Union Calendar No. 395
104th Congress REPORT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2nd Session 104-749
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INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
TOWARD THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
--------------------
THIRTEENTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
prepared in conjunction with the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
together with
additional and dissenting views
August 2, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1996
26-167 CC
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
Hampshire PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GARY A. CONDIT, California
STEPHEN HORN, California COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
JOHN L. MICA, Florida KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
RANDY TATE, Washington ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan Columbia
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana GENE GREEN, Texas
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ------
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
Carolina (Independent)
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
SCOTT L. KLUG, Wisconsin
James L. Clarke, Staff Director
Kevin Sabo, General Counsel
Robert Shea, Professional Staff Member
Jeff Wilmot, Professional Staff Member
Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Bud Myers, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New Hampshire, Chairman
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida TOM LANTOS, California
JOHN L. MICA, Florida LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts GARY A. CONDIT, California
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
Ex Officio
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
Pennsylvania
Robert Charles, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Michele Lang, Special Counsel
Sean Littlefield, Professional Staff Member
Cherri Branson, Minority Professional Staff Member
(ii)
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, California JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado
Wisconsin BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JOHN BRYANT, Texas
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico JACK REED, Rhode Island
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia XAVIER BECERRA, California
STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana ZOE LOFGREN, California
MARTIN R. HOKE, Ohio SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
SONNY BONO, California MAXINE WATERS, California
FRED HEINEMAN, North Carolina
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia
Alan F. Coffey, Jr., General Counsel/Staff Director
Julian Epstein, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Crime
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida, Chairman
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California
FRED HEINEMAN, North Carolina SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
ED BRYANT, Tennessee MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia
Paul J. McNulty, Chief Counsel
Glenn R. Schmitt, Counsel
Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Counsel
Tom Diaz, Minority Counsel
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, August 2, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight and on behalf of Mr.
Hyde and Mr. McCollum of the Committee on the Judiciary,
I herewith submit the committee's thirteenth report to
the 104th Congress. The report is based on a joint
investigation conducted by the Judiciary's Subcommittee
on Crime, and the Government Reform and Oversight
Committee's Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice.
Sincerely,
William F. Clinger, Jr.,
Chairman.
(v)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Executive summary................................................. 1
A. A brief summary of the Government's actions
toward the Branch Davidians............... 1
B. Findings of the subcommittees.................. 3
C. Recommendations................................ 5
I. Introduction........................................... 6
A. The need for the Waco inquiry.................. 6
B. Opposition to the inquiry...................... 7
C. The nature of the inquiry...................... 8
1. Document requests and review....... 8
2. Investigation and interviews....... 8
3. Hearings........................... 9
4. Post-hearing investigation......... 9
D. The structure and scope of the report.......... 9
E. Additional comments............................ 10
II. The ATF investigation.................................. 10
A. The McMahon compliance visit................... 10
B. The investigation continued.................... 10
C. Undercover operation........................... 11
D. Failure to comply with ``sensitive-
significant'' procedures.................. 12
E. The affidavit in support of the warrants....... 12
F. Findings concerning the ATF investigation...... 13
G. Recommendations................................ 14
III. Planning and approval of the raid...................... 14
A. Was ``show time'' even necessary?.............. 14
B. Was the violent outburst predictable?.......... 15
C. The predisposition to dynamic entry............ 15
1. The source of the predisposition... 15
2. Raid approval and lack of Treasury
Department oversight of ATF... 16
D. Failure to comply with ``sensitive-
significant'' procedures.................. 17
E. Findings concerning the planning and approval
of the raid............................... 17
IV. Raid execution......................................... 17
A. Rodriguez and the ``element of surprise''...... 18
1. How the Davidians knew the ATF was
coming........................ 18
2. The undercover agent............... 18
B. Who bears the responsibility for the failure of
the raid?................................. 21
C. Other ways in which the plan selected was
bungled................................... 23
1. Command and control issues......... 23
2. The lack of a written raid plan.... 24
3. Lack of depth in the raid plan..... 24
4. Tactical teams trained together for
only 3 days before the raid... 25
5. True National Guard role only made
clear 24 hours prior to
theraid....................... 25
D. Service of the warrant......................... 26
E. Unresolved allegations......................... 26
