1922 Encyclopædia Britannica/Japan

JAPAN (see 15.156). The first national census in Japan took place on Oct. 1 1920; prior to that date only the figures prepared by the local registrars and police authorities were available. Table 1 gives the census figures for Japan proper, Formosa and Japanese Sakhalin, together with those obtained for Korea from the local registrars' records. The figures for Japan proper (area, 148,756 sq. m.) show that she ranks sixth in pop. of the countries of the world, the first five being China, India, Russia, the United States and Germany. With regard to the density of pop., Japan (376 per sq. m.) ranks third, immediately following Belgium (658) and the Netherlands (536), and above Great Britain (374).

Table 1.—Population, 1920
   Households  Population Total
 


    Male Female  
 Japan, Proper 11,222,053  28,042,995  27,918,145  55,961,140 
 Taiwan (Formosa) 690,000  1,894,141  1,760,257  3,654,398 
 Karaofuto (Japanese Sakhalin)  22,087  62,241  43,524  105,765 
 Chosen (Korea) 3,297,285  8,923,060  8,361,147  17,284,207 
 



 Total  15,231,425   38,922,437   38,083,073   77,005,510 

{{EB1911 fine print|The ratio between men and women of the whole pop. is 100.4 to 100, the number of men being 28,042,995 and that of women 27,918,145. The larger number of men is recorded in the district of Tokyo and Hokkaido (112 men to 100 women) and other 11 prefectures, whilst there are 3 prefectures in which the ratio is balanced and 31 prefectures in which the number of women exceeds that of men, the prefectures of Shiga, Kagoshima, and Okinawa (the Luchu Is.) showing the lowest figures for men (93 men to 100 women). The higher proportion of men is accounted for either by the inclusion of a large city, with its commercial and industrial activities, or of a military barrack or a silver-, copper- or coal-mine. Women are generally found to be more numerous in the provincial districts, for it is oftener men than women who migrate to large cities or even abroad in quest of knowledge or fortune.

Cities and the Country.—Table 2 gives the census figures for 16 cities with a pop. numbering more than 100,000 souls.

Table 2.—Principal Cities, 1920
   Households  Male Female Total
 



 Tokyo 456,820   1,171,180   1,001,982   2,173,162 
 Osaka 276,331  673,636  579,336  1,252,972 
 Kobe 138,986  324,037  284,591  608,628 
 Kyoto 128,892  299,689  291,616  591,305 
 Nagoya 92,426  220,276  209,714  429,990 
 Yokohama 95,241  224,050  198,892  422,942 
 Nagasaki 37,036  90,897  85,657  176,554 
 Hiroshima 34,553  83,337  77,167  160,504 
 Hakodate 29,155  75,647  69,093  144,740 
 Kure 28,268  73,754  56,600  130,354 
 Kanazawa 29,287  62,842  66,478  129,320 
 Sendai 21,861  62,529  56,449  118,978 
 Otaru 21,275  56,406  51,707  108,113 
 Sapporo 20,038  53,011  49,560  102,571 
 Kagoshima  19,942  49,191  53,205  102,396 
 Yawata 22,322  56,373  43,854  100,227 

There are 25 cities with a pop. of from 50,000 to 100,000; 34 with from 30,000 to 50,000, and eight with less than 30,000.

Economic and Financial Conditions.—Prior to 1914 Japan had already almost recovered from the effects of the Russo-Japanese War, and her economic activities had yearly been making steady and more or less symmetrical progress. The World War, however, caused and even compelled the Island Empire to undertake a prodigious development of her commercial and industrial life.

During the early days of the war the disturbance in international commercial relations affected the Japanese nation in common with the other peoples of the world. She was immediately conscious of the disquieting falling-off in the demand for silk, the most important of her exports. This situation, however, began to be perceptibly modified later, when a huge demand arose on the part of Russia and other Allied Powers for the supply of immense quantities of munitions of war, and, in addition, the inability of the European belligerents to continue their overseas commerce on the pre-war scale caused a demand for Japanese products in the markets of India, the South Seas, Australia, S. America and even Africa. The wave of prosperity which the satisfaction of these demands created was increased by the great volume of the carrying trade which fell to Japan's share, owing to the number of Allied merchantmen which had been directed to warlike purposes. All these factors, in addition to the natural decline in imports from the countries of the European belligerents, conduced to turn the balance of Japanese trade in her favour practically for the first time in 20 years.

A great increase in the amount of specie held by Japan abroad inevitably resulted, and the gold accumulated at home also tended to grow rapidly. The lowering of the rate of interest followed; prices of shares began to soar—the shares of the steamship companies advanced by 400% in 1915—and the enthronement of the Emperor in the autumn of that year strewed with roses the already bright path leading to improved industrial activities. A considerable number of new undertakings, notably in the field of shipbuilding, iron and steel manufacture and the chemical industry, were brought into being. Once more the rate of interest showed an upward tendency, and the issue of bank-notes increased rapidly. The trend of circumstances described above became more and more accentuated as time went on, until at the end of 1916 the premature peace-talk counselled temporary caution to Japanese manufacturers and merchants.

The momentous events of 1917, such as the general Allied trade embargo, the introduction by the Germans of ruthless submarine warfare, the declaration by the United States of war upon Germany and the débâcle of the Russian Revolution, all had their repercussion upon Japanese commerce. The continuous internal troubles in China further added to the general international confusion. Nevertheless, in spite of the far-reaching effects of these great outside influences, Japan's trade and industry continued on the whole to register a steady development. The tightened restrictions on commerce on the part of Great Britain and the United States, especially the ban placed at one period by the latter on the export of iron and steel, caused a proportionate measure of agitation in the circles of industrial enterprise in Japan. Her shipbuilding and steel industries, however, were relieved from anxiety, and even stimulated into further development, by an arrangement which was speedily arrived at between the United States and Japan as to the exchange of ships and steel.

With the conclusion of the Armistice in Nov. 1918 the demand for warlike materials came to an abrupt end; and the branches of industry and commerce dealing with iron, steel, copper, dye-stuffs and chemicals, which had owed their inauguration or development to the abnormal situation caused by the war, received a sudden and serious blow. The demand for bottoms slackened down as a natural consequence, and the shipbuilders, who had been enjoying a period of tremendous and unprecedented prosperity, were forced to arrest their activities. There were even threatening signs of economic depression. But the revived demand for food-stuffs, and industrial materials necessary for the economic reconstruction of Europe, coupled with the roaring trade activities in the United States, still sustained the flourishing state of Japan's commerce.

For the rest, a financial panic which occurred in April 1920, due to over-speculation and misuse of credit, administered a telling blow to trade and industry. Nevertheless, Japan had amassed great wealth, her industry had advanced marvellously, not only in quantity but in variety; her merchants had acquired wide knowledge and a seasoned experience; her ships now cruised to the remotest corner of the seven seas; and many a country had been newly added to the list of her foreign customers. The foundation of industrial Japan had become incomparably stronger than in pre-war days and the brightest vista opened up before her future economic development.

The State Budget.—The general budget of Japan, which was

doubled both in revenue and expenditure during the Russo-Japanese War, was more than redoubled in the course of 1910-20. The total revenue and expenditure, which amounted in the fiscal year 1910-11 to 672,874,000 yen (£68,600,000) and 569,154,000 yen (£57,900,000) respectively, balanced at 1,563,000,000 yen (£160,000,000) in 1921-2. Table 3 shows the increasing figures of the Japanese State budget for the decade 1910-20.

Although in the early months of the war the more or less disturbed economic conditions in Japan checked the natural increase of revenue in general—the customs duties in particular yielded a considerably diminished income owing to the marked decline in foreign trade—the gradual recovery, followed by the unprecedented prosperity of industry and commerce, caused the revenue to show an upward tendency. Since 1916-7 the income-tax, especially the amount contributed by commercial and industrial corporations, had begun rapidly to ascend in amount. Receipts from public undertakings and State property, especially the income of the steel foundries and the proceeds of munition sales to Allied belligerents, contributed enormously to the general growth of the revenue, although it should be noted that the manufacture of arms necessitated the

disbursement of a sum practically equal to the income.
A noteworthy step was taken in 1918 in the creation of the

profits tax, which required the profiteers, including ship narikin, to pay not less than 20% either of their income in excess of their average profits in pre-war days, or, in case such could not be ascertained, of 10% of their invested capital. This item yielded nearly 82 million yen (£8,300,000) in 1918-9 and 93 million yen (£9,400,000) in the following fiscal year, but with the end of the war the revenue dropped to 7 million yen (£700,000).

As the war progressed it became more and more imperative that Japan should put forth her best efforts to render to her Allies military and economic industrial support. The trade boom and the enhancement at home of the national power also led to expansive industrial and educational measures. It became, moreover, evident that the salaries and wages of Government officials should be raised to meet the increased cost of living. It was only natural that State expenditure should expand in juxtaposition with the growth of the revenue. With the completion of the national defence programme spread over

seven years, there were to be further enormous outlays.
Table 3.—Budget Figures 1910-21 (in 1,000 yen)
Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus
Revenue


Ordinary  Extraordinary  Total Ordinary  Extraordinary  Total








 1910-1 491,331.3  181,542.4 672,873.7  412,009.1 157,144.8 569,154.0  103,719.7
 1911-2 508,558.6  148,633.5 657,192.2  409,889.0 175,485.5 585,374.6   71,817.6
 1912-3 552,085.5  135,306.8 687,392.4  416,895.0 176,701.3 593,596.4   93,796.0
 1913-4 575,428.0  146,547.4 721,975.4  415,635.8 157,998.1 573,633.9  148,341.5
 1914-5 536,342.5  198,305.5 734,648.0  399,225.4 249,195.0 648,420.4   86,227.6
 1915-6 538,999.6  169,616.2 708,615.8  386,516.4 196,753.3 583,269.8  125,346.0
 1916-7 622,052.1  191,256.5 813,308.6  386,065.9 204,729.3 590,795.3  222,513.2
 1917-8 763,760.1  321,198.2 1,084,958.3  437,821.4 297,202.7 735,024.2  349,934.1
 1918-9 911,579.4  567,536.4 1,479,115.8  490,167.1 526,868.4 1,017,035.5   462,080.2 
 1919-20  839,140.9  225,049.3 1,064,190.3  505,936.6 558,253.6 1,064,190.3 
 1920-1 1,012,614.1  322,741.1 1,335,355.3  724,790.8 610,564.4 1,335,355.3 
 1921-2  1,237,219.2  325,323.5  1,562,542.7   902,940.8  659,601.9  1,562,542.7 
To meet all these increases in expenses, the war profit tax alone

was calculated to be insufficient; and the income-tax was so adjusted as to yield a larger revenue, at the same time, with a view to effecting a fair distribution of the burden. The saké tax was raised; postal, telegraph and telephone charges were increased; and a higher price was charged for the Government monopoly tobaccos.

Those revenue measures were rewarded with success in 1918-9, and in the following fiscal year the sums so raised still showed an increase. In 1919-20 the effect of the conclusion of the war was felt in the marked decrease in the returns of the steel foundries. But in all other items, the budget estimates were greatly exceeded. The bourse tax and forest revenues were double the figures of the previous year. Japan had thus emerged from the five years of the World War with her financial position considerably strengthened, though during 1920-1 the effect was discounted by industrial unrest and economic depression which reacted adversely on the domestic financial conditions. The budget for 1921-2 contained the estimated expenditure for the eight-to-eight fleet-unit scheme, and it was a question at the end of 1921 how far this might be subject to modification as a result of the Washington Conference. The chief

items of revenue and expenditure for 1921-2 are given in Table 4.
Table 4.—Revenue and Expenditure 1921-2
 Ordinary Revenue:— Yen
Land Tax 73,985,325 
Income Tax 268,099,093 
Business Tax 48,670,969 
Tax on liquors 171,237,991 
Sugar Excise 41,886,037 
Consumption Tax on textile fabrics 33,260,882 
Customs Duty 69,872,070 
Other Taxes 44,452,169 
Stamp Duty 90,165,422 
Receipts from postal, telegraph and telephone services 187,177,396 
Forests 32,057,000 
Profits of monopoly 93,981,954 
Other receipts from public undertakings and State property 17,611,690 
Miscellaneous receipts 21,260,434 
Transferred from special account for deposits 43,500,776 
Total  1,237,219,208 
 
 Extraordinary Revenue:— Yen
Proceeds of sale of State property 7,361,888 
Receipts from the issue of public loan 54,264,892 
Public bodies' contributions to expenses for river, road, harbour improvements, etc.  16,373,877 
Transferred from special account for various funds 8,251,168 
Local contributions to expenses incurred by the State 6,356,400 
Surplus of the preceding year transferred 193,095,985 
Miscellaneous receipts 39,719,379 
Total 325,323,589 
Total Revenue 1,562,542,797 
 
 Ordinary Expenditures:— Yen
Imperial Household 4,500,000 
Foreign Affairs 18,488,310 
Home Affairs 40,860,512 
Finance 223,146,614 
Army 183,290,831 
Navy 144,811,078 
Justice 27,242,184 
Public Instruction 33,938,167 
Agriculture and Commerce 19,377,811 
Communications 207,285,315 
Total 902,940,823 
 
 Extraordinary Expenditure:— Yen
Foreign Affairs 3,130,574 
Home Affairs 76,426,341 
Finance 35,271,551 
Army 79,853,871 
Navy 353,826,000 
Justice 2,426,472 
Public Instruction 20,672,879 
Agriculture and Commerce 31,303,978 
Communications 56,690,308 
Total 659,601,974 
Total Expenditure 1,562,542,797 
The National Debt.—The National Debt stood at 2,793,000,000

yen (£284,800,000) at the end of 1919-20, of which 1,482,000,000 yen (£151,000,000) represented the internal, and 1,311,000,000 yen

(£133,700,000) the foreign loans. Table 5 gives the figures.
Table 5.—Debt 1910-20 (in 1,000,000 yen)
 Financial 
Year
Internal Loans
 Amount outstanding 
 at the end of the 
financial year
Foreign Loans
 Amount outstanding 
 at the end of the 
financial year
Total Debt
per
head
 in yen 





