APPENDIX
NO. 1.
In Sharp's tract, on "the injustice and dangerous tendency of tolerating slavery," published in London, by Benjamin White, Fleet-street, 1769, after quoting York and Talbot's opinion of Jan. 14, 1729, he states, that thirty years prior to this opinion, in the case of Gallway versus Caddee, before Baron Thompson, at Guildhall, the slave was judged to be free, "from his first setting foot on English ground."
He records a similar judgment in 1732, in the case of De Penna, &c. versus Henriquez; and Lord Chief Justice Holt's prior decision, "that as soon as a negro comes into England, he becomes free"—"one may be a villain in England, but not a slave."
He cites the following glorious principles of law.
"The law favors liberty." Wood's Inst. B. 1, c. 1, p. 25. Coke's 1st Inst. B. 124, and 2d Inst. 42, 115.
"The law favoreth a man's person before his possessions." Noyes' Maxims, p. 6 and 7.
"Quoties dubia interpretatio libertatis est, secundum libertatem respondendum." Digest. Lib. 50, Tit. 17, Leg. 20. Whenever the question of liberty seems doubtful, the decision must be in favor of liberty.
"The inferior law must give place to the superior—man's laws to God's laws." Noye's Maxims. If, therefore, any statute be enacted contrary to these, it ought to be considered of no authority in the laws of England. Etiam si aliquod statutum esse editum contra eas (that is against the laws of God) nullius vigoris, in legibus Angliæ, censeri debet. (Pages 55, 56, of another tract, entitled "Just limitation of slavery.")
"Usage and custom, generally received, have the force of law." Hale's History of Common Law, p. 65.
"Quia consuetudo, ex certa causa rationabile usitata, privat communem legem;" because custom, derived from a certain reasonable cause, takes the place of law. Littleton, Lib. 2, c. 10, sec. 149.
But "consuetudo, contra rationem introducta, potius usurpatio, quam consuetudo, appellari debet." When custom is adopted without reason, it ought rather to be called usurpation than custom.
"Quia, in consuetudinibus, non diuturnitas temporis, sed soliditas rationis, est consideranda." Because in judging of customs, strength of reason is to be considered, and not length of time. The reason which supports them ought to be regarded, and not the length of time, during which they have prevailed.
Two incidents are indispensable to validity of custom or usage:
1st. A reasonable commencement (for all customs or prescriptions which are against reason, are void.) 2d Inst. p. 140.
2d. Continuance without interruption.
"Malus usus abolendus est." Evil customs ought to be abolished. Littleton, 2 Inst. c. 2, p. 141. On which Sir Edward Coke remarks, that "every use (or custom) is evil, which is against reason—because, as above, "in consutuedinibus, non diuturnitas temporis, sed soliditas rationis, est consideranda."
"Debile fundamentum, fallit opus." Noyes' Maxims, p. 5. Where the foundation is weak, the structure falls.
"Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis, non convalescit." Noyes' Maxims, p. 4. What is invalid from the beginning, cannot be made valid by length of time.
"Derivata potestas, non potest esse major primitiva." Derived power, cannot be superior to the power from which it is derived. Noyes' Maxims, p. 3.
Before any contract can be valid, the civil law requires three conditions as indispensable:
1st. That the parties contracting should have a legal capacity.
2d. They must be willing to contract—because "In ea, quæ ex duorum pluriumve consensu agitur, omnium voluntas spectitur." In those things which relate to the consent of two or more, the will of every one is regarded. And again, "In conventionibus, contrahentium voluntatem, potius quam verba, spectare placuit." Digest, xliv. vii. 31, and l. xvi. 219. In every agreement, the will rather than the words of the contracting parties is to be regarded.
3d. The parties must have liberty—for "Nil consensui tam contrarium est, quam vis atque metus; quem comprobare, contra bonos mores est." Nothing is so discordant with consent, as force and fear—it is a crime against the good of society, to approve of them." Digest. 1. xvii. 116 Yet "vani timoris, justa excusatio, non est;" unreasonable fear, is not a sufficient excuse; 1. xvii. 184; but, "Vis est, majoris rei impetus, quod repelli non potest;" force consists in such a power as you cannot resist.
"Servitus est constitutio juris gentium, qua, quis, domino alieno, contra naturam subjicitur." Inst. Lib. 1, Tit. 3. Leg. 2. Slavery is a regulation of the law of nations, by which any body, is unnaturally subjected to the dominion of another.
"Crudelis etiam necessario judicabitur lex quæ servitutem augmentat, et minuit libertatem: nam pro ea, natura semper implorat humana. Quia, ab homine pro vitio introducta est servitus. Sed libertas, a Deo, hominis est indita natura. Quare ipsa ab homine sublata, semper redire gliscit, ut facit omne quod libertati naturali privatur. Quo impius et crudelis judicandus est qui libertati non favet. Hac considerantia, Angliæ jura, in omni casu, libertati dant favorem." Chancellor Fortescue, De laudibus Legum. c. 42, p. 101. The law therefore, which supports slavery, and opposes liberty, must necessarily be condemned as cruel: for every feeling of human nature advocates liberty. Slavery is introduced through human wickedness; but God advocates liberty by the nature which he has given to man. Wherefore, liberty torn from man, always seeks to return to him; and it is the same with every thing, which is dedeprived of its native freedom. On this account it is, that the man who does not favor liberty, must be regarded as impious and cruel; and hence the English law always favors liberty.
"Ratio legis, est animus legis." The resonableness of the law, is the soul of the law. Jenks' Cent. 45.
