A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities/Chapter 12
CHAPTER XII.
CONCERNING THE SELECTIONS AND THE DECISIONS OF ASSEMBLIES.
The probability of the decisions of an assembly depends upon the plurality of votes, the intelligence and the impartiality of the members who compose it. So many passions and particular interests so often add their influence that it is impossible to submit this probability to calculus. There are, however, some general results dictated by simple common sense and confirmed by calculus. If, for example, the assembly is poorly informed about the subject submitted to its decision, if this subject requires delicate considerations, or if the truth on this point is contrary to established prejudices, so that it would be a bet of more than one against one that each voter will err; then the decision of the majority will be probably wrong, and the fear of it will be the better based as the assembly is more numerous. It is important then, in public affairs, that assemblies should have to pass upon subjects within reach of the greatest number; it is important for them that information be generally diffused and that good works founded upon reason and experience should enlighten those who are called to decide the lot of their fellows or to govern them, and should forewarn them against false ideas and the prejudices of ignorance. Scholars have had frequent occasion to remark that first conceptions often deceive and that the truth is not always probable.
It is difficult to understand and to define the desire of an assembly in the midst of a variety of opinions of its members. Let us attempt to give some rules in regard to this matter by considering the two most ordinary cases: the election among several candidates, and that among several propositions relative to the same subject.
When an assembly has to choose among several candidates who present themselves for one or for several places of the same kind, that which appears simplest is to have each voter write upon a ticket the names of all the candidates according to the order of merit that he attributes to them. Supposing that he classifies them in good faith, the inspection of these tickets will give the results of the elections in such a manner that the candidates may be compared among themselves; so that new elections can give nothing more in this regard. It is a question now to conclude the order of preference which the tickets establish among the candidates. Let us imagine that one gives to each voter an urn which contains an infinity of balls by means of which he is able to shade all the degrees of merit of the candidates; let us conceive again that he draws from his urn a number of balls proportional to the merit of each candidate, and let us suppose this number written upon a ticket at the side of the name of the candidate. It is clear that by making a sum of all the numbers relative to each candidate upon each ticket, that one of all the candidates who shall have the largest sum will be the candidate whom the assembly prefers; and that in general the order of preference of the candidates will be that of the sums relative to each of them. But the tickets do not mark at all the number of balls which each voter gives to the candidates; they indicate solely that the first has more of them than the second, the second more than the third, and so on. In supposing then at first upon a given ticket a certain number of balls all the combinations of the inferior numbers which fulfil the preceding conditions are equally admissible; and one will have the number of balls relative to each candidate by making a sum of all the numbers which each combination gives him and dividing it by the entire number of combinations. A very simple analysis shows that the numbers which must be written upon each ticket at the side of the last name, of the one before the last, etc., are proportional to the terms of the arithmetical progression 1, 2, 3, etc. Writing then thus upon each ticket the terms of this progression, and adding the terms relative to each candidate upon these tickets, the divers sums will indicate by their magnitude the order of their preference which ought to be established among the candidates. Such is the mode of election which The Theory of Probabilities indicates. Without doubt it would be better if each voter should write upon his ticket the names of the candidates in the order of merit which he attributes to them. But particular interests and many strange considerations of merit would affect this order and place sometimes in the last rank the candidate most formidable to that one whom one prefers, which gives too great an advantage to the candidates of mediocre merit. Likewise experience has caused the abandonment of this mode of election in the societies which had adopted it.
The election by the absolute majority of the suffrages unites to the certainty of not admitting any one of the candidates whom this majority rejects, the advantage of expressing most often the desire of the assembly. It always coincides with the preceding mode when there are only two candidates. Indeed it exposes an assembly to the inconvenience of rendering elections interminable. But experience has shown that this inconvenience is nil, and that the general desire to put an end to elections soon unites the majority of the suffrages upon one of the candidates.
The choice among several propositions relative to the same object ought to be subjected, seemingly, to the same rules as the election among several candidates. But there exists between the two cases this difference, namely, that the merit of a candidate does not exclude that of his competitors ; but if it is necessary to choose among propositions which are contrary, the truth of the one excludes the truth of the others. Let us see how one ought then to view this question.
Let us give to each voter an urn which contains an infinite number of balls, and let us suppose that he distributes them upon the divers propositions according to the respective probabilities which he attributes to them. It is clear that the total number of balls expressing certainty, and the voter being by the hypothesis assured that one of the propositions ought to be true, he will distribute this number at length upon the propositions. The problem is reduced then to this, namely, to determine the combinations in which the balls will be distributed in such a manner that there may be more of them upon the first proposition of the ticket than upon the second, more upon the second than upon the third, etc.; to make the sums of all the numbers of balls relative to each proposition in the divers combinations, and to divide this sum by the number of combinations; the quotients will be the numbers of balls that one ought to attribute to the propositions upon a certain ticket. One finds by analysis that in going from the last proposition these quotients are among themselves as the following quantities: first, unity divided by the number of propositions; second, the preceding quantity, augmented by unity, divided by the number of propositions less one; third, this second quantity, augmented by unity, divided by the number of propositions less two, and so on for the others. One will write then upon each ticket these quantities at the side of the corresponding propositions, and adding the relative quantities to each proposition upon the divers tickets the sums will indicate by their magnitude the order of preference which the assembly gives to these propositions.
Let us speak a word about the manner of renewing assemblies which should change in totality in a definite number of years. Ought the renewal to be made at one time, or is it advantageous to divide it among these years? According to the last method the assembly would be formed under the influence of the divers opinions dominant during the time of its renewal; the opinion which obtained then would be probably the mean of all these opinions. The assembly would receive thus at the time the same advantage that is given to it by the extension of the elections of its members to all parts of the territory which it represents. Now if one considers what experience has only too clearly taught, namely, that elections are always directed in the greatest degree by dominant opinions, one will feel how useful it is to temper these opinions, the ones by the others, by means of a partial renewal.