 1910-1 1,203.1 1,447.2 2,650.3 39.1
 1911-2 1,146.2 1,437.4 2,583.6 37.3
 1912-3 1,116.2 1,456.9 2,573.2 36.3
 1913-4 1,054.6 1,529.4 2,584.1 35.6
 1914-5  991.5 1,514.8 2,506.3 33.9
 1915-6 1,028.0 1,461.1 2,489.2 33.0
 1916-7 1,097.4 1,370.2 2,467.7 32.1
 1917-8 1,159.9 1,338.7 2,498.7 32.3
 1918-9 1,268.8 1,311.1 2,579.9 33.0
 1919-20 1,482.4 1,311.1  2,793.5  36.4
Foreign Trade.—The rapidity with which Japan's foreign trade

had developed, both in volume and extent, during the half-century preceding 1920 provides a remarkable record in commercial history. The total value of exports and imports, which in the first year of Meiji (1868) amounted to the insignificant total of 26 million yen (£2,650,000), increased tenfold in 1895, a hundredfold in 1917, and l67-fold in 1920. The most striking progress was attained during the World War, when Japan's foreign trade leapt from 1,362 million yen (£139,000,000) in 1913 to 4,284 million yen (£438,000,000) in 1920; although it should be remarked that these figures do not correctly represent the proper rate of increase in the volume of trade, owing to the inflation of prices. The war first reacted prejudicially upon the foreign trade of Japan, as well as upon other branches of her commerce and industry, and the figures for the total imports and exports in 1914 indicated the marked decrease of 12.9% on those of the preceding year. The effect of the war in increasing foreign trade first showed itself appreciably in the returns for 1915, when the adverse balance of trade which had obtained for 20 years—with the exception of the years 1906 and 1909, when slight excesses of exports were recorded—was superseded by a favourable trade balance. The total value of the imports and exports for that year was 1,241 million yen (£127,000,000), an increase of 54 million yen (£5,500,000), or 4.5%, compared with 1914, although the value of the total trade for 1913 was not achieved on account of the diminished volume of imports. The favourable tendency in Japan's oversea trade was accelerated in succeeding years, until the excess of exports over imports attained 371 million yen (£38,000,000) in 1916 and 567

million yen (£58,000,000) in 1920.
This sudden expansion of trade was occasioned by the war both

directly, through the great demand by the Allied belligerents for munitions of war, and also indirectly, through the temporary retirement of the great industrial Powers of Europe from the arena of world commerce and trade. Soon after the outbreak of the war Japanese goods—chiefly consisting of semi-manufactured and finished articles, such as cotton fabrics, leather goods, watches, silk tissues and so forth— found their way in large quantities not only to the established markets in the Far East, but to various quarters of the world hitherto but little explored by Japanese traders, viz. the South Seas, S. America and even Africa. The most conspicuous expansion, however, was effected in the exports to China and India, and, until the explosion of the Russian Revolution in 1917, large shipments to Vladivostok of munitions of war and food-stuffs for use in European Russia assisted to augment the volume of trade with Asia. The United States began to buy heavily in 1916, when the figures advanced from 204 million yen (£20,900,000) in the preceding year to the substantial amount of 340 million yen (£34,800,000), the goods purchased consisting mostly of raw silk, habutai, cotton yarns, cotton fabrics and tea. British America and also Mexico increased their orders from Japan and the S. American trade showed such glowing prospects as to induce Japanese companies to open shipping

facilities to Brazil through the Straits of Magellan.
The import trade, which had been on the wane in the early days

of the war, commenced to revive in 1916, owing to larger purchases of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods, such as raw cotton, iron, wool, crude caoutchouc, flax and jute. By far the largest volume of raw cotton came from British India, but the United States had doubled her exports to Japan of that article, as well as of iron, in a twelvemonth. Australia supplied Japan largely with wool.

The war situation developed serious vicissitudes in 1917, and in a measure militated against the trend to expansion of Japan's commerce. The entry of the United States of America into the war, with its attendant embargo on steel, iron and gold, temporarily disturbed the economic equipoise of the Far Eastern Empire. The Russian Revolution and the subsequent repudiation of all foreign liabilities by the Bolshevik commissaries introduced a fresh factor of discouragement in the export trade of Japan. The internal political feuds in China would also have dismayed Japanese exporters but for the tremendous appreciation in the price of silver, which resulted in maintaining an abundant demand for Japanese articles. But in spite of all, Japan's foreign trade made progress more or less on the lines indicated before, until a complete change of the situation was brought about by the conclusion of the Armistice in the autumn of 1918. The demand for munitions of war naturally came to an end, but the rate of exchange on Europe continued on a high level. At home the cost of production had greatly increased owing to the advance in wages and the higher prices of industrial materials, whereas the enriched public demanded a higher proportion of the necessaries of life. An anti-Japanese boycott was proceeding in China to add to the curtailment of Japan's exports. All these circumstances, reënforced by the Imperial Ordinance of Nov. 1919, for the regulation of the price of commodities, temporarily exempting certain food-stuffs and industrial materials from import duties and restricting the exportation of cotton yarns, brought about a reverse in the balance of foreign trade, which had been favourable to Japan for the preceding four years. But the fact that her exports consisted of finished and semi-manufactured articles, as well as of a huge value of raw and waste silk, whilst food-stuffs, raw materials and machinery were mainly imported, was a reassuring sign. Table 6 gives the

foreign trade of Japan (excluding bullion) for 1909-20.
Table 6.—Foreign Trade (in 1,000 yen)
  Exports Imports  Excess or 
 deficit of 
Exports




 1909 413,113  394,199  + 18,914
 1910 458,429  464,234  -  5,805
 1911 447,434  573,806  - 66,372
 1912 526,982  618,992  - 92,010
 1913 632,460  729,432  - 96,972
 1914 591,101  595,736  -  4,634
 1915 708,307  532,450  +175,857
 1916 1,127,468  756,428  +371,040
 1917 1,603,005  1,035,811  +567,194
 1918 1,962,101  1,668,144  +293,957
 1919 2,098,873  2,173,460  - 74,587
 1920   1,948,395   2,336,175  -387,780
Coin and Bullion.—As regards the movement of gold and silver

coins and bullion, the balance of trade in favour of Japan, coupled with the increase arising out of freight, charterage and so forth, had resulted in an unusual influx of these metals since 1916, and in the following year the high-water mark was reached, the import being 392 million yen (£40,000,000) as against the export of 154 million yen (£15,700,000). But owing to the ban placed on the export of gold in the United States in 1917, the import of the precious metal to Japan dwindled in value to 5 million yen (£520,000), whilst in view of Japan's own embargo on gold, instituted later as a measure of self-preservation, the export only amounted to 937,000 yen (£96,000). In 1919 there were imported 327 million yen (£33,500,000), as against an exodus to the value of 5 million yen (£520,000); and in 1920 405 million yen (£48,600,000), as against 4 million yen (£410,000). The United States had raised her embargo on gold, but Japan had not yet done so in 1921.

Distribution of Foreign Trade.—The dramatic expansion of Japan's foreign commerce was not only in the old markets in Asia and America but to the new fields in the South Seas and Africa. The geographical distribution of the expansion in terms of continents is

shown in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7.—Exports, by Continents (in 1,000 yen)
To 1913 1918 1919 1920





 Asia  275,928   935,550   995,146   998,374 
 America  191,761  597,175  877,925  632,159 
 Europe 147,225  298,257  194,853  195,590 
 Australia  8,638  64,828  30,826  58,117 
 Africa 1,846  46,811  24,107  38,842 
Table 8.—Imports, by Continents (in 1,000 yen)
From 1913 1918 1919 1920





 Asia  348,055   812,713   1,074,370   942,547 
 America  127,035  655,011  791,643  910,648 
 Europe 220,290  82,787  162,970  305,318 
 Australia  14,943  48,874  56,635  62,459 
 Africa 7,189  38,627  53,168  87,157 
In the receipt of exports from Japan, the United States of America

has always headed the list, the zenith of purchase being reached in 1919—that country taking 29% of the total value of exports in 1913, 28% in 1918, 39% in 1919, and 28% in 1920—and she has been followed immediately by China (including Kwantung province), whose shares in those years were 29%, 25%, 28% and 27% respectively. Next to China, though with a wide hiatus, came France in 1913 and then followed Hong-Kong, Great Britain, British India, Italy, Germany and others. But British India and Great Britain had surpassed France by 1918. Notable, also, are the advances of Australia, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippine Islands, Egypt, Argentina, British America, Cape Colony, Hawaii and others in the

scale of demand for Japanese goods.
As regards imports into Japan, British India, which had been the

chief supplier for several years precedent to the World War (her share was 23% in 1913), yielded her place to the United States in 1916. The value bought by Japan from the latter country aggregated 766 million yen (£78,400,000, 35% of the total) in 1919 and 837 million yen (£85,700,000, 36% of the total and nearly five times the figures of 1913) in 1920. Great Britain's sale to Japan showed a marked decline during the war, but in 1920 a revival had set in. As in the case of exports, Asia, the South Seas, South America and Africa have all contributed fair shares to the advancement of Japan's import trade; but various European countries, including Germany, commenced to resume their activities in 1920.

Tables 9 and 10 show the development of Japan's foreign trade in

more important commodities.
Table 9.—Principal Exports (in 1,000 yen)
Article 1914 1918 1920




 Silk (raw waste, floss, etc.)  169,720.7   412,848.9   418,140.7 
 Silk tissues and fabrics 34,022.8  117,532.8  158,416.0 
 Cotton (yarn, thread, etc.) 81,242.5  175,368.7  173,435.3 
 Cotton tissues and fabrics 34,840.7  237,913.1  334,966.0 
 Drugs (chemicals, etc.) 23,819.7  73,660.2  68,984.8 
 Matches 7,619.1  37,742.5  28,543.0 
 Coal 23,9l4.5  32,009.4  45,200.0 
 Cement 1,033.0  6,010.1  10,059.9 
 Pottery and glass 8,914.8  36,037.0  54,691.2 
 Clocks, scientific instruments  4,548.9  30,561.3  34,182.1 
 Ships 711.1  80,060.7  15,829.0 
 Sugar, refined 12,382.8  23,252.1  30,592.9 
 Metal manufactures 3,490.4  48,562.5  38,447.9 
 Copper 28,467.5  44,702.7  12,313.0 
 Rice 4,974.0  8,317.6  5,897.5 
 Kidney-beans 832.8  30,194.0  5,287.9 
 Starch 123.3  29,610.1  4,996.2 
 Tea 12,709.9  23,056.3  17,112.5 
 Aquatic products 13,416.1  l7,099.3  17,342.6 
 Clothing 23,876.3  83,001.4  88,487.0 
Table 10.—Principal Imports (in 1,000 yen)
Article 1914 1918 1920




 Raw cotton  218,974.5   513,738.4   720,160.5 
 Iron 41,662.9  310,391.4  279,222.2 
 Rice 24,823.9  89,755.6  l8,059.1 
 Wool l4,783.7  61,432.7  121,982.7 
 Drugs, chemicals, etc. 37,372.7  77,963.4  140,906.7 
 Machinery 24,942.3  58,497.9  110,571.3 
 Sugar 21,833.4  33,693.8  61,034.3 
 Oils, fats, waxes and manufactures 17,077.7  33,312.9  60,340.2 
 Metal manufactures 8,468.4  33,351.1  47,009.5 
 Skins, hair, bones, horns, teeth, etc. 8,165.0  28,583.7  44,847.7 
 Dyes, pigments, coating and filling matters  8,080.7  22,002.1  34,441.6 
 Tissues of wool 10,225.1  11,485.5  31,270.2 
 Paper, books and pictures 10,445.8  17,765.4  36,191.7 
Industrial Development.—Although the expansion of Japanese

industries was enormous during the Word War, the rate of progress registered in the pre-war period of 1908-13 had also been remarkable. In 1908 there were 11,390 industrial establishments and 196 Government factories; in 1913 the Government factories had decreased to 188 (in 1918 there was a further drop to 161), but the other industrial establishments had increased in number to 15,811, or 38.8%. By 1918 the figure had risen to 22,391, an increase of 41.6% on 1913 and 96.6% on 1908. In a decade, that is to say, Japan had practically doubled the number of factories in operation. Table 11

illustrates the development.
Table 11.—Industrial Progress
Government Factories

  No.  Motors  H.P. Men  Women 






 1908  196 1,746 169,510 98,533  25,351
1913 188 5,211 292,177 99,992  29,994
1918 161 7,014 361,226 123,087  36,349

Industrial Establishments

1908 11,390 11,848 379,556  248,751 400,925
1913 15,811 20,013 916,828  375,596 540,656
1918  22,391   42,436   2,006,098   646,115   763,081 

{{EB1911 fine print|It is significant that the number of male workers employed increased in a higher proportion than that of the female workers, showing that the trend of expansion was in the heavier grades of production, such as the iron and steel industries and shipbuilding. A striking advance was also attained in the use of mechanical power in factories, for not only had the number of motors in actual use advanced by 68.9% and 112% in the first and second half of the decade respectively, but the actual horse-power developed had increased to the unprecedented extent of 141.5% and 118.8% in the same periods. In other words, Japan nearly quadrupled the number of motors in use, whilst the horse-power developed increased fifty-fold during the decade.

Shipbuilding.—In 1896 the Diet passed the Navigation Encouragement Law, and from that time onwards remarkable progress in the shipbuilding industry was made. In 1898 a steamer of 6,000 tons, the first large boat to be built in a Japanese yard, was completed by the Mitsubishi dockyard at Nagasaki for the Nippon Yusen Kaisha. Subsequently the same dockyard and the Kawasaki establishment constructed steamers of over 10,000 tons, as well as cruisers for the Imperial Japanese navy and for China. In 1912 these two dockyards had reached such a pitch of development that each was entrusted with the building of a dreadnought of 27,500 tons.

In 1913 there were six shipyards, with 17 slipways and employing 26,139 workers, and a year later the output of ships of over 1,000 tons gross was 16, the total tonnage being 78,010. In the following five years, owing to the great demand for bottoms to replace the wastage of war, the shipbuilding industry worked with an intensity and vigour which overcame the serious difficulties of lack of skilled workers and of sufficient iron and steel material. Table 12 is eloquent of the results achieved.