"Scribitur hæc lex in corde cujuslibet hominis, docens eum quid agendum, et quid ugiendum: et quod rationis, in corde scribitur, idio deleri non potest, nec enim recepit mutationem ex loco nec tempore, sed ubique et inter omnes homines, servari debet. Nam jura naturalia, immutabilia sunt; et ratio immutationis, est quod recipiunt naturam rei pro fundamenta, quæ semper eadem est, et ubique." Doct. and Stud., c. 2. This law is written upon the heart of every man, teaching him what to choose and what to refuse. What is written by reason in the heart, cannot be effaced; neither is it liable to change from either place or time, but ought to be preserved every where by all men. For the laws of nature are immutable; and the reason of their immutability is this, that they have for their foundation, the nature of things, which is always and every where the same.
"Contra eam non est præscriptio vel oppositum statutum, sive consuetudo, et si aliqua fiant, non sunt statuta, sive consuetudines, sed corruptela." Doct. and Stud. B. 5. Against this there is no prescription or statute, or usage; and should any be enacted, they would not be statutes, or usages, but corrupt customs. Quia ilia potestas, (juris) solius Dei est; potestas autem injuriæ, diaboli, et non Dei; et cujus horum opera fecerit rex, ejus minister erit, cujus opera fecerit (Rom. vi. 16.) Igitur dum facit justitiam, vicarius est Regis Eterni; minister autem diaboli, dum declinat ad injuriam." Bracton, Lib. 3, c. 9, p. 106-7. The lawful power is from God alone; but the power of wrong, is from the devil and not from God; and whosesoever work a king shall do, his servant he is, whose work he does. Wherefore, when he does justice, he is the minister of the Eternal King—but when he does unrighteousness, he is the servant of the devil. "Dicitur enim rex, a bene regendo, et non a regnando; quia rex est dum bene regit. Tyrannus, dum populum sibi creditum, violenta opprimet dominatione." Ibid. For he is called a king (ruler) for ruling righteously, and not because he reigns. Wherefore, he is a king, when he governs with justice—but a tyrant, when he oppresses the people committed to his charge.
"For though custom, tribute, fear and honor, are certainly due to him, who is the minister of God to us for good; yet surely no honor is due, or ought to be rendered to the minister of the devil; to the perjured violator of a public trust, who in the eye of the English law, is not even worthy of so much as the name of a king." Granville Sharp's "Law of passive obedience," p. 75.
"All men therefore, be they ever so rich, or ever so poor and mean, are required to vindicate the cause of truth, justice and righteousness, whenever they have a favorable opportunity of doing so;" p. 89. "An hereditary knowledge of good and evil, is a talent committed to all men, for the use or abuse of which therefore, all are accountable in exact proportion to the extent of the gift;" p. 89, 90. "The hasty revenger of his own cause, is so far from being a friend to the community, or a lover of liberty, that he himself, is actually a tyrant; because he neglects the necessary doctrine of christian submission to personal injuries; and is ready to revenge his own cause, with his own hand, and to usurp all the distinct offices of Judge, Jury and Executioner. He is so far from vindicating the law, like the generous and patriotic apostle, for the sake of national liberty, that he manifestly sets himself up above the law, (which is the first characteristic of a tyrant) and thereby renders himself) in fact, an open enemy to liberty, and consequently a disgrace to society," ibid.
"When they (men) are freest they have limits, for they are not infinite; nay, when they are most free, they are most bound to good order and to right reason." Sadler's Rights, p. 135.
And in Blackstone's Commentaries, Chitty's edition, 1826, we read:
"The law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe; in all countries, and at all times. No human laws have any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid, derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately from this original." And again, "Those rights which God and nature have established, and which are therefore called 'natural rights,' such as life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws, to be more effectually vested in every man, than they are. Neither do they receive any additional strength, when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no human legislation has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit some act, that amounts to forfeiture." Introduction, Section 2.
"Law favoreth life, liberty and dower. Law regards the person above his possessions—life and liberty most," &c. Principia Legis and Equitatis, p. 56.
Such are the glorious foundations of British, eternal and universal law. Such are the principles which, without partiality and without hypocrisy, yield "glory to God in the highest, and on earth, peace, good will, to man." Such are the principles, which an American, cast away upon the shores of Morocco, would wish to find prevailing there. Such are the principles, without which, all boasts of liberty, are but a lie; a triumph of licentiousness over freedom; the boast of the strong, and the bane of the weak! Such are the principles, the universal prevalence of which, would make the world a moral Eden—the rejection of which, keeps it a little hell; especially where freemen hold slaves; for of all governments, an oligarchy is the worst. It consists of a hundred, or a thousand, or ten thousand tyrants, instead of one. It is "diffusing tyranny every where." It is "bringing despotism home to every man's door." It involves the greatest deliberateness and desperation of iniquity, both with law and without law, which it is possible for power to perpetrate against weakness. And this enormous concatenation of all possible wickedness, is at its climax, when the oligarchs, the petty despots, the plantation tyrants most boast of freedom!! Witness Sparta and Athens, and republican Rome, in ancient times—in modern, witness the colonies of France, Holland and England. At this moment, see especially the United States; and at their apex, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Missisippi and Louisiana.
NO. 2.
In the year 1824, a little band of refugee slaves, that is, of guiltless British subjects, who had fled in peace, from the the most iniquitous
This work was published before January 1, 1929, and is in the public domain worldwide because the author died at least 100 years ago.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse