A wandering student in the Far East/The making of the North-East Frontier Part II.

by Lawrence Dundas

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE MAKING OF THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER.

PART II.: GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

In the preceding chapter I have outlined the history of Anglo-Chinese relations on the Burmese marches up to the present day. The part played by France in the events which led up to the annexation of Upper Burma has been mentioned, and in order to complete the sketch of the building of the frontier, it is necessary to pass in brief review the action of that Power in this part of Asia, since, for the whole of an anxious decade, she stood boldly in the way of the peaceful moulding of India's eastern frontier.

In judging of French action in Indo-China it must not be forgotten that she had at one time aspired to become the overlord of India itself, and had actually grasped within her hand the sceptre of Indian empire. For a brief and breathless moment the whole continent of India vibrated beneath the magnetic touch of the dramatic figure of Dupleix, and when the glittering prospect opened up by him faded before the grim tenacity and forceful determination of the seamen and traders of Great Britain, a craving for empire sprang up in adjacent territories and found expression in a series of ill-conceived enterprises in the direction of Burma and Siam. Bearing in mind the disappointment suffered by her eclipse on the Indian continent, it is not altogether surprising to find that the sequence of events in Further India already described, disclosed in their onward march a growing rivalry between England and France, and pointed clearly to the danger which attended the approaching shock of collision between their rapidly converging frontiers "The game of conquest and politics in Indo-China, the vicissitudes of which had been heretofore almost confined to the struggles of the obscure states within its bounds, were henceforth to be played by Powers from afar, and to influence the future of old European Governments."^[1]

The annexation of Upper Burma sooner or later was, in all probability, inevitable; but it was the action of France which was responsible for its actual accomplishment. Rumours of a Franco-Burmese Convention aroused the suspicions of the India Office in the summer of 1885. Questions were addressed to the French Government. The paramount position of Great Britain was admitted; the Ministers of France "temporised politely and deprecated, while they did not arrest, the activities of"^[2] their agent upon the spot; and it was their agent upon the spot who was guiding and controlling events in Upper Burma. Nowhere is the real story of this gentleman's proceedings so well told as in Dr Morrison's inimitable account of his journey across China in 1894. The French Political Resident, M. Haas, zealous for the greatness and the honour of his country, drew up and submitted to King Theebaw the articles of a secret treaty. Let me quote Dr Morrison's own words:—

"By this treaty French influence was to become predominant in Upper Burma; the country was to become virtually a colony of France, with a community of interest with France, with France to support her in any difficulty with British Burma. Fortunately for us, French intrigue outwitted itself, and the Secret Treaty became known. It was in this way. Draft copies of the agreement, drawn up in French and Burmese, were exchanged between M. Haas and King Theebaw. But M. Haas could not read Burmese, and he distrusted the King. A trusted interpreter was necessary, and there was only one man in Mandalay that seemed to him sufficiently trustworthy. To Signor A——, then, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires and manager of the Irrawadi Flotilla Company, M. Haas went, and, pledging him to secrecy, sought his assistance as interpreter.

"As M. Haas had done, so did his Majesty the King. Two great minds were being guided by the same spirit. Theebaw could not read French, and he distrusted M. Haas. An interpreter was essential, and casting about for a trusted one, he decided that no one could serve him so faithfully as Signor A——, and straightway sought his assistance as M. Haas had done. Their fates were in his hands; which master should the Italian serve, the French or the Burmese? He did not hesitate—he betrayed them both. Within an hour the Secret Treaty was in possession of the British Resident. Action was taken with splendid promptitude. M. de Freycinet, when pressed on the subject, repudiated any intention of acquiring for France a political predominance in Burma. An immediate pretext was found to place Theebaw in a dilemma; eleven days later the British troops had crossed the frontier, and Upper Burma was another province of our Indian Empire."^[3]

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Defeated in her efforts to lay hold of Upper Burma, she turned her eyes towards Siam as the next most convenient field for imperial exploitation. Great Britain could not view with equanimity the prospect of a powerful neighbour establishing herself along her eastern frontier, uncontrolled and ill-defined as such frontier was, and consisting of an ill-assorted patchwork of little-known tribes whose proclivities would be only too likely to lie in the direction of crooked diplomacy and intrigue; and being driven to action by the pressure of events, the Foreign Office fell back upon their panacea for every frontier ill—the creation of a buffer state. With this object in view, slices of her recently acquired Burmese territory were handed round to any one who could be found willing to take them,—China, as has already been recorded, receiving the state of Kiang Hung, and Siam being presented with the adjoining territory of Kiang Cheng. This arrangement served for a time, until the discovery was suddenly made by the explorers and historiographers of France that the rulers of Siam were in unlawful possession of territory

A Burmese Pagoda.

which of right belonged to France as the overlord of Cochin China and Annam, resulting in a declaration by the French ambassador in London in the spring of 1893 that his Government claimed for Annam the whole of the country on the left bank of the Mekong—a declaration at which Lord Rosebery "could not conceal his surprise."