Table 12.—Shipbuilding
   End of 1913   March 1918 



 Number of shipyards  57 
  Yen Yen
 Nominal capital  25,550,000   163,050,000 
 Paid-up capital 23,150,000  109,542,000 
 Debentures 3,600,000  22,050,000 
     
 Number of slipways  17  157 
 Number of workers 26,139  97,355 
The tonnage built at the leading dockyards in Japan during the four years ending in 1918 is shown in Table 13.
Table 13.—Tonnage built in 1914-8
Dockyard No. of
 Steamers 
Gross
Tons



 Kawasaki  49 289,083
 Mitsubishi (Nagasaki)  27 160,161
 Osaka Ironworks (Osaka)  40 133,927
 Uraga  24  99,086
 Osaka Ironworks (Innoshima)   24  97,021
 Asano  12  65,329
 Ishikawajima  14  31,005
 Mitsubishi (Kobe)  10  29,312
 Harima  10  22,953
 Fujinagata  10  20,249
 Yokohama   6  13,124
 Ono Ironworks   7  11,557
 

 Total 233  972,807 
With regard to her steam merchant fleet, Japan advanced during

June 1914 to June 1920 from sixth to third position among the world Powers, since at the latter date she possessed 2,996,000 tons as against 1,708,000 tons in 1914, thus emerging after the war with an increase of 1,288,000 gross tons. Japan also established a world record in shipbuilding speed during the war. On Oct. 7 1918 at 7 a.m. the keel was laid in the Kawasaki shipyard at Kobe of the “Raifuku Maru,” a steamer of 9,000 tons dead weight, length 385 ft., breadth 51 ft., moulded depth 28 ft. At 6 a. m. on Oct. 30 1918, or only 23 days later, the vessel was successfully launched, and later achieved a mean speed of 17.39 knots on two trial runs of 3 m. each.

The principal shipyards in Japan are as follows: The Mitsubishi Dockyard, Nagasaki, is the oldest and most important dockyard in Japan with up-to-date equipment. It has a water-frontage of about 1½ m. and is nearly 115 ac. in extent. This yard also possesses its own power station with turbo-generators developing 2,000 kw., as the chief machines, machine tools, shop and wharf cranes are all electrically driven. About 10,000 hands are employed and the firm holds the licence for building Parsons turbines. The Kawasaki Dockyards cover about 40 ac. of land, with a water-frontage of about 1 mile. Although formerly only medium-sized steamers and torpedo craft were built here, the capacity is now sufficient for any vessel up to 27,000 tons. At Hyogo the same company has a steel foundry, with a 20-ton Siemens furnace, producing very fine steel castings. The firm has also secured Italian patents for submarine construction and for motors. The Osaka Ironworks, founded in 1880 by the late Mr. E. H. Hunter, was converted into a joint-stock company in 1914, and now consists of separate engineering, shipyard and repairing departments, with a branch at Innoshima, on the Inland Sea. The shipyard covers nearly 16 ac., with a water-frontage of over 1,000 feet. The firm formerly specialized in the construction of dredgers, shallow-draught steamers, trawlers, etc., but now builds passenger and cargo boats up to 10,000 tons. The annual capacity of the yards is 200,000 tons, and the firm has specialized in the Isherwood type of vessel, having purchased the patent. The Asano Dockyard at Tsurumi, near Tokyo, was started to meet the war emergency and has a number of slips for ships of 12,000 tons. Its yearly capacity is almost equal to the pre-war total of the Japanese dockyards. The Suzuki Dockyard comprises the Harima and Toda yards, which were purchased by the Suzuki Co. of Kobe. When completely reorganized, the capacity of the former will be five vessels of 5,000 tons, and of the latter two of 3,000 and one of 1,000 tons. The Ishikawajima Dockyard at Tokyo has been reorganized to build ships of 6,000 tons. The Uraga Dockyard has a capacity of six vessels; between 5,000 and 10,000 tons. It should also be mentioned that the Yokohama Dockyard, which formerly confined itself to repairs, has now started building. Two other yards, of considerable size, are the Asahi, under the firm of Masudaya, Yokohama, and the Uchida yard, owned by Messrs. S. Uchida of Kobe.

Raw Silk and Silk-Weaving.—The manual dexterity peculiar to Japanese women is a factor which ensures the lasting prosperity of Japan's raw-silk industry, and when full advantage has been taken in modernizing the various processes of production in silk filiatures, enhanced benefit should accrue. Japanese silk goods have made great progress, and particularly silk pongee, which has now practically driven the Chinese product from the markets of the United States. At the end of 1918 there were 3,848 factories engaged in the silk industry, employing 64,188 male and 430,110 female operatives.

Cotton-Spinning, Cotton Textiles and Knitted Goods.—In spite of the difficulties during the World War of importing from Great Britain and the United States sufficient machinery to meet the enhanced demand for cotton yarn, the spinning-mills of Japan prospered exceedingly. The paid-up capital invested in the mills at the end of June 1920 was 248,180,000 yen, equivalent to an increase of 288% over the pre-war figure, whilst the number of spindles in use in 1918 was 3,384,800, and in June 1920 3,689,000, compared with 2,409,900 in 1914. At the end of 1918 there were 6,710 factories, with 65,316 male and 218,041 female operatives, the total number of workers in the textile industries being therefore 777,655. The latter figure includes about 25,000 who are engaged in the production of knitted goods, consisting principally of gloves, stockings and underwear, in which a large trade, chiefly with British India, has grown up in the last few years. As knitting was formerly entirely a domestic industry, there have been difficulties in producing goods of uniform quality for export, and a system of inspection was therefore instituted towards the end of 1917, under which it was prohibited to export articles of inferior quality. Previous to the war, the average output of knitted goods was 6,660,000 doz., valued at 8,937,000 yen, but during the five years of the war the output averaged 15,143,000 doz., of a value of 23,073,000 yen.

Iron-foundries.—Before the war there were only some 20 iron-foundries in Japan, but the difficulties during the war in obtaining from abroad the large quantities of iron and steel required to meet the boom in industry resulted in the establishment of over 250 foundries before the close of 1919. In 1914 the output of pig-iron amounted to 302,000 tons and of steel materials to 283,000 tons. In spite of the slump in the iron industry which occurred after the Armistice, in the year 1919 613,000 tons of pig-iron and 553,000 tons of steel materials were produced.

Machine- and Tool-Making.—At the end of 1918 about 2,700 factories were engaged in various forms of machine making; and also in many branches of metalwork and metalware. The manufacture of machinery for the production of electric apparatus and lamps, as well as the construction of dynamos, telephones, railway signals and measuring instruments, are practically new growths of iron and steel industrial activity. Table 14 shows the position of four representative concerns engaged in machine construction in the

second half of 1918.
Table 14.—Machine Construction Firms 1918
  Paid-up
capital
 (1,000 yen) 
Receipts
 (1,000 yen) 
 Expenditure 
(1,000 yen)
 Dividend 





 Shibaura Engineering Works   5,000 17,401 3,208 35.0%
 Nigata Ironworks  1,818  3,224 2,842 22.0%
 Tokyo Electric Co.  6,000  6,664 5,943 20.0%
 Osaka Ironworks 10,500 10,095 4,398 35.0%
Dyestuffs.—The manufacture of dyestuffs was an untried industry

in Japan prior to the war, and in 1913 no less than 6,000 tons of dyestuffs, valued at 8,000,000 yen, were imported for use in the cotton and silk industries. After the outbreak of the war the cessation of foreign supplies, chiefly derived from Germany, compelled Japan to make an effort to become, to some extent, self-supporting. In 1915 certain dyes were produced, the largest quantity being sulphuric black, then alizarin, acid blue and aniline salt. These were followed by yellow, red, and blue acid, yellow and red direct, and purple, blue and brown basic colours. Early in 1916 the Japanese Government started and subsidized the Japan Dyestuff Manufacturing Co., which later succeeded in producing an artificial indigo, though only on a laboratory scale. By the end of 1918 nearly 100 factories, with a paid-up capital of 14,000,000 yen, had come into existence, and the annual output, including some 80 varieties of dyestuffs, reached 5,400 tons.

Chemicals.—The manufacture of chemicals in Japan does not owe

its inception to the war, but its great development and the many innovations introduced were the direct result of war-time conditions. There was, however, a sharp decline in the prosperity of the chemical industry immediately after the Armistice. In 1916 the Japanese Government set up a subsidized company for the production of glycerine, entitled the Glycerine Industry Co., and, as the result of extensive investigations at the Industrial Institute into the qualities of sea-weeds and vegetable ash, the production of basic chloridized alkali increased from 2,000 tons in 1913 to 10,000 tons in 1917. The match industry, which formerly derived chlorate of potash from European sources, by the end of 1917 was able to depend on the home supply. In that year there were over 50 factories in existence, producing 10,000 tons of chlorate of potash, which in quality compared favourably with the imported article.

The soda industry, although it existed as long ago as 1880, did not reach a high standard of technical perfection before the war and also failed to satisfy the total annual requirements in caustic soda, amounting to about 25,000 tons. During the war, however, the number of factories increased to about 20, and the annual production rose to 14,000 tons in 1918 and 20,000 tons in the following year.

Some of the chief products in the chemical industry are: sulphuric, hydrochloric and nitric acids, sodium sulphate, carbonate of soda, caustic soda, iodine, potassium iodine, potassium chlorate and chloride, ammonium sulphate, acetic acid, acetone and wood spirit.

Table 15 indicates the growth of the industry.
Table 15.—Chemical Industry
 Year  No. of
 Factories 
Employees  Value of Products 
Yen




    Male  Female   
1908  36  1,605   52  2,740,441
1909 143  1,902  159  4,356,718
1910 218  2,436  168  4,890,043
1911 230  2,570  223  6,406,024
1912 237  2,449  212  5,646,356
1913 341  3,089  276  7,687,232
1914 402  3,048  134  7,583,782
1915 468  4,708  407 16,717,143
1916 717  9,422  883 37,848,244
1917 832 12,435  900 42,494,620
1918 841  12,781  1,026 47,399,696
Agriculture.—The movement of the agrarian population towards

the cities, a familiar phenomenon in most European countries, found its counterpart in Japan during 1910-20. The increase in pop. was about 7,000,000, or roughly 14%, so that it might reasonably have been expected that a corresponding increase would take place in the number of persons engaged in agriculture. The figures, however, show the reverse, as in 1908 there were 5,408,363 persons and in 1918 5,476,784 in the category in question, the increase being only 1¼%. During 1916 and 1917, when Japan was putting forth her greatest effort in producing munitions of war for the Allies, the number of those actually holding land decreased to the extent of 20,800 and 36,400 respectively, whilst in 1918, when the war boom in industry was practically over, the gain to agriculture was only 20,200 persons.

The relative proportion of farmers cultivating their own land, tenant farmers, and farmers combining tenantship with cultivation,

showed little variation in the decade, as is shown by Table 16.
Table 16.—Farmers and Tenant Farmers
  Farmers
 cultivating 
own land
Tenant
 farmers 
Farmers
 combining 
 tenantship 




 1908  33.27% 27.58% 39.15%
1918 30.98% 28.31% 40.71%
The high proportion of small holders in Japan is characteristic of

the agricultural life of the country. Table 17 shows that the variation

in this proportion has remained practically negligible.
Table 17.—Percentage Proportion of Land Holders
  Under
 1.23 ac. 
Over
 1.23 ac. 
Over
 2.45 ac. 
Over
 4.90 ac. 
Over
 7.35 ac. 
Over
 12.25 ac. 







 1908  37.28 32.61 19.51 6.44 3.01 1.15
1918 35.54 33.30 20.70 6.33 2.82 1.31
Rice still remains the staple food of the country, and the area

under cultivation is nearly twice that devoted to the production of barley, rye and wheat. Intensive cultivation of all crops is carried out, and the limit of return has actually been reached in some cases. In the decade from 1908 to 1918 an additional 418,515 ac. were under rice cultivation, and the yield per acre only fell fractionally from 36.42 to 36.24 bushels. In barley and rye the cultivated area showed a slight drop, but in wheat there was an increase of 242,376 ac., the yield per acre showing an increase in all three cases. Little progress as far as yield is concerned was obtained with millet, the area under cultivation also decreasing. The production of potatoes was practically doubled during the decade, although the yield per acre was not so satisfactory.

Cotton, hemp and indigo were all retrogressive, the cotton chiefly owing to the large imports of cheaper cotton from abroad. Table 18 shows the acreage of the chief food products under cultivation at the beginning and end of the decade, and also the position with regard to certain special crops.

Table 19 shows, by index-numbers based on the year 1912, the

rise in prices of commodities in Japan between 1912 and 1919.
Table 18.—Principal Crops
  Area in Acres Production


1908 1918 1908 1918





      Bus. Bus.
 Rice  7,159,850   7,578,365   259,669,465   273,495,435 
 Barley 1,578,203  1,308,983[1] 47,219,585  49,175,375 
 Rye 1,687,213  1,583,586[1] 37,893,020  38,103,475 
 Wheat 1,101,467  1,343,843[1] 22,062,225  31,804,235 
 Millet 719,178  560,981  17,141,625  14,514,970 
 Beans 1,659,682  1,456,975  27,378,725  25,112,525 
 Buckwheat 405,579  333,966  6,170,890  4,261,825 
 Rape-seed 359,738  284,936  6,096,350  4,284,400 
      Tons Tons
 Potatoes 148,705  323,621  567,055  1,195,315 
 Sweet Potatoes  745,799  754,223  3,556,229  3,388,664 
 Cotton 12,934  6,197  4,120  2,513 
 Hemp 33,010  28,960  8,606  9,460 
 Indigo (leaf) 29,809  13,647  20,730  10,029 
 Sugar-cane 42,344  71,950  631,058  1,165,113 
Table 19.—Prices of Commodities
   1912   1914   1916   1917   1918   1919 







 Rice 100 77  66   95 156  219
 Wheat 100 99  100  124 203  203
 Soya Beans 100 100  99  124 162  198
 Salt 100 93  90  103 120  135
 Soy 100 97  88   91 106  168
 White Sugar 100 99  110  115 129  180
 Saké 100 93  100  111 130  179
 Tea 100 102  104  111 139  213
 Beef 100 97  98  141 202  248
 Eggs 100 100  95  113 163  224
 Milk 100 95  89  105 134  174
 Cut Tobacco 100 101  101  102 115  127
 Cotton Yarn 100 81  101  191 253  371
 Raw Silk 100 98  124  136 162  220
 Hemp 100 85  90  107 126  187
 Silk Tissues 100 94  108  155 172  215
 Cedar Square Timber  100 97  123  146 212  240
 Pig-iron 100 100  244  569  1,006  425
 Petroleum 100 104  141  140 217  277
 Coal 100 115  132  276 399  416
 Firewood 100 95  97  103 165  241
 Charcoal 100 107  111  120 209  278
 Seed Oil 100 92  108  164 216  227
 Paper 100 103  107  113 170  197







 Average 100 97  107  146 208  237
Railways.—The first railway line in Japan was opened to traffic

in 1872, subsequent developments of the railways being chiefly in the hands of private companies. In March 1906 the Railway Nationalization Law was enacted, and in the next two years the Government gradually assumed control of some 17 of the leading railway companies. On the completion of nationalization, the Government possessed 4,371 m. of railway, representing a capital of 700,000,000 yen. By the end of 1917 the process of absorption was practically complete.

