INTRODUCTION

UPON the ashes of Persepolis arose a new Ori­ent, a world in which Greek and oriental elements were strangely intermingled. The task of holding together as a political entity this vast area extending from the Mediterranean to the Indus proved too great for the successors of Alexander; their strength was eventually spent in fratricidal wars, and the East once more lapsed into the control of petty kinglets. The time was ripe for the formation of a new empire. Rising out of the obscure mists to the east of the Caspian Sea, Parthian horsemen rode victoriously over all Iran. Governed by strong, able, and resolute kings, they subdued nation after nation until from the slopes of the Zagros Mountains they could look out over the colorless alluvium of Meso­potamia. In 141 b.c. their squadrons clattered down the passes and conquered these fertile lands. Under Parthian administration commerce greatly increased, and cities long abandoned and then nothing more than mounds of dun-colored earth rose again to life. New canals were dug and old ones cleaned of the silt accumulations of centuries.

Unlike other invaders from the northeast, the Parthians did not kill and destroy for the sake of booty, but often took over new territory without creating more than a ripple in the life of the common man. The greatest changes which they brought about probably took place within the administrative machinery, but unfortunately little firsthand information is available on the internal structure of the Parthian empire, because we possess very few official documents. Most of our knowledge comes from excavations at sites such as Susa and Dura-Europus or by inference from casual statements made by classical authors. Our best information, then, comes from areas on the periphery of the empire, and general conclusions drawn from it can be accepted only with great caution.[1]

In effect the Parthian empire became a vast feuda­tory power, a pyramid the apex of which was the King of Kings, beneath whom came the satraps, the nobles, the Greek merchants, and finally the native tillers of the soil, the ultimate basis upon which any such system must rest. The nobles who controlled the land probably lived in the larger cities, where they and the wealthy Greek merchants who depended upon them for protection would naturally form alli­ances. The parallel with the Middle Ages in Europe is striking, and the decay of the two systems came about in much the same manner. During much of the period before the Christian era the royal power was supreme; but after that time the nobles, then firmly rooted and grown wealthy from lands and war, began to usurp more and more authority. Their defiance of the king brought about frequent periods of disruption and eventually the downfall of the empire. Very probably the decline of the royal power and the rise of the nobles were closely connected with the religious revival of the latter half of the first century after Christ. Parallels for the struggle between the nobles and Magi on one hand and the king on the other can easily be found in Achaemenian and Sasanian his­tory.

Some years before the death of Mithradates II in 87 b.c. he had carved on the rock at Behistun a relief in which he and his principal officials appear. The chief of these is called satrap of satraps, the other three simply satraps. Probably these men belonged to the great families of Iran such as the Surens and Karens. Their positions with attendant rights and duties gradually became hereditary. A Suren always placed the crown upon the head of a new king, and, as at Carrhae, a Suren frequently led the Parthian armies in battle.

Evidently the form of government of Parthian de­pendencies varied widely and changed from time to time. Mithradates apparently appointed a governor to rule over newly conquered Media; Himerus served in the same capacity in Babylonia; and at a later date Mesopotamia was governed by this method. In other cases, however, either the local dynasty was retained or some other ruler acceptable to the Parthians was installed. Armenia was ruled by a member of the Arsacid family, as was Media Atropatene at times. Vassal kings remained in Adiabene, Characene, Elymais, and Persis and in some of the city-kingdoms such as Hatra and Osroene. Of all these only Chara­cene, Elymais, and Persis were permitted to strike money while under Parthian control. Of the impor­tant cities, Seleucia alone seems to have been accorded the right to issue civic coinage; and its small bronze issues, contrary to generally accepted numis­matic principles, traveled fairly long distances, for example as far as Susa. However, numismatics must be applied with caution to questions of territorial control. Dura-Europus in the Parthian period used money from Syrian Antioch. Southeastern Iran, though at times directly under Parthian control, does not seem to have used the royal coinage.[2] Parthian coins traveled eastward along the great silk route into Turkestan; but none has been reported in China, and they are rarely, if at all, found in India proper.

