CHAPTER XIII.
(November 27th, 1914)
THE COMMAND OF THE AIR.
§ 85. Air Power as Affecting Combined Tactics. Some indication has been given in the preceding articles of the influence that the advent of aircraft may be expected to have on the tactical value and employment of the other Arms of the Services; more particularly attention has been called to the changes that will almost inevitably be found necessary in the employment of cavalry. Certain writers, basing their views too exclusively on the experience of the present war, have expressed the opinion that the aeroplane, and, more broadly, aircraft, though of the greatest service and utility as a new means of reconnaissance (and, to some extent, of offence), will not have any material influence on the tactical employment of the older Arms, either Infantry, Cavalry, or Artillery. In the opinion of the author this view is fallacious, and the present war, at least so far as developed, cannot be taken as a criterion. It may be thought overbold thus to give preference to purely theoretical deduction in place of actual experience, but a little consideration will show that the experience, such as it is, cannot be regarded as a serious indication of the future. It is an undeniable fact that the aeroplane has, in the present war, been able to give information of the positions and movements of the enemy such as would have been otherwise unobtainable, and in a few cases it has enabled points to be attacked which could not have been reached by any other means. To this extent it may be said to have invented or originated new duties not overlapping those of the older Arms. It is equally true that, so far, it has not seriously encroached by its employment on the duties of the other Arms—it has not replaced cavalry in any measurable degree, neither has aeroplane bombardment been found effective as a .substitute for gun-fire. There is, however, one important consideration that should prevent us from drawing too hasty a conclusion from these facts. The number of aeroplanes at present in service (as already pointed out) is small in comparison with the size of the armies in the field, so much so that we can only afford to employ our aeroplanes for work for which they are pre-eminently suited; that is to say, to perform mainly those duties which cannot be done by other means.
The position is perhaps most easily illustrated by means of an analogy. Some years ago, when the milling-machine was first introduced into our general engineering shops, it was not an uncommon thing to see one such machine installed (more or less experimentally) in a large machine-shop alongside some hundred or so lathes and other machine-tools; such a machine usually had allotted to it a number of odd jobs that could not be done conveniently or cheaply on any other machine. Any superficial observer asked to report on the innovation might have been tempted to say, "By means of this new machine work may be undertaken which could not, commercially speaking, be done previously; it does not, however, show any promise of replacing to any extent the older forms of machine-tool, and can only be regarded as useful for doing the special work for which it has shown itself of unique value." Such a view would, we know, have been utterly wrong. The milling-machine to-day is doing a multitude of jobs formerly looked upon as essentially work for the lathe or planing-machine, but it had no opportunity of demonstrating its full capacity until installed in sufficient numbers. The above is merely an illustration chosen from innumerable examples which might be cited.
§ 86. General Influence on Combined Tactics. Aircraft as affecting Attack and Defence. Without attempting to discuss fully the influence of the development of the Fourth Arm on questions of "grand" or "combined" tactics, mention may be made of one salient fact which has already become manifest; the influence of aircraft as a means of reconnaissance has greatly increased the power of defence without, it would appear, conferring a commensurate benefit on the attack. It is possible that the fighting power of the aeroplane may in the future be found to redress the balance of advantages but, so far, there is no definite indication that this will be the case.
It may be stated tersely that the equilibrium between forces conducting respectively an attack and defence is normally maintained by a balance between strategic and tactical advantages. Thus the tactical advantage lies with the defender, in so far that he may be presumed to occupy chosen positions carefully prepared and fortified in advance, so that to place the attack on terms of equality the force employed must (locally at least) be numerically stronger; a numerical superiority many times that of the defending force may be required. The strategic advantage is with the attacking force, owing to the fact that the general in command can select any one of a number of possible points at which to deliver his assault. By exerting pressure at other points, by way of feint, he can keep the enemy in ignorance of his intentions whilst he is concentrating at the point chosen for the main attack, and so prevent him (the defender) taking steps to reinforce his lines. Thus an attacking army can always ensure a local numerical superiority at the decisive moment, and the issue will largely depend on whether this advantage is sufficient to outweigh the tactical advantage of the defending force as due to its choice of position and entrenchments and other defensive works. Clearly much, if not everything, depends upon the general in command of the attack being able successfully to conceal his movements until the moment arrives for delivering his blow. But the veil of secrecy has been lifted by the advent of aircraft. It is for this reason that the power of aerial reconnaissance has proved so valuable a weapon to the defending force, and of comparatively little value to the attack. It is quite true that the aircraft of the attacking force may be of considerable use in reporting the nature and strength of the defences, and so may disclose the points of weakness at which the chances of successful assault are the greatest: but this will only in a very small degree compensate for the premature disclosure of the whole plan of attack to the defenders, a disclosure which, if we may judge from experience so far gained, appears to be little short of complete.
The foregoing applies more particularly to warfare in which large bodies of troops are engaged over a great extent of territory; evidently where fighting is on a small scale, and the whole of the movement constituting a concentration and attack can be executed between sunset and sunrise, the operations can be considered to be of a purely tactical character. It may be emphasised that it is by destroying the strategic advantage hitherto enjoyed by the attack that aeronautical reconnaissance gains its especial value as an aid to the defence. Thus, so far, the advent of aircraft in the field of battle has had the effect of tending to produce a deadlock, or position of stalemate, such as we are able to witness at the present time in the north-west of France and on the Belgian frontier.