The decade 1910-20 witnessed an increase of over 31% in the mileage of the State railway system (from 4,624 m. to 6,073 m.), and in the same period the number of passengers carried was more than double (from 128 millions to 288 millions). A marked advance in receipts was seen in the years 1917-9, partly owing to increased fares and partly to the large number of additional passengers carried under war conditions.

Tramways.—The number of electric tramway undertakings, both owned by municipalities and by private companies, showed a remarkable increase in the decade, from 34 in 1910 to 74 in 1919. The mileage rose from 367 to 1,059; and passengers carried from 328 millions to 1,225 millions. Further progress should be seen when it is possible to realize some tentative schemes which were being discussed in 1921 for utilizing hydro-electric power to a greater extent. Japan is well endowed by nature with waterfalls, many of which have already been harnessed.

Posts.—The postal service of Japan has developed steadily, both in extent and efficiency, since 1908. There are three grades of post-office, known as first, second and third class: the first class is confined to the larger cities, such as Tokyo and Osaka, and these offices not only act as supervising offices for those of lower category,

but also control maritime affairs in their respective districts. The
great majority of the post-offices belong to the third grade, and are

conducted on a contract system, which has proved eminently satisfactory. The post-offices in Japan include in their operations such diverse matters as the carrying, within limits as to size and weight, of every kind of freight, the collection of taxes and bills, the distribution of advertisements, and the paying of pensions and annuities on behalf of the national Treasury. The post-offices also undertake the business of State life insurance by a simplified process for the benefit of the middle and working classes. Table 20 shows the expansion of the postal services, the figures being compiled in

each case to the end of the respective fiscal years (March 31).
Table 20.—Postal Service
End of
 Fiscal Year 
 Number of 
 Post-Offices 
 Number of 
Packets
 Number of 
Parcels




1910 6,946 1,464,557,721 20,281,823
1911 7,086 1,512,029,475 22,210,422
1912 7,166 1,634,423,611 23,178,936
1913 7,268 1,635,151,146 24,393,232
1914 7,268 1,798,716,674 25,370,165
1915 7,266 1,801,092,286 25,202,220
1916 7,358 1,888,002,293 26,128,093
1917 7,530 2,043,601,963 29,578,542
1918 7,647 2,362,802,401 33,243,648
1919 7,764  2,783,803,434   40,246,772 
The Post-Office Savings Bank was first inaugurated in 1875, and the

rate of interest was raised from 4.2% to 4.8% in April 1915. The number of depositors increased from 10,052,641 on March 31 1910 to 20,088,713 in 1919, the deposits having advanced in the same period from 127,112,097 yen to 605,480,783. The figures at the end of the fiscal year 1920 were 23,787,626 depositors and 827,550,777 yen respectively.

Telegraphs.—Since 1879 Japan has belonged to the International Telegraph Convention, and in June 1908 she ratified her membership of the International Wireless Union. The expansion of her home telegraph service has been noteworthy. In 1910, with a total of 3,951 telegraph offices, 101,500 m. of wires were in use and 28,205,032 messages were sent; in 1919, there were 5,651 offices, 124,776 m. of wire in use, and 60,262,101 messages were transmitted.

Wireless.—In addition to the main wireless station of Funabashi, Japan has nine other shore stations, with a daytime transmission distance varying between 300 and 600 nautical m., the night distance being between 1,000 and 1,800 nautical miles. Two of these stations, Choshi and Osezaki, have been reconstructed and have a daytime transmission power of 1,500 nautical m., with 3,000 at night. In 1910 there were 7,817 wireless messages, and 121,974 in 1919.

Telephones.—When first inaugurated in Dec. 1890, the telephone service failed to attract many subscribers, but its popularity gradually increased, until in March 1918 there were 210,321 applications for installations outstanding, and the sums deposited by would-be subscribers in the hands of the authorities exceeded 3,000,000 yen. The authorities had started in 1909 a system of giving preference for an installation in consideration of a payment varying between 150 and 285 yen, according to locality, and this system, which has been very successful, still obtains. The maximum annual charge for the telephone service is 66 yen and the minimum 36 yen, according to locality, and at the end of the fiscal year 1918-9 there were 273,309 subscribers and 3,090 telephone offices, besides 799 fitted with automatic apparatus. At the same period the length of telephone lines was 9,467 m., the length of wires 700,651 m., and the number of messages in the year was 1,821,038,722.

Aerial Communications.—Japan keeps in close touch with the latest developments in aviation, and especially with those which hold possibilities of improving the facilities for the transmission of postal matter and goods. In 1920 and 1921 experiments in civil aviation were carried out, and early progress was anticipated.

The Army.—After the Russo-Japanese War, six divisions were added to the Japanese army, making the whole strength 19 divisions, and in 1915, two more divisions were established for the defence of Chosen. After the World War it was planned to bring the Japanese military organization up to the standard of efficiency and equipment set by new experiences in Europe. An 18-year reorganization scheme, involving 180,000,000 yen (18,400,000) was passed by the Diet in 1918; and in 1920 it was decided not only to alter the scheme considerably but to expedite its execution and have it completed in 14 years. The estimate passed was 290,000,000 yen (£29,600,000). The expansion of the flying corps was also decided upon. There were to be six flying squadrons consisting of three flights and each flight was to be equipped with 12 aeroplanes.

The Japanese army consisted in 1920 of 84 regiments of infantry, 28 regiments of cavalry, 26 regiments of field artillery, 6 regiments of heavy artillery, 3 regiments of mountain artillery, 20 companies of engineers, 18 companies of commissariat, 2 regiments of communication troops, 1 regiment and 1 company of telegraph corps and 4 flying corps.

Under the system of conscription, able-bodied males of from 17 to 40 years of age are liable for service in the army. Those who have completed the middle school education or who are recognized to have had an equal education, can apply for the volunteer service of one year in lieu of the ordinary three years' service. A young man who is receiving a liberal education may be exempted from military service until it is finished; residents abroad are also exempted until they attain their 37th year.

The new scheme of organization entails the constitution of each division on a three-regiment basis and the abolition of the brigade. An army corps will thus consist of two divisions; and six army corps, exclusive of the Guards' division, are to be established. A Japanese infantry regiment contains four battalions, each of a strength of 600 men; a cavalry regiment has four squadrons, each of 100 sabres; six four-gun batteries, that is, 24 guns, are the strength of a regiment of field artillery, and a battalion of engineers consists of three companies, each 300 strong.

The Navy.—As a sequel to the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese naval authorities came to the conclusion that the most efficient fleet unit would be the so-called “8-8 plan”; viz. a unit consisting of eight battleships, eight battle-cruisers and a suitable strength of subsidiary boats. The Diet agreed to the scheme in principle in 1917, but owing to financial reasons it was decided to start with an 8-4 fleet. In the following year, the Diet passed an expanded plan of 8-6 unit, spread over seven years. On account of the strengthened financial situation, the naval authorities proposed, in Dec. 1920, an additional appropriation of 751,900,000 yen (£76,990,000) beyond the 408,000,000 yen (£41,700,000) previously assigned for warship construction, with the view of completing the 8-8 unit scheme in eight years. The Diet gave its assent to this proposal in passing the Budget for 1921-2, and, according to this plan, Japan was expected to have in commission, by 1927, 4 battleships, 4 battle-cruisers, 12 cruisers, 32 destroyers, 5 gunboats, 12 fleet auxiliaries, 6 mine sweepers, and several submarines, thus bringing the strength of the Japanese navy in ships not exceeding eight years in age to 8 battleships, 8 battle-cruisers, 23 cruisers, 73 destroyers, approximately 80 submarines, 5 gunboats, 27 fleet auxiliaries and 120 submarines. In conjunction with this 8-8 scheme, the expansion of the naval air force was decided upon, and by 1923 the formation of 17 service corps and 2 practice corps was to have been completed.

In 1910 the tonnage of the Japanese navy was 524,273; in 1920 it was 796,288. In 1920 its strength was 15 battleships, 7 battle-cruisers, 9 armoured cruisers, 16 light cruisers, 14 coast-defence vessels, 8 gunboats, 87 destroyers, 20 torpedo-boats, and about 20 submarines. In 1910 the navy had 4,814 officers, 193 cadets, 14,616

non-commissioned officers, and 47,998 men.

Domestic History

Social Aspects.—The chronological mutation from the Era of Enlightened Peace (Meiji) to the Era of Great Righteousness (Taisho) also incidentally registers a period of great historic moment for the Japanese people, who were gradually awakening to the evolutional necessity of moral reconstruction. The wars with China and Russia had given them the reassuring confidence that their country was safe from any foreign aggression, the fear of which had been a perpetual nightmare to the founders of modern Japan. The considerable achievements in the domains of her trade and industry strengthened their belief in the destiny of the nation. Especially the younger generation, whose cradles were neither haunted by the shapes of monstrous “black ships” and belching guns, nor were oppressed by the overwhelming influx of novel knowledge and strange customs, had set themselves to the task of self-orientation. Western literature itself, translated on a large scale into the vernacular, had taught them that the undigested application of foreign laws and institutions would do more harm than good to the national well-being. The alleged attempt on the person of the Emperor Meiji in 1910—a solitary occurrence in the age-long history of a patriotic people—brought men to serious reflection. The dazzling glory of victories was somehow eclipsed by the growing social agitation. Is it not the mission of the islanders of Nippon now to take upon themselves the creation of a new civilization by harmonizing and uniting the East and the West? This was the question which presented itself to the mind of young Japan. There followed a remarkable revival in the study of the Japanese and Chinese classics. There was heard a voice in the wilderness crying that men must return to nature before aspiring to be a Japanese, a father, a scholar, or in fact almost anything. A leader of the Shirakaba circle, a coterie of literary men strongly advocating the latter movement, selected a mountain site in southern Japan to establish his “New Village” to be conducted on the humanitarian principle. The repeated famines in the N.E. districts of Japan, the disastrous eruption of the Sakurajima volcano, the rapid rise in the cost of living, the revelation of bribery scandals, the frequent changes of Cabinets all these worked together to cause popular disquietude. The external relations of Japan, too, contributed their quota to the stirring of the popular imagination and excitement: Korea had been annexed; China had started a revolution; and California was adopting the policy of racial discrimination towards Japanese immigrants. But, what most deeply affected the heart of the Japanese people was the demise of the Emperor Meiji in July 1912. The whole nation mourned and lamented the loss of the great leader under whose rule modern Japan was created. The dramatic suicide, on the occasion of the Imperial funeral, of Gen. Nogi, the hero of Port Arthur and Mukden, added a climax to the national bewilderment. And the Era of Taisho was but two years old at the advent of the World War.

After several months of commercial depression the trade and industry of Japan began to prosper, and had attained a most remarkable development by the time of the Armistice. This progress, however, was not without its attendant evils: war profiteers—the narikin or queened pawns—sprang up like mushrooms overnight; into the maw of busy factories was poured a tremendous amount of labour; the cost of living advanced by leaps and bounds; but wages and salaries did not keep pace with the soaring prices. An age of Western capitalism was in sight. Public sentiment in Japan was, moreover, heartened by the Allied assertions that the war was a democratic crusade against the rule of despotism. The word “democracy” was on the lips of the man in the street. Strikes, which had long been stifled by Article 17 of the Peace Police Regulations issued in 1900, practically prohibiting the establishment of trade unions, began, despite all restraining circumstances, to be more and more frequently organized. Encouraged by the results achieved in 1916, the following year saw no less than 417 strikes involving 66,000 wage-earners, and in 1918 the number increased to 497. Most of these resulted in favour of the workers, earnings being ultimately nearly trebled in some trades and a marked improvement being also effected in the hygienic conditions of the workpeople. A significant incident, which was the spark to ignite the train of strikes in 1918, was the “rice riot” started in Toyama, a small town on the coast of the Sea of Japan, by village fisherwomen whose thread of patience had snapped at the never-ending rise in the price of that commodity. The whole nation was involved in the general conflagration which followed. There occurred, in rapid succession, strikes in Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka, Tokyo and elsewhere, and riot and destruction took place to such an extent that the Government, at last, found it necessary to resort to the use of troops in the pacification of the angry mobs.

Even such methods as sabotage and “ca'canny” strikes were introduced. As a consequence, no less than 200 new labour organizations were formed, of which the Yuai Kai and a dozen others are of importance. The Government, in an eager attempt to meet the extraordinary developments of the situation, encouraged the establishment of the Roshi Kyocho Kai, or the Labour and Capital Harmonizing Association, which came into being in 1919 with Prince I. Tokugawa as president and Visct. Shibusawa as one of the vice-presidents. Moreover, Japan participated in the International Labour Conference; the revision of the Factory Law which was enacted in 1911 and came into force in 1916, was taken in hand. Meantime, popular agitation against the bureaucratic method of administration arose on all hands, and the question of universal suffrage was vociferously discussed. In the spring of 1918 a reform bill was passed, and the number of electors was doubled.

With the restoration of peace, however, a slump set in, profits fell and the demand for labour abated. The unemployment question also arose to a certain extent, but not in an entirely threatening aspect. Although the high-water mark of labour agitation had probably been reached by 1921, the causes for the phenomenon remained to offer food for the deepest reflection on the part of the thinkers and statesmen of Japan. The national characteristics of Japan, which are the heritage of her history—the peculiar harmony and self-restraint pervading all classes of the people, the spirit of individual sacrifice and self-abnegation, in the interests of the whole—were indeed strong relieving factors in all the social unrest she had experienced. How far this mentality was the legacy of feudalism and destined to disappear in time, and how far it was born of the unique social conditions of the Yamato race, which has remained homogeneous and unmolested on the Far Eastern islands for 30 long centuries without a single case of successful external invasion and subjugation, is a question which perhaps the future alone can definitely answer. Be that as it may, it was the eager hope of young Japan in 1921 that she might struggle to work out her own solutions of the perplexing problem of capital and labour.