That the royal power extended even to matters of local government is proved by a letter of Artabanus III to the city of Susa validating a contested election. Incidentally it is interesting to note that the letter was in Greek, though documents sent to the eastern part of the empire would probably be in the official Pahlavi. That an election case was of such vital importance as to force the king to intervene over the heads of the properly constituted authorities seems doubtful; hence we must conclude that certain places were more or less under royal jurisdiction.

Careful distinction is made by some contemporary writers between Greek and Parthian cities within the Parthian empire. This may well imply a difference in administration as well as population, for documents from Dura and Susa show that the governments of these places preserved the pattern of the Hellenistic city-state. Such places rarely held Parthian garrisons. Ctesiphon, for example, is said to have been built to house Parthian troops, which evidently could not be installed in Seleucia across the river.

The Parthians secured their revenues as did the Achaemenidae by means of tribute and customs duties, and they were anxious to further peace and the free interchange of commerce to increase the royal income. Although the Parthian revolt was originally a reaction against Iranian Hellenism, its character as a steppe culture modified by Iranian and Bactrian contacts underwent considerable alteration in the presence of the more ancient cultures of Mesopotamia and the strong Hellenistic influence there. For a hundred or more years after the Parthians entered the Land of the Two Rivers, Greek elements formed an important part of their culture, until at last they were overshadowed by another oriental reaction.

When the Parthian feudal system was at its height, its military power was immense. In addition to mere numbers, the Parthians possessed the compound bow and complete scale armor for man and horse, arms of offense and defense against which the Roman legions had never before been matched. In 53 b.c. the consul Crassus and thirty thousand of his men fell under a hail of Parthian arrows, and the succeeding years saw raids into the rich territory about the pleasure center of Antioch. The armies which humbled the "invincible" legions were almost entirely composed of cavalry, both light- and heavy-armed. Because of the expense of maintaining horses and armor the heavy-armed was recruited from the nobility, who were also expected to supply and equip some light cavalry, not armored, but furnished with the bow as a weapon of offense.

As a result of their exploitation of the land, the success of their commercial alliances, and the profits of the booty from raids into Roman territory, the nobility gained tremendously in power and importance. On the other hand the royal family, the Arsacidae, in whom the succession to the throne remained, was torn asunder and weakened by intrigue, murder, and quarrels between members of the dynasty. The result was inevitable, just as in Europe. The feudal lords no longer responded to the call to arms, no longer paid their annual tribute, but engaged in plots against the king and were ready to defy him by force of arms should he interfere with their rights. Disorganization within the empire, not force of arms, opened the way for the Roman legions into Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, the plundering of great commercial centers and royal treasures, as well as losses in man power and territory occasioned by the wars with Rome, greatly contributed to the decline of Parthia.

In the last years of the empire the name "Arsaces" became but a shuttlecock, bandied back and forth by claimants who possessed little if any real power. Under such conditions a strong leader backed by a powerful army had little difficulty in overcoming the disunited efforts of the nobles, many of whom must have longed for another strong central authority which should restore peace and prosperity. The Parthians had originally been alien to both Iran and Mesopotamia; their conquerors the Sasanidae came from Persis, where the ruined cities and the tombs of the great Achaemenid monarchs were a constant reminder of former Iranian glories. Ardashir, first of the new dynasty, found it no difficult task to overthrow the tottering and decrepit Arsacid line and thus to write the last chapter in the political history of Parthia.

  1. On the organization of the Parthian empire see the publications of the excavations at Dura-Europus, Seleucia on the Tigris, and Susa and the excellent statement by Rostovtzeff in CAH, XI, 113–20.
  2. H. H. Wilson, Ariana Antiqua. A Descriptive Account of the Antiqui­ties and Coins of Afghanistan … (London, 1841); H. T. Prinsep, Note on the Historical Results Deducible from Recent Discoveries in Afghanistan (London, 1844).