Seymour v. McCormick (57 U.S. 480)

by Robert Cooper Grier

United States Supreme Court

57 U.S. 480

Seymour  v.  McCormick

THIS case was brought up by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.

The manner in which the suit was brought, and the charge of the Circuit Court, which was excepted to, are stated in the opinion of the court. The reporter passes over all other questions which were raised and decided, except those upon which the decision of this court turned.

It was argued by Mr. Gillet, for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Stevens and Mr. Johnson, for the defendants in error. There was also a brief filed by Mr. Selden, for the plaintiffs in error.

The following points are taken from the brief of Mr. Gillet, for the plaintiffs in error.

Sixth. Where the claim on which the suit is founded is for an improvement on old machines, patented or unpatented, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, as a measure of damages, the mechanical profits that he could make upon the whole machine, including the old part. His damages are limited to the profits on making and vending the improvement patented and infringed.

The plaintiff recited in his declaration and furnished oyer of his old patent of 1834, for a reaping machine, which expired in 1848, and his patent of 1845, which is described as an 'improvement upon his patented machine.' In his patent of 1847, he claims 'new and useful improvements in the reaping machine formerly patented by me,' in which he also claims other improvements besides the one in controversy, which is his last claim, and relates to the seat. For the purpose of this suit, the machine described in the patent of 1834, (which had in fact become public property,) and the improvements in the patent of 1845, and a large portion of those included in that of 1847, the defendants had a perfectly lawful right to use. This covered the whole of the improved reaping machine, except what related to the seat, and its combination with the reel. It cost the defendants to make their machine, which had no seat, about $64.26. There was no proof to show the extent of the cost of the plaintiff's seat. One was made by Zinck, for one dollar. The plaintiff allowed Brown in effect, in 1845, 1846, $75 each, for making machines without the elevated seat-and he proved on this trial by Blakesley, that it cost him only $36, and by Dorman, $37, to make them with it. There can be no pretence that the addition of the seat, and what is covered by the last claim, added much, if any thing, to the cost of constructing the improved machine. The plaintiff proved by Blakesley, that the manufacturer's profit on the whole machine, including a $30 patent fee, was $74.

It is evident that the manufacturer's profit constituted the principal item of gain in constructing and selling the plaintiff's reaper. The court instructed the jury that this profit on the two old machines, and on that part of the new not in controversy, could be recovered as a part of the plaintiff's 'actual damage' for violating the last claim of the patent of 1847. The old machine of 1834 was public property, and everybody had a right to construct and use it. The patents show that it contained the great and fundamental parts, and nearly the whole of the new machine. As the plaintiff had decided not to proceed on his patent of 1845, that was, in effect, public property. By waiving any right to proceed on the first claim of his patent of 1847, the plaintiff limited himself to the seat, combined with the reel. The defendants had a right to make every other part of the improved machine, and having the right, the profits up to that point were lawfully theirs. They had the right to construct the whole, save the seat. If a profit could be made upon such construction, it was as clearly theirs as if they had been made upon a machine totally unlike the plaintiff's. There is no law, statute, or otherwise, which profits their making and receiving such profits. The court instructed the jury that all these profits belonged to the plaintiff, but pointed to no law showing him entitled to them. The manufacturer's profits were distinct from his patent profits, which he estimated and charged the defendants and his partners generally at $30. The charge of the court gives him both. It makes the monopoly of a patent confined to an inexpensive improvement carry with it a monopoly of manufacturers' profits upon what is public property, precisely the same as if the whole had been included in the claim on which the trial was had. The ruling of the judge allowed the plaintiff damages to as great an extent as if the trial had been on, and had established, the old patents of 1834 and 1845, and on the first claim of that of 1847, as well as on the last. If the defendants pay these damages, there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff suing on the patent of 1845, and on the first claim of that of 1847, because this trial and verdict were confined to the last claim of the latter patent. They were not recovered upon. But the plaintiff was adjudged to enjoy their advantages under the head of manufacturers' profits. But we deny that the patent laws confer a monopoly of profits on any thing not actually patented. It would be extending the statute so as to make it cover, in effect, things that the patentee did not invent, and which by law belong to the public at large. This principle would authorize the patentee of an improvement in steamboat machinery, or railroad cars, carding, spinning, weaving, and other like machines, to recover on a patent for some trifling improvement of either the entire profits of manufacturing the whole apparatus to which it might be attached.