Political Developments.—Owing to the necessity of establish- ing a strong central authority—imposed upon Japan for self-defence owing to the apparently aggressive policies in the Orient of the Western Powers towards the end of the 19th century—and probably from an abundance of conservative caution, as the country had just emerged from ages of feudalism, the makers of modern Japan often turned to German legislation in seeking for models of the constitution and other laws. But an important factor that should not be lost sight of by students of Japanese politics is that English has long been by far the most extensively studied foreign language among the people. Whilst the static institutions remain more or less Teutonic in form, dynamic inspiration has continuously been drawn from English-speaking sources. That explains why the Japanese body politic understands democracy along the lines of its common acceptation in the British Empire and the United States; why the press and students of politics often advocate the development of a polity somewhat like the British parliamentary system. The political history of Japan in 1910-21 was the last phase of the struggle between the wise council for the national security with which the Genro, the Elder Statesmen, are popularly identified, and the progressive outcry for the emancipation of the people's will. As external dangers diminish, vox populi speaks more effectively.

After the longest tenure of office in the constitutional history of Japan, four and a half years, Premier Katsura resigned in Aug. 1911, “with a view to renovating the spirit of the people.” With the collaboration of Marquis Komara, Foreign Minister, Marquis Katsura had accomplished with great merit various financial reforms, the annexation of Korea and the revision of commercial treaties with the Western Powers. Katsura was succeeded by Marquis Saionzi, who had been leading the Seiyukai party after the retirement of Prince Ito (see 15.272).

It was during the premiership of Marquis Saionzi that a tremendous moral shock was experienced by the whole nation on account of the death on July 30 1912 of the Emperor Mutsuhito, the centre of reverence and affection of the nation. Meiji Tenno, as he was posthumously styled after the name of the era of his 45 years' reign, which stands out with glorious prominence in the annals of the empire, was succeeded by his son, Yoshihito Shinno, who ascended the throne at the age of thirty-three.

The downfall of the Saionzi Cabinet was due to a very peculiar circumstance, which is accounted for only by the paramountcy of the instinct of national self-defence. Before the year 1912 had closed, the establishment of two army divisions in Korea (Chosen) had been tenaciously persisted in by Lt.-Gen. Uyehara, Minister of War. But his colleagues on the Cabinet, as well as the press, counselled retrenchment and economy. Uyehara resigned; and the premier sought for his successor. But no soldier would accept the post without a commitment by Saionzi as to the two-division increase; and by law a Minister of War must hold the rank of a general or lieutenant-general in the active service. The premier was constrained to request the Emperor to relieve him from his office. There followed a ministerial deadlock, until Katsura, actuated by chivalrous motives, descended upon the confused arena. He had been created a prince, and had made up his mind to offer the young Emperor the loyal but non-political services of the rest of his life in the capacity of Grand Chamberlain and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal. The young and care-free generation of Japan had come to assert themselves, and the unconstitutional tendency of the Genro's activities had been made the object of popular criticism. The wide-spread suspicion that he harboured the intention of attempting to direct the affairs of state unconstitutionally “from behind the sleeves of the Sacred Dragon,” coupled with his personal failing health, made the path of Prince Katsura's renewed political life immeasurably thorny and arduous. He found the Lower House unexpectedly untractable. Mr. Ozaki's resolution of no confidence caused a tremendous sensation; riotous mobs demolished the offices of the Kokumin, which newspaper had been loyally supporting the ministerial programme. No choice was left Katsura but to tender his resignation.

As soon as Prince Katsura became unfettered from official duties, he essayed to demonstrate his sincere aspirations for the constitutional development of the Empire by starting a political party, the Rikken Doshikai (the Constitutional Comrades Association). Under this banner there rallied all the members of the Chuo Club, and a majority of the members of the Kokuminto (the National party). But before the realization of his hopes Katsura died in the following December. The Yamamoto Cabinet which followed (Feb. 20 1913) was short-lived, owing to the unfortunate “naval scandal,” involving the arrest and trial of high officials in the navy; the Siemens-Schuckert Co. had dispensed bribes in connexion with the building of a Japanese warship.

After the refusal of Prince I. Tokugawa, and the abortive attempt by Visct. Kiyoura, to form a Cabinet, Count Okuma, the “grand old man” of Waseda, undertook, on April 14 1914, to stand at the helm of the Empire, backed by the legacy of Katsura, the Doshikai, and Baron Kato, the leader of that party, was entrusted with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. It fell to the lot of this Cabinet to deal with the invitation of Great Britain to join in the World War under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In Nov. 1915 the enthronement of the Emperor was conducted with the time-honoured imposing ceremonies at Kyoto, and the whole nation was en fête for seven days.

Premier Okuma, in tendering his resignation on account of indifferent health, in the summer of 1916, recommended Visct. Kato, who had yielded the charge of Foreign Affairs to Visct. Ishii and was outside the Cabinet, to be his successor. At that moment, however, the Genros are reported to have intervened, and, in spite of the fact that Kato's new party, the Kenseikai (the Constitutionalists), which was an amalgamation of the Doshikai, the Chuseikai and Koya Club, commanded a majority in the diet, Marshal Terauchi was appointed premier on Oct. 9. This alleged irregular development excited the hostility, not only of the Kenseikai, but of the general public, and ended in an antagonistic attitude on the part of the diet towards the new Government. Parliament was dissolved, and a general election took place on April 20 1917. The result was a signal victory for the Government party, the Seiyukai winning 157 seats, whilst the number of the Kenseikai dwindled from 204 to 117.

Actuated by the desire, in view of the war, to effect unity of all shades of opinions, Premier Terauchi's ingenuity brought forth soon after his instalment in office the Temporary Diplomatic Investigation Council (Rinji Gaiko Chosa Kai), where leaders of all political parties were represented. Kato was invited to join, but refused on the ground that he could not associate himself with the idea of establishing a responsible body for external affairs outside of the Cabinet itself.

The “rice riot” and the ensuing serious disturbances, and strikes which raged like wild-fire in various parts of Japan in the summer of 1918, sealed the fate of the Terauchi Cabinet, which tendered its resignation in the middle of September.

By that time democratic ideas had been gaining strength on account of the war and internal social unrest. Moreover, the manner in which the Terauchi Cabinet was installed had its due reaction. The people demanded that the next administration should be more in keeping with the spirit of the parliamentary system. Mr. Takashi Hara, the leader of the Seiyukai in succession to Marquis Saionzi, was entrusted with the task of forming a new Cabinet, as the first commoner to hold the office of premier in Japan. The ministers, except those holding the portfolios of War and the Navy, were, for the first time, a body of party politicians more or less free from the bureaucratic savour which had always clung to the former administrations. Incidentally, a new Ministry—that of Railways—was included in the Cabinet. In March 1918, in response to the popular demand, a political reform bill was passed, lowering the property qualification of voters to the payment of a direct national tax of three yen instead of ten yen. The number of electors was thus more than doubled, increasing from 1,450,000 to 3,000,000. The people were, however, not satisfied, and a year of popular clamour for the universal suffrage followed. In Feb. 1920 a universal suffrage bill was at last introduced by the Opposition in the House of Representatives. But, on the ground that no election on the basis of extended franchise had as yet taken place and consequently it was premature to make any further attempt at suffrage reform, the diet was immediately dissolved. The nation was called upon to express its opinion on the matter by the general election of May 10. The result was a decided victory for the Seiyukai, the Goverment party, which secured 280 seats, whilst, the Kenseikai registered 110.

Foreign Relations

Having emerged victorious from the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was relieved from the long nightmare that Korea might be engulfed in the Russian hegemony and constitute a permanent menace to her national safety; moreover, the wrong done to her by the three-Power intervention in wresting from her the natural fruits of her victory in the Chino-Japanese War—the Liaotung peninsula—was fully and conclusively avenged. But the Russian grip on N. Manchuria and Mongolia was not only unabated but, on the contrary, became signally tightened. There were even fears of a renewed clash between the quondam foes. Statesmanship, however, counselled Japan and Russia to come to a friendly entente in 1907. There was made a similar understanding between Japan and France in the same year. Further, the complicated post-war situation in Manchuria was decisively, if not definitely, disposed of by the Chino-Japanese understandings of 1909. In 1910 and 1916 more definite agreements were reached between Japan and Russia with the view of maintaining the status quo of Manchuria. Korea was, in the meantime, made a Protectorate of Japan, and the gradual development of affairs in that country led to the final annexation. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, which had been not only the keystone of Japan's foreign relations, but the mainstay of the general tranquillity of East Asia, was renewed (1911). Whilst Japan's position in the Far East became thus more or less reassuring, the dark cloud of anti-Japanese sentiment, on the Pacific coast of the United States, loomed up on the horizon. China's revolution in 1911, instead of bringing immediate peace and liberty to the denizens of the Celestial Empire, divided the nation into two irreconcilable camps, and contributed temporarily to the political instability of the Extreme Orient. To the neighbouring Japan, this meant an exacting burden upon her diplomatic wisdom and tact. When Japan was, on the one hand, racking her wits how to cope with the quicksand situation in China and, on the other, how to safeguard Japanese residents against discriminatory treatment in the west of America, the fateful Aug. of 1914 came to pass.

Japan's part in the World War dwindles into insignificance in face of the stupendous efforts of other great Powers espousing the Allied cause. But she contributed what little she could with her very limited national strength and resources. Her geographical situation, however, afforded her, from the economic point of view, a position of vantage. In pre-war days she was still struggling in financial straits as a result of her Russian conflict, but she came out of the World War with overflowing coffers, even if these coffers were of modest dimensions. At the Peace Conference in Paris, she lost her issue on the question of racial dignity, but her claims with regard to Shantung and the South Sea Islands were recognized; and her position among the great World Powers was assured. But her immediate outlook in 1920-1 bristled with difficulties and complexities: China had refused to negotiate Japan's offer to restore Shantung; the Washington Government would not be persuaded to the Japanese point of view on the Yap question; several states on the Pacific coast of America were vying with each other to abridge the civil rights of Japanese residents; Korean malcontents abroad were in a fitful mood of rebellion; the Siberian situation was far from being tranquil. Japan's natural path of aspirations was beset with suspicions and misunderstandings. Never before in Japan's diplomatic history was she burdened with weightier responsibilities.

Manchurian Question.—Prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the growing international rivalry for spheres of influence in the Chinese Empire had convinced the interested Powers of the necessity of establishing the policy of the “open door” and equal opportunities for commerce and trade in that country. That principle was from time to time enunciated by Great Britain in the latter decades of the 19th century, but it was reserved to Mr. John Hay, Secretary of State under President McKinley's administration, to make its definite pronouncement to the world. In Secretary Hay's Circular Note addressed to various Powers under date of July 3 1900, it was declared that the policy of the United States was to assure permanent safety and peace to China, to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, to protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and to safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Empire. The doctrine was accepted in principle by Japan, Great Britain, Russia, France and Germany. Japan went so far as to conclude specific agreements for its execution with Russia (July 30 1907) and France (June 6 1907). It was, however, understood that the spheres of influence already established—Great Britain in the Yangtsze valley, Tibet, and Weihaiwei; Germany in Kiaochow; Russia in Manchuria and Mongolia; France in Yunnan were not to be prejudiced by the newly professed principle of commercial impartiality.

The Russo-Japanese War brought about the tenure by Japan in S. Manchuria of a similar position to that which the great Western Powers had held in other parts of China. But “because Manchuria had been the scene of the greatest war of modern times,” the world's eye became fixed upon every act of Japan in that region in “an exceptionally rigorous scrutiny” and “the nations behaved as though they expected her to live up to a standard of almost ideal altitude.” Meanwhile, China, for her part, fell into a mood of impatient irritation on account of the presumed encroachments upon her sovereignty, and the “rights-recovery campaign,” clamorously conducted throughout that Empire, somewhat strained her relations with Japan in the early part of 1909 in respect of various questions in Manchuria. However, in Aug. of that year, a series of agreements was reached between the two States by which all those outstanding problems were composed. Among the rest, Chinese sovereignty over Chientao was confirmed, and arrangements about railways, including that of the Antung-Mukden line, were effected.

From out of the blue, there came from America a proposal for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways in Jan. 1910. In the view of Mr. Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State, that was best calculated to further the principle of the “open door” by putting an end to the abnormal conditions obtaining in Manchuria. But Russia and Japan could not accede to the scheme, on the grounds that their established rights and interests ought to be respected and that they were by no means threatening the Chinese sovereignty or the “open door” principle. Great Britain kept aloof, declaring that the question should be settled among the immediately interested Powers, namely, China, Japan and Russia. Nor was the proposal to the taste of China, who regarded it as a further encroachment upon her sovereignty. She replied that her treaty obligations with Japan and Russia precluded her from supporting the American idea. And the proposal fell through. Meanwhile, the Russo-Japanese negotiations as to their future attitude in Manchuria and Mongolia came to a satisfactory conclusion and a steadying element was added to the situation in the Far East in the form of an agreement between Japan and Russia, signed at St. Petersburg on July 4 1910, under which they pledged themselves to maintain the status quo in Manchuria and to abstain from any unfriendly competition in the development of that region. The Russo-Japanese rapprochement was further solidified, in view of the World War, by the Convention of July 3 1916, which provided that each of the two countries would not become a party to “any political arrangement or combination” directed against the other and that they would take counsel together for the necessary measures, “should the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one of the High Contracting Parties be threatened.” The agreement made greatly for the maintenance of good order in the Orient until the Russian Revolution brought about the drastic change of the whole situation.

Annexation of Korea.—Japan had waged two wars, one against China and the other against Russia, in order to prevent Korea from becoming “a dagger pointed against Japan's heart.” In June 1905 she established a protectorate over the Hermit Kingdom so as to put a definite end to the wayward and suicidal diplomacy of the Seoul courtiers, but the whole peninsula could not be cleansed of its inveterate political and social iniquities. The hopelessness of real reform under the existing régime had become manifest; and the assassination of Prince Ito by a Korean, in Oct. 1909, was the climax.

