in Bridges III, are not vital; the additions to the text, for Pars Prima, are however of real value. While vol. III (Bridges) suggests that it is not complete (see pp. 177 and 179, “preface to this volume”), I am informed that the late editor left no further materials.
The method followed has been simple, but it has been sought to make it painstaking. Certain definite questions were put to my Author, and the answers sought in his own words; attention has been confined to a critical examination of his own works, and the literature on Bacon has been little taken into account. The method of collation of parallel passages has been employed to the utmost possible limit. Accordingly, as an instrument for automatic control, an Index Rerum was composed, comprising something over two hundred concepts, and containing upward of seven thousand references. With this my Author’s treatment-in-chief was compared with all other relevant passages, to establish consistency or reveal inconsistency of conception. Where the latter appeared, it was sought to indicate a reconciliation, if possible, and that failing to seek the cause or the motive for the inconsistency. Pains have been taken throughout to say nothing which cannot be established by definite citation. And, further, it has been taken to be of essential importance not only to answer a given question clearly, but just as clearly to indicate my failure to do so.
The limitations of my work are expressed in the title selected, which it will be observed is fairly broad. Under Theory of Mind is included Psychology and Epistemology; under Psychology, both the physiological and the analytical; under Epistemology, both Theory of Perception and Theory of Knowledge, with the implied Criteriology. In Chapters II and III is to be found Bacon’s Psychology; thus, the distinction between vegetative, sensitive and rational souls, their origins, their relations to each other, and the faculties and physiological basis of the sensitive soul, on the one hand: and an examination of the rational soul in and for itself, with reference to form and matter, and in relation to its sources of knowledge, with reference to the “intellectus agens” problem, on the other hand. In Chapter IV is to be found our Philosopher’s Epistemology and Criteriology; thus, first his notion of the Perception of the External World, where the process of Perception, its analysis into Sensation, Association—and here his notion of the Universal—and Inference, and true as opposed to erroneous Perception, are considered: then, second, his notion of the part played by the Understanding in the winning of our Knowledge, where his conception of Proof in general and in particular is examined, to make clear how far a Criterion is given. Chapter I contains, as a necessary introduction, a critical presentation of his Theory of Species, which colors the whole background of his Theory of Mind in particular, and his Philosophy in general.
A word should be added concerning the general character of Bacon’s work. Although premature, it would not seem hazardous to assume that his work retained to the end of his days much more the character of outline than of system. The frequent repetitions, the extraordinarily wide scope of his reading, his marked gift of criticism and less marked capacity for synthesis, his intense enthusiasm and lack of judicial calm, on the one hand; and the purely external circumstances that filled his literary career with embarrassments and difficulties, and especially the imprisonment that robbed him of many of his best years, on the other hand—all make for a very reasonable presumption that his chief contribution in the history of thought was to be less a systematic Philosophy than a Method of procedure. For an excellent picture of the difficult circumstances that surrounded the composition of the Opus Majus, Opus Minus and Opus Tertium, attention is especially called to Brewer’s Introduction (pp. xvi. ff). It is well to keep this picture clearly before one’s mind in the study of Bacon; for it frequently makes plain what would otherwise be puzzling.