§ 87. Previous Improvements in Weapons and Armament. Question of Depth of Fighting Line. It is of interest to note that, previously to the arrival of the aeroplane, most of the improvements of weapons and armament have tended to favour the attack and to render defence more difficult. During the last three or four centuries we have seen the value of permanent defences gradually diminish, as constructional improvements and scientific methods of usage have rendered the Artillery Arm more and more deadly. Of more recent times we have witnessed the result of the increased effectiveness of fire-arms generally in the greater concentration that can be effected on any given point in a field of battle. In other words, the depth of the line has been increased by the greater range of small-arms, and it may to-day be increased almost indefinitely by the employment of artillery of heavier and heavier calibre, with correspondingly increased range. Such increase in the depth of the line only becomes of general value when, as in the present war, the number of men per mile of front is great, and more men are available than can be effectively employed in the trenches or infantry supports. Any additional numerical strength must then be assigned to the Artillery Arm, and the greater the supply of men (in other words, the greater the density of the line), the greater becomes the relative importance of Artillery: then the heavier and longer range should be the artillery brought into action, in order to ensure that the weight of numbers shall tell, in some degree at least, in accordance with the n-square law. It would seem that this is a point which has been very fully realised by the German Staff. In our own experience it is certain that the Boer War, owing to the comparative openness of the country and less density of the fighting-line, did not fully demonstrate the importance of artillery from the standpoint of modern European warfare.
§ 88. The Command of the Air. It is probable that in the future the employment of aircraft in large numbers, tactically in a combative capacity, may, in effect, still further deepen the fighting-line. Without attempting to predict exactly what röle the aeroplane will take in this regard, it is safe to say that if, during a battle, it is found practicable to conduct air raids and air attacks systematically over a considerable belt of territory in the rear of an enemy's lines, this belt will require to be defended, and (if the air forces employed are of numerical strength comparable to the other Arms) the belt will actually become a measure of the depth of front. The permanent defeat of the enemy's air fleet and, as we may express it, the capture of his air will then become the first and most important duty of the Aeronautical Arm. It is difficult to gauge what the total consequence of defeating the enemy in the air will be. It is unlikely that it will entirely prevent his aerial reconnaissance; his scouts will doubtless manage to run the gauntlet and continue to keep him sufficiently informed. On the other hand, he will be deprived of all those uses of the Aeronautical Arm in which some more direct and definite purpose is involved, such as the direction of gun-fire, defence of stores, protection of cavalry, etc. He will require to submit to aeroplane attack without possibility of effective counter; he will be subjected to long-range gun-fire (directed by aeroplane) without means of returning it; his cavalry will be continually harassed by machine-gun fire and explosive grenades, and will cease to be of service; his railways, convoys, and mechanical transport will be nowhere safe; and he will need to expend an undue proportion of his resources in patrolling his lines of communication and guarding points of strategic importance. The command of the air opens up possibilities in the direction of raiding of a kind and with a scope not hitherto known in warfare. To what extent it will be found possible for aircraft to detach themselves from their base, and execute extended raids in territory ' held by the enemy, only the future can determine. It would certainly appear that if the inhabitants are friendly, and the enemy's aircraft are no more a force to be reckoned with, tactics of this kind may be quite feasible.
Once again the author would point out that the experience of the present war is no guide; the Aeronautical Arm quâ Arm cannot at present be said to exist. The Flying Corps, excellent though it be, is scarcely more than necessary to constitute an armed reconnaissance service.
§ 89. Total Defeat in the Air an Irreparable Disaster. From the foregoing it would appear to be at least doubtful whether in future warfare an army which has been deprived of its aircraft, or has to admit the air supremacy of an enemy, will find itself in a position to carry on a campaign. It is, in any case, certain that it will only be able to do so at a very grave disadvantage. It is the author's opinion that the time will come when the total and irretrievable loss of the command of the air to an enemy will be regarded as a disaster of an altogether irreparable and decisive kind, and although there may be a great deal of fighting still before the end, nothing less than an overwhelming superiority in the other arms will save an army deprived of its air service from ultimate defeat. We are thus led to the consideration of a branch of the subject of extreme importance—namely, aeroplane tactics.
§ 90. Employment of Aircraft in Large Bodies. Air Tactics. In some of the previous Chapters (Chapter VII., et seq.) the question of aircraft fighting—i.e., aeroplane versus aeroplane—has been considered, and matters such as armament have been fully discussed. We shall now deal with the employment of the armed machine in its fighting capacity, not as a single unit, but as part of a force whose function is the destruction of the armed air fleet of the enemy, and the crippling of his reconnaissance service. It is evidently necessary to assume that the enemy in his turn has prepared an armed air fleet, and that the problem to be studied is the handling and bringing to battle of the two air fleets in their struggle for supremacy.
The various factors that enter into the problem, apart from the personnel are those of speed, climbing power, armament, and last, but not least, numerical strength. These, together with that all-important item—the tactical scheme—are the more weighty of the material factors on which the question of victory or defeat will turn. The relative importance of the different items is not by any means always the same. It may, for example, usually be assumed that one or the other of the combatant forces is seeking, and the other endeavouring to avoid, battle, or at least is only willing to accept battle under conditions deemed favourable; thus it may be that the enemy can be only brought to battle by virtue of superior speed. In other cases it will be possible to force the enemy to give battle by attack upon some vulnerable point connected with his land forces; all this is strictly analogous to the similar problems of naval warfare. Given the main conditions, all that can be accomplished by a tactical scheme is to ensure engaging the enemy in the most favourable manner possible, and, as in the problems studied in Chapters V. and VI., bringing the greatest weight of numbers possible to bear on lesser numbers of the enemy, in order to reap the advantage of the n-square law. The object of the practice of tactical exercises will be to enable an air fleet to manoeuvre to defeat the enemy in detail, and, if his numbers are superior, to prevent him from bringing his whole concentrated fire to bear by the adroit handling of the weaker numbers, and so to neutralise the advantage of his numerically superior force.