The Tokyo Government thus came to the conclusion that “the responsibilities devolving upon Japan for the due administration of the country (Korea) cannot be justly fulfilled without the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire.” The fusion was accomplished by a treaty concluded between the Governments of Japan and Korea on Aug. 22 1910. It vvas decided that the ancient name of Chosen should be revived in lieu of Tai-Han and in future be officially used. Under the terms of the treaty, the Korean Imperial House was assured of high honours and dignities as well as a liberal grant for maintenance. Japan, at the same time, notified the foreign Powers concerned that their treaties with Korea, including those of extra-territoriality, were all annulled; but that, nevertheless, their vested rights and interests would be fully respected; that the tariffs in force in Korea would be maintained for 10 years; that cabotage would be permitted to foreign vessels for the same period; and that the port of Masanpo would be closed for naval reasons, but Shin Wiju or Gishu would be added to the open commercial ports.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.—The general changes of situation in the Orient after the Russo-Japanese War, notably the annexation of Korea to the Japanese Empire in 1910, impelled the British and the Japanese Governments to revise the Agreement of Alliance concluded in 1905. The negotiations in London between Sir Edward (afterward Visct.) Grey and Baron (afterward Visct.) T. Kato ended in the renewal of the Alliance on July 13 1911. The important feature of the new agreement was the inclusion of an Article exempting either high contracting party from the obligation to come to the armed assistance of the other when a general arbitration treaty was concluded between that other Power and a third party (Art. IV.). At that particular time a treaty of such a description was under negotiation between the British and the American Governments, and it was with the particular object of excluding the United States from the application of the Alliance that Art. IV. was inserted. The proposed general arbitration treaty, however, failed to obtain the consent of the American Senate for its ratification, but the British and the Japanese Governments undertook on several occasions to make it clear that the spirit in which the Article was conceived had not on that account been altered in the least. The Alliance of 1911 was to last for 10 years, and, in the absence of a year's notice from either contracting party to terminate the agreement, it would automatically continue in existence, even after July 1921, until such denouncement was made. The World War, into which Japan readily entered on account of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, ended with the Treaty of Versailles which brought forth the League of Nations. The question was then mooted, though more academically than politically, whether the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would not be in contravention with the letter of the Covenant of the League, and on July 8 1920 the two high contracting parties addressed a joint note to the Secretary-General of the League to the purport that the Agreement of Alliance would in case of its renewal be made to conform to the Covenant in its form. The renewal of the Alliance was discussed at the British Imperial Conference in London in June 1921; and it was then announced that, under the terms of the treaty, it would continue, without definite renewal. But at the Washington Conference, in Dec., the agreement made for a four-Power treaty (America, France, England, Japan) provided for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being brought to an end.

The Chinese Loan Consortium.—A gradual change came about in the opening years of the 20th century in the general policies toward China of the Great Powers, who had become convinced of the fruitlessness of mutual competition; signs also became visible of the altered attitude of Western financiers in regard to the investments in that Empire. In 1908, a British and a German bank undertook to finance in common the Tientsin-Pukow railway. In 1911, a four-Power group consisting of Great Britain, Germany, France and the United States, was formed in connexion with the Hankow-Szechuen railway loan, as well as the loan for currency reform in China and industrial enterprise in Manchuria. Japanese and Russian bankers agreed to join this Consortium in 1912, with the understanding that the special interests of Japan and Russia in Manchuria and Mongolia would not be interfered with in the internationalization of the Chinese loans. With the inauguration of Mr. Woodrow Wilson as President in 1913, the U.S. Government decided to withdraw their bankers from the Consortium, and subsequently the World War prevented Germany from remaining in the financial league. In 1917 the Consortium, now comprising the four Powers, Great Britain, France, Japan and Russia, invited the United States to rejoin in its activities. The American Government hesitated at first to respond to this call, but in June 1918, took the initiative for the reconstruction of the financial group. By that time the Tsarist régime in Russia had come to an end, but the other nations interested expressed their assent to the American proposal; and negotiations were started in May 1919, in Paris, between the financial representatives of Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States, simultaneously with the Peace Conference. After considerable interchange of views, part of which concerned the reservations by Japan as to S. Manchuria and E. Inner Mongolia, an agreement was signed in New York on Oct. 15 1920. The most important feature of the new agreement was that the object was purely and simply economic, being entirely free from any political complexion. All the members were to pool their existing and future loans (i.e. options) both as regards industrial and administrative undertakings, with the exception of the industrial enterprises upon which substantial progress had already been made. As to Manchuria and Mongolia, the Powers arrived at a satisfactory understanding, Japan withdrawing her previous reservations. The statement of the Japanese Government issued on April i 1921 contained the assurance that Japan only desired in those regions definitely to ensure “her national defence and the security of her economic life,” and she was confident that she could safely rely upon the mutual trust and friendship of the Powers in regard to the exigencies of any situation that might arise in future.

Equality of opportunities was fully guaranteed to all members, thus eliminating unnecessary and harmful competition. It was believed that this coöperative action of the various banking groups, which alone could offer the enormous amount of capital necessary for the reconstruction of Chinese economic life and for the building of sufficient means of communication and transportation all over her vast territory, would be in the best interests of the Chinese people.

The Anti-Japanese Movement in America.—In the opening years of the century, the continuous influx of a large number of Japanese immigrants from the Hawaiian Islands to California had caused much alarm to the labour organizations in that state, and even in wider circles. Anti-Japanese feeling first overtly manifested itself by the attempted segregation in 1905 of Japanese children in the public schools of San Francisco. With characteristic perspicacity, President Roosevelt early discerned that public sentiment on the Pacific slope towards the Japanese was taking an untoward course, and, bent upon stemming the tide in time, in 1906 he advocated, in his presidential message to the Federal Congress, that an Act should be passed investing the Japanese, who had “won in a single generation the right to stand abreast of the most intelligent and enlightened peoples of Europe and America,” with the right to naturalization, which had been reserved to “free white persons, aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent.” The lawgivers at Washington, however, did not, or could not on account of the agitation in the West, so much as consider the question. Nevertheless, an informal agreement was reached between the Washington and Tokyo Governments, by which Japan pledged herself that she would not issue passports for the continental United States to those classes of Japanese who would, or might, engage in manual labour. Those Japanese who had previously resided in the United States, or were the immediate relatives of Japanese immigrants already in the United States, or the “settled agriculturists” who were to assume active control of an already established farming interest (only three or four persons actually came under this last category), were to be accepted. Japan engaged herself to observe this arrangement voluntarily, and the sincere efforts of her Government in executing it received recognition from many American publicists.

This “Gentleman's Agreement,” as it was generally styled, was confirmed by a declaration on the part of Japan made simultaneously with the revision of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in Feb. 1911. However, the feeling against the Japanese in the United States subsequently became more and more pronounced. Apart from sporadic legislation imposing restrictions on them with regard te civil rights, such as marriage and the pursuit of an avocation, the Alien Land Act was passed by the California Legislature in May 1913, and put into force three months later, despite strong Japanese protests and repeated admonitions from Pres. Wilson's Cabinet. This law prohibited aliens ineligible to citizenship of the United States (including companies the majority of whose interests were under the control of such aliens either in point of their number or the amount of capital held) from owning land in the state of California, allowing them only the privilege of leasing land on a three years' tenure. The terminology employed invested this law with an appearance of innocent impartiality, but it was none the less obvious that the Japanese alone would, in point of fact, be the sufferers from an invidious discrimination.

The exigencies of American participation in the World War tended to lull Californian opposition towards the Japanese. But, with the termination of the war, it was renewed. In spite of the efforts of the Japanese Government to respect the susceptibilities of their American neighbours, of which the stoppage of passports in the spring of 1920 to the so-called “picture brides” was an example, the day of the presidential election Nov. 2 witnessed the passage by the Californians of the most drastic law yet enacted against “ineligible aliens,” by which they forfeited even those rights which they had formerly been allowed to retain of holding land under a three years' lease. The Federal authorities had been averse to such a step, but the “initiative” poll decided in favour of the enactment by a majority of three to one (668,483 to 202,086 votes), and the law came into force as from the Dec. following. Thus in 1921 no Japanese might own or lease land, neither could he act as guardian of his own American-born offspring (who are of right American citizens) in whose name land is held, nor might he possess a share even in American-controlled landowning companies. “In that State,” wrote The Nation (New York), “America's traditional sense of fair play has been swept away in a ferment of race prejudice and campaign buncombe. The notion that the Japanese land ownership constitutes a ‘menace’ in the sense employed by anti-immigrationists is entirely refuted by the facts. Of the 28 million acres of farming area which compose one-fourth of the State's total acreage, only 458,000 acres, or 1.6 per cent, are under cultivation by Japanese. But this is not all. Of this small proportion not over 27 thousand acres—less than one-tenth of one percent—are owned by Japanese, the balance being made up of lands cultivated by Japanese under leases, under crop share contracts, under labour contracts, and finally, of 48,000 acres owned by American corporations with some Japanese shareholders.”

Anti-alien land legislation would appear to have become the fashion on the Pacific slope in 1921, the example set by California being emulated by Nebraska, Idaho, Oregon and Washington; the last two states, be it remarked, had systematically refused to make common cause with California during the past decade.

In the meantime, conversations were taking place at Washington between Mr. Roland S. Morris, the American ambassador in Tokyo, and Baron Shidehara, the Japanese ambassador in Washington, with the view of working out a formula which, whilst providing a practical solution of the unfortunate and complicated problem, would be at the same time acceptable to both nations. An agreement was reported to have been reached in Feb. 1921, and it appeared that it remained for the new Republican administration to give its assent in order that the desired arrangement might be put into actual operation.

There would appear to be some misapprehension with regard to the rights of foreigners in Japan to hold land and it has been stated that no such rights exist. This is not the case, as all persons, without discrimination, who are not Japanese subjects, may enjoy absolute ownership of land, if they are formed and registered under Japanese law as a juridical person, that is, as a partnership or corporation. There are, in fact, many such corporations in existence in Japan, composed exclusively of aliens.

Foreigners are further permitted to acquire rights in land, other than ownership, on the same footing as Japanese nationals, the following being some of the most important of these rights.

1. Superficies.—This is a right in rem by virtue of which land

belonging to another person can be used for the purpose of owning thereon structures, trees or bamboos. It can be created even though no structures, trees or bamboos are actually in existence on such land, provided that the object and intention is to use the land for the purpose named. The law contains no limitation upon the period of time for which that right can be created, consequently a superficies for, say, 1,000 years will sell for a sum closely approximating to the value of a right of absolute ownership.

2. Emphyteusis.—This is a right in rem to carry on agricultural or stock farming on the land of another person. The period of time for its duration is to be fixed by the parties concerned at not less than 20 years and not more than 50 years.

3. Lease in Perpetuity.—This is a lease without limit as to its duration, and, for all practical purposes, it is as good as ownership. It was originally granted to foreigners within the Foreign Settlements for a nominal consideration paid to the Japanese Government. Although the Foreign Settlements were abolished in 1898, perpetual leasehold survives and is still enjoyed by foreigners.

4. Leasehold.—This is a right in personam, effective only as between the parties concerned. When registered, however, it can be set up against third persons as the effect of such registration. The duration period is fixed at 20 years, renewable for a further 20 years from

the time of renewal.

The World War.—No sooner had the World War broken out in 1914 than there took place several exchanges of views between the British and the Japanese Governments as to possible assistance by Japan in the protection of British trade in the Far East. Japan soon made it clear that she was prepared to take the responsibility imposed upon her by the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance, should the menace by the Germans to British interests necessitate such a step. It was not long before such a contingency arose, and on Aug. 15 1914 the Japanese Government sent an ultimatum to Berlin demanding the immediate withdrawal of the German warships from Chinese and Japanese waters and the surrender of Kiaochow to Japan by Sept. 15, with a view to eventual restoration of the leased territory to China; a week was allowed to the German Government in which to make a definite reply. On Aug. 23, the term having expired without any answer being forthcoming from the Kaiser's Government, Japan declared war against Germany. In coming to this decision Japan remembered that it had been through the machinations of the Berlin Government that Germany, France and Russia acted jointly in 1895 in “advising” Japan in the name of peace in the Orient, and not without a hint of force, to retrocede to China the peninsula of Liaotung, which had been won by Japan at a heavy sacrifice of life and treasure and ceded to her under the Shimonoseki Treaty, and further that it was barely two years after that incident that Germany had installed herself at Tsingtao on a flimsy pretext. The Japanese nation welcomed the opportunity of eradicating the German menace in the East which owed its inception to such unfortunate circumstances.

The Capture of Tsingtao.—The first part which Japan took upon herself to play after she aligned herself with the Allies, was the reduction of the German stronghold in the Far East. Tsingtao, on the bay of Kiaochow, had been converted in the hands of the Germans into one of the most impregnable fortresses in the Orient—the “mailed fist” calculated to intimidate any possible objectors to the Kaiser's imperialist aims. It served at the outset of the war as the only base of operations in E. Asia for the German marauders menacing the Allied trade routes. The five German warships forming the main part of Adml. von Spee's squadron had been running amok, not only in Chinese and Japanese waters, but as far as the South Seas. It was imperative to make these raiders homeless, if they could not be captured or destroyed, and the military and naval operations against the redoubtable base, which was under the command of Capt. Meyer-Waldeck and garrisoned by some 13,000 men, of whom 5,599 were German regulars, were started with the utmost dispatch. On Aug. 27, the blockade of Kiaochow Bay was declared by the Japanese navy and Lungkow, 150 m. N. of Tsingtao, was chosen as the point for landing troops. The selection of Lungkow as the spot for disembarkation had been agreed upon between the Japanese and British commanders, who saw the necessity of clearing the hinterland prior to the landing of troops at some point nearer the fortress. However, the point being outside the zone of the leased territory, it was thought necessary to have a war zone established, following the precedent of the Russo-Japanese War, and negotiations with that view were started between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments as early as Aug. 20. An understanding was soon come to between the two Governments, and the Peking Government issued a declaration establishing such a war zone on Sept. 3. The Chinese Government, in the meantime, intimated to the Japanese Government that it might nevertheless be found advisable to enter a formal protest to Japan against her troops' landing at Lungkow, for the sole purpose of exonerating themselves from any responsibility towards the German Government. Upon Germany's strong protest against permitting the Japanese troops to land in the neutral territory, the Chinese Government went so far as to point out that Germany herself had in a measure created the situation through her unauthorized fortification of Tsingtao.

