Theses Presented to the Second World Congress of the Communist International/Chapter 7

Theses Presented to the Second World Congress of the Communist International
the Comintern, Grigory Zinoviev, and Vladimir Lenin
Thesis VII: When and Under What Conditions Soviets of Workers' Deputies Should Be Formed.
4286582Theses Presented to the Second World Congress of the Communist International — Thesis VII: When and Under What Conditions Soviets of Workers' Deputies Should Be Formed.the Comintern, Grigory Zinoviev, and Vladimir Lenin

When and Under What Conditions Soviets of
Workers' Deputies Should Be Formed.

1. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies appeared for the first time in Russia in 1905, at a time when the revolutionary movement of Russian workmen was at its height. Already in 1905 the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies was taking the first instinctive steps towards a seizure of the power. And at that time the Petrograd Soviet was strong only as far as it had a chance of acquiring political power. As soon as the imperial counter-revolution rallied its forces and the Labour movement slackened, the Soviet, after a short vegetation, ceased to exist.

2. When in 1905, at the beginning of a new strong revolutionary wave, the idea began to awaken in Russia regarding the immediate organisation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the Bolshevik party warned the workmen against the immediate formation of the Soviets, and pointed out that such a formation would be well-timed only at the moment when the revolution would have already begun and when the turn would have come for the direct struggle for the power.

3. At the beginning of the February revolution of 1917, when the Soviets of Workers' Deputies were transformed into Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, they drew into the sphere of their influence the widest circles of the popular masses and at once acquired a tremendous authority, because the real force was on their side, in their hands. But when the liberal bourgeoisie recovered from the suddenness of the first revolutionary blows, and when the social traitors, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviki helped the Russian bourgeoisie to take the power into its hands, the importance of the Soviets began to dwindle. Only after the July days and after the ill-success of Komilov's counter-revolutionary campaign, when the wider popular masses began to move, and when the threat of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois coalition government came quite near, then the Soviets began to flourish again; and they soon acquired a prominent importance in the country.

4. The history of the German and the Austrian revolutions shows the same. When the popular masses revolted, when the revolutionary wave rose so high that it washed away the strongholds of the monarchies of the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs, in Germany and in Austria the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were formed with gigantic rapidity. At first the real force was on their side, and the Soviets were well on the way to become practically the power. But owing to a whole series of historical conditions, as soon as the power began to pass to the bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary Social Democrats then the Soviets began to decline and lose all importance. During the days of the unsuccesful counter-revolutionary revolt of Kapp-Lüttwitz in Germany, the Soviets again resumed their activity, but when the struggle ended again in the victory of the bourgeoisie and the social-traitors, the Soviets, which had just began to revive, once more died away.

5. The above facts prove that for the formation of Soviets certain definite premises are necessary. To organise Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and transform them into Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the following conditions are necessary:

(a) A great revolutionary impulse among the widest circles of workmen and workwomen, the soldiers and the workers in general.

(b) The acuteness of a political economical crisis attaining such a degree that the power begins to slip out of the hands of the government;

(c) When in the ranks of considerable masses of the workmen and first of all when in the ranks of the Communist Party a serious decision to begin a systematic and regular struggle for the power has become ripe.

6. In the absence of these conditions the Communists may and should systematically and Insistently propagate the idea of Soviets, popularise it among the masses, demonstrate to the widest circles of the population that the Soviets are the only efficient form of Government during the transition to complete Communism. But to proceed to a direct organisation of Soviets in the absence of the above three conditions is impossible.

7. The attempt of the social traitors in Germany to introduce the Soviets Into the general bourgeois-democratic constitutional system, is treason to the workers' cause and deceit of the workmen. Real Soviets are possible only as a form of state organisation, relieving bourgeois democracy, breaking it up and replacing it by a dictatorship of the proletariat.

8. The propaganda of the right leaders of the Independents (Hilferding, Kautsky and others), proving the compatibility of the "Soviet system" with the bourgeois Constituent Assembly, is either a complete misunderstanding of the laws of development of a proletarian revolution, or a conscious deceiving of the working class. The Soviets are the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Constituent Assembly is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. To unite and reconcile the dictatorship of the working class with that of the bourgeoisie Is impossible.

9. The propaganda of some representatives of the Left independents in Germany presenting the workers with a ready-made, literary plan of a "Soviet system", which has no relation whatever to the concrete process of the civil war is a doctrinary pastime which draws the workers away from their essential tasks of the real struggle for power.

10. The attempts of separate Communist groups in France, Italy, America, England to form Soviets not embracing the larger working masses and unable therefore to enter into a direct struggle for the power, are only prejudicial to the actual preparation of a Soviet revolution. Such artificial hot-house "Soviets" soon become transformed in the best of cases into small associations for propaganda of the idea of a Soviet power, and in the worst case such miserable "Soviets" are capable only of compromising the idea of the power of "Soviets" in the eyes of the popular masses.

11. At the present time there exists a special condition in Austria, where the working class has succeeded in preserving its Soviets, which unite large masses of workers. Here the situation resembles the period between February and October 1917 in Russia. The Soviets in Austria represent a considerable political force, and appear to be the embryo of a new power.

It must be understood that in such a situation the Communists ought to participate in these Soviets. help the Soviets to penetrate into all phases of the social economic and political life of the country; they should create Communist factions within these Soviets, and by all means aid their development.

12. Soviets without a revolution are impossible. Soviets without a proletarian revolution inevitably become a parody of Soviets. The authentic Soviets of the masses are the historically revealed form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. All sincere and serious partisans of the power of Soviets should deal cautiously with the idea of Soviets, and while indefatigably propagating it among the masses, proceed to the direct realisation of such Soviets only under the conditions mentioned above.

G. Zinoviev.