The story of the subsequent operations between France and Siam, which were brought to an abrupt conclusion by the appearance of two French gunboats at Bangkok, need not be retold here. The British Government had not the slightest intention of burning their fingers by intervening on behalf of Siam; but with the collapse of that country before the determined attitude of France, French claims showed a disconcerting tendency to expand, and before the summer of 1893 was through, embraced the whole of the territory on the left bank of the Mekong, including consequently a portion of the state of Kiang Cheng already conditionally presented by Great Britain to Siam. Once more was there a flutter of excitement in the Foreign Office dovecot, and after declaring that "the approach of a great military Power like France to a frontier lying naked to attack could not be regarded with indifference," Lord Dufferin succeeded—at no small sacrifice of territory and prestige—in securing the assent of France to the formation of a buffer state. A protocol embodying this proposition, and providing for the despatch of a commission to collect the data necessary for its geographical definition, was signed on July 31st. The difficulties, however, in the way of bringing into being a satisfactory buffer state only grew as the question of its boundaries and its government were discussed, and the declaration of Lord Rosebery in October 1893 that, in the event of negotiations failing, the British Government would have to take "such measures as they might consider necessary for their own protection," followed as it was by a curt retort from the French representative to the effect that the integrity of Luang Prabang was of the highest interest to France, and that "neither the French Chamber nor French public opinion would tolerate its disintegration," showed how perilously near to the powder-magazine the match had come.

The war-cloud fortunately blew by, the parties interested agreeing to postpone any definite decision as to mutual concessions to a later date, and it was not until 1896—the commission arranged for under the terms of the protocol of July 1893 not having started until December 1894—that the matter was finally adjusted. By an Agreement signed in that year by Lord Salisbury and the French ambassador in London, the integrity of the kingdom of Siam was guaranteed and the line of division between "the possessions or spheres of influence" of the two countries to the north of that state determined. By the boundary therein decided Great Britain admitted the claims of France to the ownership of the Möng Hsing district of Kiang Cheng—an admission which was all the easier to make, as Lord Salisbury somewhat cynically remarked in forwarding a copy of the Agreement to the British ambassador in Paris, owing to "its extent and intrinsic value not being large," and because "on account of its unhealthy character, it had no great attractions for Great Britain."

By Article IV. of the same instrument, it was agreed that "all commercial and other privileges and advantages conceded in the two Chinese provinces of Yün-nan and Ssŭch'uan, either to Great Britain or France, in virtue of their respective conventions with China, of March 1st, 1894, and June 20th, 1895, and all privileges and advantages of any nature which may in the future be conceded in these two Chinese provinces, either to Great Britain or to France, shall, as far as rests with them, be extended and rendered common to both Powers and to their nationals and dependents, and they engage to use their influence and good offices with the Chinese Government for this purpose."

With the conclusion of this Agreement was closed a chapter of bitter diplomatic warfare in the history of Anglo-French relations. Hereafter the feelings of the two nations towards one another steadily improved, until in 1904 Lord Lansdowne was able to place a seal upon their friendship in the shape of the famous document known as the Anglo-French Agreement of April of that year, dealing with outstanding matters of difference between the two countries in all four quarters of the globe. A brief declaration with regard to Siam found a place in this momentous Agreement. Articles I. and II. of the Agreement of 1896, by which France and Great Britain undertook to refrain from any armed intervention or the acquisition of special privileges in the Siamese possessions which were included within the basin of the Menam river, were reaffirmed, and further extended to bring the understanding between the two Powers into line with the development of events which had taken place between 1896 and 1904. Both England and France had entered into Agreements with Siam—Great Britain with regard to the Malay Peninsula and France with regard to the Mekong valley,—the preponderating influence of Great Britain in the western and of France in the eastern portions of the Siamese dominions being tacitly recognised. This tacit understanding found documentary expression in the declaration concerning Siam included in the Agreement of 1904. the two Contracting Parties, while disclaiming all idea of annexing any Siamese teritory, declaring nevertheless by mutual agreement that "the influence of Great Britain shall be recognised by France in the territories situated to the west of the basin of the river Menam, and that the influence of France shall be recognised by Great Britain in the territories situated to the east of the same region, all the Siamese possessions on the east and south-east of the zone above described and the adjacent islands coming thus henceforth under French influence, and, on the other hand, all Siamese possessions on the west of this zone and of the Gulf of Siam, including the Malay Peninsula and the adjacent islands, coming under English influence."

A settlement of the Franco-Siamese frontier has been finally come to in a treaty signed between the two countries at Bangkok on March 23rd, 1907, the chief feature of which is the cession to France by Siam of the territories of Battambang, Siem-Reap, and Sisophon in return for the territories of Dan-Saï and Kratt, and all the islands situated to the south of Cape Lemling as far as, and inclusive of, Koh-Kut.

All danger, then, of collision between Great Britain and France in this part of the world may be said to have been removed, and as regards that Power, as well as China, the making of the "North-East Frontier" may be said to be an accomplished fact.

END OF FIRST VOLUME.

1. Sir Henry Yule in 1883.
2. 'Life of Lord Randolph Churchill,' vol. i. p. 522.
3. The whole of these details are omitted from the account of the annexation given in the 'Gazetteer of Upper Burma'; but they are undoubtedly correct. An interesting side-light is thrown upon the matter by Major E. C. Browne in a volume entitled 'The Coming of the Great Queen,' published in 1888. "Writing of the French intrigues which led to the action of Great Britain, he says: "Strangely enough, I think I know the source from which this wild enterprise sprang." He then describes how, when in Paris in 1880, he attended a meeting of "La Société de Cochin-Chine." The meeting took place in the private apartments of a nobleman, and a paper was read upon Indo-Chinese affairs, followed by a somewhat constrained discussion. The Society appeared to be "a sort of private Intelligence Department" which watched French interests in Indo-China, and "kept the Government coached up on the subject." The conclusion which he drew from his inquiries is summed up as follows: "I have often thought since that the feebly supported attempt to establish French influence at Mandalay was the outcome of this Society's investigations. The Government not improbably said to this body, 'If you can get a footing in Upper Burma without bringing us into conflict with England, we shall say you deserve well of your country.'"

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE LORD RONALDSHAY'S JOURNEY.

W^m. Blackwood & Sons.