A Critical Exposition of the Popular 'Jihád'/Chapter 11/81

[Sidenote: 81. Lecky's Standard of Morality.]

But supposing the modern morality does not approve of Mohammad what hardly "affected his character in Arab estimation," are there no diversities in moral judgments? The moral unity to be expected in different ages is not a unity of standard or of facts, but a unity of tendency.

"That some savage kill their old parents, that infanticide has been practised without compunction by even civilized nations, that the best Romans saw nothing wrong in the gladiatorial shows, that political or revengeful assassinations have been for centuries admitted, that slavery has been sometimes honoured and sometimes condemned, are unquestionable proofs, that the same act may be regarded in one age as innocent, and in another as criminal. Now it is undoubtedly true, that in many cases an historical examination will reveal special circumstances explaining or palliating the apparent anomaly. It has been often shown that the gladiatorial shows were originally a form of human sacrifice adopted through religious motives; that the rude nomadic life of savages rendering impossible the preservation of aged and helpless members of the tribe, the murder of parents was regarded as an act of mercy both by the murderer and the victim; that before an effective administration of justice was organized, private vengeance was the sole preservation against crime, and political assassination against usurpation; that the insensibility of some savages to the criminality of theft arises from the fact that they were accustomed to have all things in common; that the Spartan law legalizing theft arose partly from a desire to foster military dexterity among the people, but chiefly from a desire to discourage wealth; that slavery was introduced through motives of mercy to prevent conquerors from killing their prisoners. All this is true, but there is another and a more general answer. It is not to be expected, and it is not maintained, that men in all ages should have agreed about the application of their moral principles. All that is contended for is, that these principles are themselves the same. Some of what appear to us monstrous acts of cruelty were dictated by that very feeling of humanity, the universal perception of the merit of which they are cited to disprove; and even when this is not the case, all that can be inferred is, that the standard of humanity was very low. But still humanity was recognized as a virtue, and cruelty as a vice."[1]


Footnotes edit

  1. History of European Morals, from Augustus to Charlemagne. By William Edward Hartpole Lecky, M.A., Vol. I, pp. 101-102.