The judge's rule allows the plaintiff precisely the same damages as if his last claim covered the whole reaping machine, and had been held to be valid. Under his ruling, if the material parts, other than the seat, had been covered by several other patents, the defendants would have been responsible on each, as well as to the plaintiff, for all profits, manufacturing as well as for the patent-right. In such a case the plaintiff's rights, as against the defendants, would be precisely as strong as when the latter used what is now public property. If the plaintiff should bring a new suit on his patent of 1845, the recovery on that of 1847 would be no bar, and he might obtain a second manufacturer's profit. The defendants sought to attack the validity of the patent of 1845, but the evidence was ruled out; still the plaintiff was allowed to recover for the manufacturer's profits of the part of the machine covered by this patent, just the same as if it had been a part of the last claim of the patent of 1847. If the defendants had been patentees of the whole machine except the seat, and they had infringed the patent for that, could the plaintiff recover manufacturer's profits on the whole machine? Clearly not. Still the rights of the defendants to make and use all but the seat, are just as strong and legal, when they use what is public property, or what is not covered by the last claim of the patent of 1847, as if they exercised them under a patent. The fact that they had or had not a patent for every thing but the seat, can neither increase nor diminish the plaintiff's rights to damages; they must rest solely upon his patent, and not upon those of others. The law allows him all the profit he can make on his patented improvement, and nothing beyond. The judge's instruction was clearly erroneous, and vitiates the verdict.

Seventh. In estimating the plaintiff's damages for an infringement, his 'actual damages' alone are to be considered, and the jury are not authorized to presume that if the defendants had not made and sold machines, 'all persons who bought the defendants' machines would necessarily have been obliged to go to the patentee and purchase his machines.'

The proof showed that the plaintiff manufactured his machines only at Chicago, in Illinois, and his sales were in the Western States, except a few in western New York. The defendants manufactured their machines at Brockport, near Rochester, in New York, and sold them there, in Canada, and some at the west, as proved. It was proved by Hanna-'The demand within my knowledge has been unparalleled, the manufacturer oftentimes not being able to supply the demand at certain points.' The plaintiff offered no proof tending to show that he could and did supply all the demands for his machine, and could have furnished more if called for. In the absence of this evidence, and in direct conflict with the oath of the plaintiff's own witness, who was his superintendent, the court instructed the jury, that as a matter of law they were to presume that if the defendants had not constructed and sold any machines, the plaintiff would have manufactured and sold machines to the same persons to whom the defendants had sold. Hence, the jury were instructed to presume 'in the judgment of the law' what was grossly improbable, and what the plaintiff himself had actually disproved. The law does not presume that all the persons who purchased of the defendants would have purchased of the plaintiff, because the law does not presume absurdities, and what is substantially a physical impossibility; nor does it presume, without evidence, that the plaintiff had introduced a witness who had sworn falsely. This part of the charge is clearly erroneous; the court should have submitted this matter to the jury, to pass on as a question of fact.

(Mr. Stevens's eighth point was relative to the following exception which had been taken by the defendants below, namely:)

To that part of the charge which states, 'the general rule is that the plaintiff, if he has made out his right to recover, is entitled to the actual damages he has sustained by reason of the infringement; and those damages may be determined by ascertaining the profits which, in judgment of law, he would have made, provided the defendants had not interfered with his rights. That view proceeds upon the principle that if the defendants had not interfered with the patentee, all persons who bought the defendants' machines would necessarily have been obliged to go to the patentee and purchase his machine;'-the defendants' counsel excepted.

VIII. The tenth exception cannot be sustained. That exception is to that part of the charge which states that the rule of damages is, 'that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the actual damages he has sustained by reason of the infringement.' Those damages may be determined by ascertaining the profits which the plaintiff would have made if the defendants had not interfered with his rights.

It is submitted that this is the correct rule of damages in any case; but in this case its correctness cannot be doubted. The defendants, with a full knowledge of plaintiff's rights, intentionally violated them. They were intentional wrongdoers, and were, therefore, bound to pay the plaintiff all the damage he had sustained by their tortious acts, just as much as they would be bound to pay him the full value of a horse, or any other chattel, of which they had tortiously deprived him.

It was, indeed, contended on the trial, that defendants were only bound to pay such profits as they had made by this intentional piracy.

Without stopping to discuss the question whether there may not be considerations in a suit in equity, where the defendants ignorantly infringed a patent, which might limit the damages in accordance with the rule contended for by the defendants, it is respectfully submitted, that in a suit at law, where the defendants have wilfully, knowingly, and intentionally, piratee the invention of the patentee, and appropriated it to their own use, the rule of damages laid down by the court in this case is correct.

An infringer can afford to sell the machine patented at a less profit than the patentee can.

He has spent no time, exercised no intellect, in excogitating the discovery or invention.

He has spent no time nor money in procuring the patent and bringing it into public use. Any other rule of damages, therefore, than the laid down by the court, would do great injustice to the patentee.

According to the rule contended for by defendants, if they had sold the reapers made by them for simply what it cost to construct them, or had given them away, although it deprived the patentee of the profits which he might have made upon those reapers, yet he could recover no damages.

But the defendant's counsel did not request the court to charge that the rule of damages was different from that stated by the court. They simply excepted to the charge of the court in that respect, without giving any reasons, or stating how otherwise they desired the court to charge, in that regard.

As to the rule of the damages, see Pierson v. Eagle Screw Company, 3 Story, 402, 410; Allen v. Blunt, 2 Woodbury & Minot, 123, 446-7.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

Notes