1. Who shot first?.................... 26
2. Were shots fired from the
helicopters?.................. 27
F. The firing and rehiring of Chojnacki and
Sarabyn................................... 28
G. Findings concerning the raid execution......... 28
H. Recommendations................................ 29
(vii)
V. Military involvement in the Government operations at
WACO.................................................. 30
A. The expansion of military assistance to law
enforcement............................... 30
1. The Posse Comitatus Act............ 30
2. Interstate use of National Guard by
Governors..................... 33
B. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms'
request for military assistance and the
military assistance actually provided..... 35
1. Overview........................... 35
2. Concerns of military legal advisors 39
3. Evidence indicating problems in the
approval process.............. 40
C. The alleged drug nexus......................... 43
1. Methamphetamine laboratories....... 43
2. Evidence purporting to show the
alleged drug nexus............ 45
3. Evidence refuting ATF's claim of a
drug nexus.................... 48
D. Post-raid military assistance to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation................... 50
1. Military equipment and personnel
provided...................... 50
2. Advice/consultation provided by
military officers............. 51
3. Foreign military personnel......... 51
E. Findings concerning military involvement in the
Government operations at Waco............. 52
1. The Posse Comitatus Act was not
violated...................... 52
F. Recommendations................................ 53
VI. Negotiations to end the standoff with the Davidians.... 55
A. The conflict between tactical commanders and
negotiators............................... 56
1. The problem with two teams: one
negotiating team and a
tactical team................. 56
B. Negotiation opportunities lost................. 58
1. Why the FBI changed negotiators.... 58
2. Why the FBI didn't allow others to
participate in the
negotiations.................. 59
C. Lack of appreciation of outside information.... 60
1. Why the FBI did not rely more on
religious advisors to
understand Koresh............. 60
2. Others who contributed information. 62
D. The FBI's failure to follow its own expert's
recommendations........................... 64
1. What the FBI's own experts
recommended................... 64
E. The decision to dismiss the surrender plan..... 64
1. ``Kids lined up with their jackets
on''.......................... 64
2. Breakthrough with Koresh's letter.. 65
3. The breakthrough communicated to
Jamar......................... 65
4. The failure to communicate this
breakthrough up the chain of
command....................... 65
5. Evidence that Koresh was writing
his interpretation of the
Seven Seals................... 66
6. Why the FBI disregarded the
evidence that the Seven Seals
were being written............ 66
F. Findings concerning the negotiations to end the
standoff with the Davidians............... 66
G. Recommendations................................ 66
VII. The Attorney General's decision to end the stand-off. 67
A. Overview of the plan to end the standoff....... 67
B. The operation plan for April 19, 1993.......... 67
1. Overview of the written operation
plan to end the standoff...... 67
2. Acceleration provisions of the
operations plan............... 68
C. The way the plan actually unfolded............. 68
D. Overview of the use of CS chemical agent....... 69
1. Introduction....................... 69
2. Concerns over use of CS............ 70
E. Clinical effects and toxicity of CS............ 70
1. Common effects of exposure to CS... 70
2. Toxicity of CS..................... 71
F. Effect of the CS and methylene chloride in the
quantities used on April 19th............. 71
1. Lethality of CS as used at Waco.... 71
2. Lethality of methylene chloride
used with CS at Waco.......... 73
3. Other possible effects of methylene
chloride used with CS at Waco. 74
(viii)
G. Analysis of the Attorney General's decision to
end the standoff on April 19, 1993........ 75
1. The decision not to storm the
residence..................... 75
2. The reasons asserted for ending the
standoff on day 51............ 75
3. The decision as to how to implement
the plan...................... 79
H. Presidential involvement in the events at Waco,
TX........................................ 81
I. Findings concerning the plan to end the
standoff.................................. 81
J. Recommendations................................ 83
VIII. The fire............................................. 84
A. Summary of the development of the fire......... 84
B. Other theories concerning the development of
the fire.................................. 85
1. Whether the methylene chloride in
the CS riot control agent used
by the FBI caused the fire.... 85
2. Whether the irritant chemical in
the CS riot control agent used
by the FBI caused or
contributed to the spread of
the fire...................... 86
3. Whether the combat engineering
vehicles used by the FBI on
April 19 started the fire..... 86
C. Whether the Davidians could have left their
residence after the fire began............ 87
D. The FBI's planning for the fire................ 87
E. Findings concerning the fire................... 88
VIEWS
Additional views of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen...................... 91
Additional views of Hon. William H. Zeliff, Jr.................... 92
The submission by Hon. Steven Schiff, of the Subcommittee on
National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice
of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, of
extraneous material provided to him by Hon. Bob Barr, of the
Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary....... 93
Additional views of Hon. Tom Lantos............................... 97
Dissenting views of Hon. Cardiss Collins, Hon. Karen L. Thurman,
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. Robert E. Wise,
Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Louise M.
Slaughter, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney,
Hon. Thomas M. Barrett, Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins, Hon.
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. James P. Moran, Hon. Carrie P.
Meek, Hon. Chaka Fattah, and Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.......... 98
(ix)