On Sept. 2 1914, the Japanese division, under the orders of Lt.-Gen. Kamio, commenced landing at Lungkow, in the teeth of a heavy downpour of rain, which swelled into a terrible tempest and caused the whole district to be flooded as it had not been flooded for half a century; the advance of the troops was therefore immeasurably hard and dangerous. They had to wade through muddy streams; their diet for days consisted of a handful of millet. Despite such extreme adversity of circumstance, the vanguards arrived on the 12th at the small town of Chimo, where they encountered the enemy for the first time. In the meantime, the railway connecting Tsingtao with Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, was freely used by the Germans for military purposes. The crew of the Austrian cruiser “Kaiserin Elisabeth,” who were on leave at Tientsin, were brought back to Tsingtao by means of that line, and war materials were incessantly transported into the fort by the same route. It was discovered that China not only winked at such acts of violation of her neutrality but actually gave aid and comfort to the Germans. Japan made protests to the Peking Government but to no purpose; she was constrained to take over the operation and the safeguarding of the railway. The second Japanese contingent began to land at Laoshan Bay, within the leased zone, on Sept. 18 and soon established touch with the I. Army. The Japanese forces under Gen. Kamio thus amounted to about 22,980 officers and men and they succeeded in some ten days in wresting from the Germans several of their advanced positions. On Sept. 24, there arrived at the arena of campaign the British force, commanded by Gen. Barnardiston, consisting of 910 officers and men of the 2nd South Wales Borderers and 450 of the 36th Sikhs. After permitting the non-combatants to leave the fortress, the general attack on the

position was commenced on Oct. 31, the Japanese blockading fleet off the harbour assisting by a continuous bombardment. On the morning of Nov. 7, white flags were descried on the forts of Moltke, Bismarck and Iltis, to the pleasant surprise of the attacking army, which had expected a protracted siege. After the fall of the stronghold, it was ascertained that all enemy ships, including the Austrian cruiser “Kaiserin Elisabeth,” had been sunk in the port of Tsingtao. The Japanese army lost, during the campaign, 1,968 killed or wounded, and the Japanese navy a cruiser, a destroyer and a torpedo boat. The port of Kiaochow was reopened for trade by the Japanese on Dec. 28 1914.

The Japanese Navy in the War.—Although Tsingtao was thus early captured, there still remained the important task of locating and disposing of Adml. von Spee's squadron, consisting of the “Scharnhorst,” the “Gneisenau,” the “Nürnberg,” the “Leipzig,” and the “Dresden,” which were seriously menacing the Allied commerce in the South Seas. It had further been reported that several German warships were at large in the Pacific Ocean. As early as Aug. 26, the battle cruiser “Ibuki” and the cruiser “Chikuma,” and shortly afterwards six more Japanese cruisers, were ordered to join the British China Squadron under the command of Adml. Jerram. There were further dispatched a squadron of eight cruisers to the China and the East Seas and two squadrons—one comprising two battle cruisers, two cruisers, and a division of torpedo destroyers and the other one battleship and two cruisers—to the South Pacific Ocean. The cruiser “Idzumo,” which happened to be in Mexican waters, as well as the “Asama” and the “Hizen,” were entrusted with the patrol of the western coast of America, in coöperation with the Canadian “Rainbow” and the British cruiser “Newcastle.”

In the middle of Sept., a great sensation was aroused by the dramatic appearance in the Bay of Bengal of the German raider “Emden,” which had effected her egress from Tsingtao before the blockade was instituted by the Japanese navy. Several British merchantmen fell victims to her ruthless attack in appallingly swift succession, and it was only after two months' strenuous chase by the British and the Japanese squadrons that the “Emden” was sunk by the Australian cruiser “Sydney” near the island of Cocos. In the meantime, Australian and New Zealand troops were being hurried to various theatres of war in Europe, and Japanese warships assisted in the convoy of the transports across the Indian Ocean. At one time, whilst the “Emden” was still working havoc in Indian waters, the “Ibuki” was obliged to convoy no fewer than 38 troopships by herself. Apart from the anxious, as well as hazardous task of convoy, Japanese warships were, in Feb. 1915, called upon to hurry to Singapore and land troops thereto assist the British forces, side by side with French and Russian marines, in suppressing a mutiny of Indian soldiers who had come under German influence. In 1917, and after, the Japanese navy undertook the guardianship of the safety of the Indian Ocean as far as the Cape of Good Hope. Von Spee's squadron, as a result of the concerted operation of the British and the Japanese navies, was chased in the direction of Cape Horn towards the end of 1914, and on Dec. 8 was encountered by Adml. Sturdee's squadron off the Falkland Is. and was completely annihilated, with the exception of the “Dresden,” which, however, was also sunk by the British off Chile three months later. Meanwhile the German gunboat “Geier” was disarmed and interned at Honolulu, and thus the Pacific Ocean was cleared of the enemy, greatly to the relief of Allied commerce.

The next, and not the least important, contribution of the Japanese navy toward the successful conduct of the war, was the sending of the cruiser “Akashi” and three destroyer divisions under the command of Rear-Adml. Sato to the Mediterranean. The German submarine warfare was about that time beginning to be carried on in a ruthless manner, and the British navy had been earnestly requesting Japanese help. Whilst the British, French and Italian forces were engaged in blockading the Adriatic Sea and the Dardanelles, Adml. Sato's squadron assumed the all-important duties of convoying Allied vessels to and fro between ports in the Mediterranean. The Japanese destroyers successfully escorted 21 British warships, as well as 623 British, 100 French, 18 Italian and 26 other troopships or merchantmen, totalling 788 ships, and they cruised altogether 220,000 miles.

Japan's “Twenty-one Demands” upon China.—Friction between neighbours is deplorable, though far too common, but it is altogether exasperating when friction is caused by the neglect of order in the house of a neighbour. No one more regretted the continued internal troubles and disorder in China, which had been divided into two camps since the Republic was proclaimed, than Japan herself, whose national destiny is so intimately entwined with that of China. The Tokyo Cabinet became impatient toward the end of 1914, of the general trend of the Chinese-Japanese relations which, largely owing to China's procrastinating and wayward diplomacy, had been marked by constant and cumulative misunderstandings and irritations. In the judgment of the Okuma Cabinet the only effective move was an attempt to cleanse the Augean stable, and on Jan. 18 1915, with a view to liquidating all outstanding problems between Japan and China, the “twenty-one demands” were presented to President Yuan Shi-k'ai at the hands of Mr. Hioki, the Japanese minister in Peking. The demands consisted of five groups: Group I., which related to Shantung province, comprised four items; Group II., in respect of S. Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, had seven items; Group III. concerned the Hanyehping Co. and included two items; Group IV. consisted of one item relative to the territorial integrity of China. The V. Group was not presented as “demands” but as “wishes,” consisting of seven items, covering the employment of Japanese advisers; land ownership by Japanese hospitals, temples and schools; the purchase of munitions of war from Japan; the right to construct a line connecting Wuchang with the Kiukang-Nanchang railway as well as the Nanchang-Hangchow and the Nanchang-Chaochow lines; the priority of Japanese capital regarding railways, mines and harbour works in Fukien province; and Japanese missionary propaganda. The too ambitious attempt of the Tokyo Cabinet evoked adverse criticisms from various quarters. But that was more on account of the manner in which the demands were made to China. It was undoubtedly unfortunate that, whatever cogent reasons there might have been, the “wishes” were not placed on the table from the outset as well as the “demands.” As to their intrinsic merit, the London Times (Feb. 13 1915) observed: “Even in the Peking version . . . these terms do not look harsh or unreasonable in principle. . . . They do not in any wise threaten the integrity of China, nor do they appear to violate the doctrines of the equality of opportunity and of the open door as hitherto accepted by other Powers.” Even granting that some of the proposals were unwisely conceived, the general belief that Japan purposed at that time to establish a veiled protectorate over China was merely the result of active and extensive hostile propaganda; no insinuation could be more malicious and misguided. For Japan it was a matter of superlative interest and importance that her neighbours should attain a good Government, a prosperous industry and a flourishing trade; it was her greatest fear that China should become the Turkey of the extreme Orient. Chagrined by the endless tergiversation of the Chinese Government, in entire disregard of Japan's friendly and conciliatory intentions, which were amply shown during the four months' negotiations at Peking, the Japanese Government pressed the Peking Government, on May 7 1918, to express their definite answer within a time limit. In the result the Chinese President, Yuan Shi-k'ai, acceded to the Japanese proposals; and on the 25th of the same month, under the signature of Mr. Hioki and Lu Cheng-Hsieng, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, two treaties were concluded—one respecting the province of Shantung, and the other regarding S. Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia—and 13 notes were exchanged. The treaty respecting the province of Shantung stipulated that China should recognize all arrangements to be made between Japan and Germany as to the German rights in that province; that, for the construction in future of a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway, Japanese capitalists should first be approached; that China should of her own accord early open suitable cities and towns for the residence and trading of foreigners. China further pledged herself in a note that she would not lease or alienate any part of Shantung, including the islands off its coast.

With special reference to Kiaochow, the Japanese Minister, in an exchange of notes, made the following declaration:—

“If upon the conclusion of the present war, the Japanese Government

should be given an absolutely free disposal of the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay, they will return the said territory to China, subject to the following conditions:

“1. Opening of the whole of Kiaochow as a commercial port;

“2. Establishment of a Japanese settlement in the locality to be designated by the Japanese Government;

“3. Establishment, if desired by the Powers, of an international settlement;

“4. Arrangements to be made, before the return of the said treaty is effected, between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments with respect to the disposal of German public establishments and

properties and with regard to the other conditions and procedures.”

By the treaty respecting S. Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Government engaged that the terms of lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, and of the S. Manchuria railway and the Antung-Mukden railway, should be extended to 99 years respectively; that Japanese should be permitted in S. Manchuria to lease land for residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural purposes, and further should be free to enter, travel, reside and pursue various vocations; that in Eastern Mongolia Japanese should be permitted to carry on, jointly with Chinese, agricultural undertakings; that Japanese conducting business in those regions should be submitted to Chinese police laws and taxation; that civil and criminal cases should be tried by the Japanese consul or by Chinese officials according as the defendant was Japanese or Chinese, save in cases of land disputes where a mixed tribunal would have the power of adjudication (all this pending the eventual reform of the Chinese judicial system); that suitable cities and towns would early be opened to foreigners of China's own accord; that various agreements relating to the Kirin-Changchun railway should early be revised. By the exchange of notes, certain mining rights, and the priority of Japanese capital in relation to loans for building railways and other loans on the security of taxes, save the salt gabelle and customs revenue, were granted to Japan. It was further agreed that Japanese might be employed first in case China needed foreign advisers or instructors in S. Manchuria. As to the Hanyehping Co., in view of the very close relations existing between Japanese capitalists and the company, China agreed to approve a possible future arrangement for its joint undertaking and further not to confiscate or nationalize it without Japan's consent, or let it contract foreign loans other than Japanese. In regard to the province of Fukien, the Chinese Government declared that they would not permit a foreign Power to build or finance any shipyard or military or naval establishment.

If Yuan Shi-k'ai had been disinterested and had taken a wider view of the general situation, those treaties and agreements could very well have been utilized for bringing China and Japan closer, and consolidating the peace of the East. But he was paving his way to his ambitious goal—to ascend the throne. It was unfortunate that Yuan's subsequent actions and proclamations inspired undue ill-will in the Chinese people.

Japan's War Mission to the United States.—Shortly after the declaration of war against Germany by the United States in April 1917, the Allied Powers sent their leading statesmen and soldiers to Washington to confer as to the best methods of coöperation in the war; how to coördinate their respective national strengths so as to bring about an early victory. Great Britain was represented by Mr. Balfour and France by M. Viviani and Marshal Joffre. Japan entrusted the mission to Viscount K. Ishii, whose major task was to consult about the distribution of the Allied naval forces, and the arrangement as to the exchange of ships and steel, for whereas America urgently needed transports to convey her troops to the western front, the Japanese steel plants and shipbuilding yards would shortly be forced to remain idle if they were unable to obtain a supply of American iron. During Viscount Ishii's stay in Washington, the Ishii-Lansing Agreement in regard to China was incidentally concluded.

The Ishii-Lansing Agreement.—In the course of conversation which took place between Mr. Robert Lansing, the United States Secretary of State, and Viscount Ishii, when the latter went to Washington on the Special War Mission in 1917, it was found advisable that a public announcement of the desires and intentions of the two Governments with regard to China should once again be made, “in order to silence mischievous reports” that had from time to time been circulated. On Nov. 2 notes were exchanged between the two plenipotentiaries, declaring:—

“The Governments of Japan and the United States recognize

that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

“The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

“The Governments of Japan and the United States deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called ‘open door,’ or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

“Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full

enjoyment of equal opportunity in its commerce and industry.”

The Japanese Expedition to Siberia.—After the Russian Revolution in 1917, a unique and anomalous situation developed in Siberia owing to the conjunction effected by German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war with Bolshevik forces, the former assuming the practical command. These Teutonic-Bolshevik allies seriously threatened the safety of the Czechoslovak troops who had essayed through the only available route of Siberia to join the Allied armies fighting on the western front in France. The U.S. Government proposed to the Japanese Government in the early part of 1918 to dispatch an Allied contingent to Eastern Siberia to give succour to the helpless and distressed Czechoslovaks. To this Japan gave her assent, and in Aug. undertook to detail a contingent to Vladivostok; the United States and Great Britain also dispatched troops to Siberia. Early in Sept. Khabarovsk was captured by the Allied forces, and during the month of Oct. the Bolshevik influence in Eastern Siberia was signally diminished and the Czechoslovaks in the interior succeeded in re-establishing communication with their compatriots in the littoral districts. The Allied successes in Siberia endowed the anti-Bolshevists, rallying under the banner of Adml. Kolchak, with fresh power; and the orders of the Omsk Government, established in Nov. 1918, extended as far as the Ural regions by the end of that year. But in May 1919 the anti-Bolshevik forces sustained a crushing reverse at the hands of the Red army; and Adml. Kolchak's Government first removed from Omsk and then, toward the winter, to Chita. In face of such unfavourable developments of affairs, Japan saw the necessity of early arriving at a definite understanding with the U.S. Government as to the future dispatch of reënforcements to Siberia. The Washington Government, however, responded in Jan. 1920 with a sudden decision to withdraw all the American troops and railway experts; first, because the repatriation of the Czechoslovak forces was about to be completed, and secondly because the very unstable situation in Siberia would render futile any military assistance to the attempt to establish an autonomous Russian Government in Siberia. The American Government further stated that if Japan would continue in her endeavours in Siberia single-handed, they had no objection whatever. In point of fact, the exigencies of the situation soon obliged Japan to send a reënforcement. But the Social Revolutionaries and the Bolshevists were in the spring of 1920 fast establishing ascendancy in Eastern Siberia, having their headquarters at Vladivostok, Verkhne Udinsk and Blagovyeshchensk—the three centres being more or less independent each other. After the arrest and execution by Bolshevists of Adml. Kolchak in Feb. 1920, the only remaining reactionary leader was Gen. Semenoff, who had established his Government at Chita and had the whole province of Trans-Baikalia under his sway. In March 1920 a most sanguinary incident occurred at Nikolaievsk, capital of Sakhalin Province and situated on the river Amur; all the Japanese residents of that city, men, women and children, numbering 350, including Consul Ishida and his family, were murdered by the “Partisans,” a Bolshevist guerrilla gang infesting the littoral regions. The Japanese Government declared on July 3 that as there existed no responsible administrative centre in Russia which could negotiate about the flagrant outrage on Japan's prestige at Nikolaievsk, the Japanese forces would occupy certain places in Sakhalin province, pending the establishment of a legitimate Government. At the same time, it was made known that Japanese contingents would soon be withdrawn, as in fact they were, from Trans-Baikalia, inasmuch as the Czechoslovak troops had been successfully assisted on their homeward journey (the last troops left Vladivostok in Sept. 1920), but that Vladivostok and Khabarovsk would still have to be garrisoned by a small military strength. Upon inquiry from the Washington Government, it was explained by the Japanese Government that Vladivostok was the prolific hatchery of Korean revolutionary plots, and further the safety of the Japanese residents had to be provided for, and that Khabarovsk was a point in close strategic relation with Nikolaievsk. As soon as signs became visible of the growing stability of Khabarovsk, in Sept., evacuation of that region was immediately started. Meantime, the Bolshevists at Verkhne Udinsk began to style themselves the “Far Eastern Republic,” and in concluding an agreement as to the suspension of hostilities with the Japanese military authorities in July 1920, formulated a memorandum to the purport that the Republic would follow democratic and not communist principles of administration and would constitute itself a buffer state in the interests of a speedy resuscitation of peace and order in Siberia. Then the movement for the unification of the several “Governments” in Eastern Russia was started, and in Nov. the so-called Amalgamation Assembly at Chita declared the independence of the “Far Eastern Republic”—adopting the name at first conceived at Verkhne Udinsk—holding as its territory the Russian provinces E. of the Selenga river and professing anti-communist democracy as its basic political principle. The coup d'état carried out by the reactionary Kappelists in Vladivostok on May 26 1921 showed that the Siberian situation was still very unstable.

Anti-Bolshevist Agreements.—In view of the Siberian situation, military and naval agreements were concluded between the Governments of Tokyo and Peking in March 1918 for the purpose of coördinating the forces of the two countries to oppose the probable invasion by the Bolshevists from the Siberian direction. China inaugurated an Office for Joint Military Action under the directorship of Tuan Chijui, to give effect to the terms of the agreements, receiving from Japan a supply of capital to the amount of 20,000,000 yen for the upkeep of the forces and 33,000,000 yen for purchasing munitions of war. Whilst the arrangement proved to be of considerable service in impeding the Bolshevik advance to the S., the incidental increase in the power of Tuan's party—the Anfu Club—gave rise to considerable misgivings and misunderstandings, at the expense of Japan's good name. It was, therefore, decided by Japan in March 1919, to furnish no further supplies of money and arms. After the downfall of Tuan and his friends in July 1920, the Peking Cabinet expressed their desire to discontinue the pact, and, but for the unfortunate state of affairs in Eastern Siberia, it would have been early terminated. As it was, the annulment was agreed upon by Tokyo and Peking on Jan. 27 1921.

Japan at the Peace Conference.—At the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, Japan was represented by Marquis (afterwards Prince) Saionzi; Baron (afterwards Viscount) Makino; Viscount (afterwards Count) Chinda; Mr. (afterwards Baron) K. Matsui; and Mr. (afterwards Baron) K. Ijuin. The plenipotentiaries went to France with the firm conviction, as Baron Makino had made unmistakably clear before he left Japanese shores, that the attitude of Japan at Paris should be, not so much to advance her own case before the comrade nations in the war, as to take counsel with them in the creation of a new world in which justice and humanity would reign supreme and which would assure an enduring peace. The first claim laid on the peace table by the Japanese delegates was for the recognition of racial equality. The public opinion of Japan demanded that, if a new era of righteousness and fairness was to be established and peace and good-will among men were to be assured for all time, one of the postulates should be the principle of the equal dignity of races. The Japanese nation had been deeply conscious of the discriminatory treatment meted out to its nationals in various parts of the world. It recognized that differences in ability, power and character among men always exist; but it appeared wrong that there should be inequality of opportunities—inequality before the law. The present state of human civilization having been achieved by a series of social, religious, political and economic emancipations, it seemed certainly to be time that racial emancipation should, in the interests of the real progress of civilization, be foreshadowed and approved at least in principle. The original Japanese proposal for insertion in the Covenant of the League of Nations read:—

“The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of

Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of the states members of the league equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction,

either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.”

In explaining the Japanese position, Baron Makino made it clear “that the question being of a very delicate and complicated nature involving the play of a deep human passion, the immediate realization of the ideal equality was not proposed, but that the clause presented enunciated the principle only and left the actual working of it in the hands of the different Governments concerned.” Every national of the States in the League was expected “to share military expenditure for the common cause and, if need be, sacrifice his own person. In view of these new duties . . . arising before him . . . each national would naturally feel, and in fact demand, that he be placed on an equal footing with the people whom he undertook to defend even with his own life.” The Japanese proposal, which was later somewhat modified in terminology in an attempt to meet objections, obtained 11 votes out of 17 in its favour, but it was ruled that unanimity was necessary. Japan abided by that decision, reserving the right to raise the question again at an opportune moment.

The disposition as regards Kiaochow was the next question with which the Japanese delegates had to grapple. When the Japanese people gave a hearty send-off to their plenipotentiaries, they had no shadow of doubt as to the final issue of this question. The greater, therefore, was their disappointment, if not stupefaction, when the Chinese delegates came out with a demand for the direct restitution of the ex-German stronghold. Japan claimed Kiaochow in recognition of all her military and naval services, by which, with British assistance, the German Far Eastern base had been reduced, by which trade routes in the Orient had been kept unmolested and by which Allied troopships had safely been convoyed to various fronts. It was at the same time made clear that Japan would be content, having once secured Kiaochow in her hand, not to retain it in her possession, but to offer it to China as a mark of good-will and friendship. “A cordial friendship between Japan and China” had been a slogan on the lips of thinking Japanese, and it was expected that a new leaf in Japanese-Chinese relations would be turned by this timely offering. The Chinese delegates, however, insisted that the declaration of war by China against Germany on Aug. 14 1917 had abrogated all her treaties with Germany, including that of the lease of Kiaochow. Whether a lease treaty is not a sort of pacta transitoria is, to say the least, a moot question; it would appear to be contrary to common sense to contend that a paper declaration of war could constitute a magic wand to transfer to her possession a formidable fortress which China could never have reduced with her own resources, and which, if it had not been captured beforehand, would have been a potential intimidation, and would possibly have prevented her making that very declaration. China's further plea was that her engagement of May 1915 (see p. 653, the Twenty-one Demands) had been made under duress and was therefore null and void. It is a fact, however, that China did not question the validity of that engagement, when she willingly concluded the formal understanding of Sept. 24 1918, which was actually based on the above-mentioned agreement of May 1915, and accepted an advance of 20,000,000 yen under that understanding. The position of Japan, it should be observed, had furthermore been fortified by the previous undertakings of Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy in 1917, to support or at least raise no objection to the Japanese claim.

The Supreme Council finally decided in favour of Japan, on May 5 1919 (Arts. 156-158, Treaty of Versailles). Rumours were in circulation that Japan had struck a bargain between the race question and the Shantung dispute; and further, that the withdrawal of Italy from the Peace Conference had made for Japan's strength. The latter surmise may have been true in a certain measure, but the former was hopelessly wide of the mark.

The ex-German islands in the Pacific lying N. of the Equator, which had been under the Japanese occupation since 1914, were allocated to the Japanese administration under the newly formulated mandatory system, at the Supreme Council held at the Trianon Palace on May 7 1919. They include the Marshall, Caroline, Palau (Pelew), and Marianne (Ladrone) islands.

The Restitution of Kiaochow.—With the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles on Jan. 10 1920, the German rights and interests in Shantung passed to the hands of Japan, and the Tokyo Government, in conformity with their pledged obligation to China, and true to their repeated public avowals (by Baron Makino in Paris on May 4 1919; by Viscount Uchida in Tokyo, May 17 and Aug. 2 1919), immediately instructed Minister Obata to invite the Peking Government to open negotiations for effecting the restitution of the ex-German possessions in Shantung (Jan. 19). It was desired that the necessary preparations for accepting the restoration should forthwith be started, and that China should organize a police force to take over the charge of guarding the Tsinan-Kiaochow railway. As soon as such an organization was completed—even if it were prior to an agreement being reached as to the restoration—the Japanese troops would be immediately withdrawn. Three months passed without any response from Peking to the Japanese overtures. Japan repeated on April 26 her desire to start negotiations, and the Chinese reply (May 22) was that she could not conduct direct negotiations with Japan as to the question of Tsingtau on the basis of the Treaty of Versailles, which she did not sign, and further, that the whole public of China had assumed a strongly antagonistic attitude in respect of the question. Whereupon the Tokyo Government asked the Chinese Government to reconsider the matter, assuring the latter that they were ready to commence negotiations at any time China might deem convenient. But Peking again remained deaf. It was then rumoured that the question might be brought up by the Chinese delegation before the First Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva in Nov. and Dec. 1920. No direct mention of the question was made; but Dr. Koo reserved for “a more appropriate time in the future,” the matter of bringing before the League certain “subjects of vital interest to China, affecting international relations.”

The Yap Controversy.—The Council of the League which met in Geneva on Dec. 17 1920, decided upon the statute relative to “C” class mandates, under the terms of the Covenant of the League (Art. 22, 6) and pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Council on May 7 1919, allocating the ex-German South Sea islands to Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The Japanese Government had been contending that, according to their legal interpretation, the principle of equal opportunities for trade and commerce should, under the Covenant, be assured to “C” class as well as to “B” class mandates (Art. 22, 5). But in view of the importance of unity and coöperation among the Allied nations, Japan gave her assent to the issue of the statutes, on the understanding that “that decision should not be considered as an acquiescence by the Japanese Government in the submission of Japanese subjects to discriminatory and disadvantageous treatment in the mandated territories, nor have they thereby discarded their claim that the rights and interests hitherto enjoyed by Japanese subjects in these territories should be fully respected.”

To the statute relative to the islands N. of the Equator which came under the Japanese mandate, “as an integral portion of its territory,” the United States took exception, on the plea that the island of Yap should not be included in the islands to be so assigned. It was argued that President Wilson had submitted to the Supreme Council his proposal of having that island internationalized for reasons vitally affecting the world communications, and that its decision, published on May 7 1919, should not be regarded as by any means conclusive. Further, the Washington Government declared that they had never ratified the Treaty of Versailles and accordingly were not bound by that instrument in any sense; but the United States should, treaty or no treaty, have a voice in the disposition of the affairs immediately arising from the World War. So far as the status of the island was concerned, Japan's position was that, if the published decision of the Supreme Council were not final, she did not know what she could rely upon as definite finality; the Allied powers in Europe appeared to support the Japanese view. In the presentation of their case, the American Government further stated that “even if Yap should be assigned under mandate to Japan, all other Powers should have free and unhampered access to the island for the landing and operation of cables.” Japan contended that “the (cables) question seems to be one which should be freely settled by the nation which has the charge of the place.” As the result of the Washington Conference at the end of 1921, an agreement between Japan and the United States was eventually signed on Dec. 12, by which Japan's sovereignty (as the mandatory Power) in Yap was admitted by the United States, while Japan accorded to the United States full rights and facilities in connexion with the cables and other matters.

The European Tour of the Crown Prince.—The Crown Prince Hirohito broke the age-long tradition of Japan's history, and, as the first heir to the throne to leave his native shores, set forth early in March 1921, in company with Prince Kan-in, and escorted by Count Chinda, ex-ambassador to the court of St. James's upon a tour of study and observation in Europe. Prior to departure, the more conservative section of the Japanese public, including some influential leaders in politics, gave vent to their anachronistic, though loyal, solicitude as to the safety of the Prince in risking such an unprecedented adventure, the reported indifferent health of the Emperor also inspiring anxiety in many uneasy minds. To add fuel to the popular disquietude a rumour was in circulation that the betrothal between the Crown Prince and Princess Nagako of Kuni might be cancelled, and this development was even attributed to political reasons; a timely dementi, however, was issued by the Imperial Household. The battleship “Katori,” with the Crown Prince on board, called at Hong-Kong, Singapore, Bombay, Port Said, Malta and Gibraltar, en route to Portsmouth, where she anchored on May 8. The reception by the King and the public of Great Britain was most cordial and spontaneous, befitting the Alliance uniting the two nations for the past two decades. The Crown Prince, leaving for France on May 29, said in his farewell message to the British nation: “It has been my happiness to see something of almost every side of the national life and institutions of the British people.” The Imperial tour extended to France, Belgium, Holland and Italy. As to the United States of America, the Crown Prince had occasion to say that he much regretted he could not visit that country on this trip, but that he still hoped to do so in the not far distant future. (H. Sa.)

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 This figure is the 1919 acreage.