All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 2/Chapter 1

by Epictetus

Layout 1

THE

DISCOURSES

OF

EPICTETUS.

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BOOK II.

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CHAPTER I.

That Courage is not inconsistent with Caution.

§. 1.hat is asserted by the Philosophers may, perhaps, appear a Paradox to some: let us, however, examine, as well as we can, whether this be true; That it is possible in all Things, to act at once with Caution and Courage. For Caution seems, in some measure, contrary to Courage: and Contraries are by no means consistent. The Appearance of a Paradox to many, in the present Case, seems to me to arise from something like this: If, indeed, we assert, that Courage and Caution are to be used, in the same Instances, we should justly be accused of uniting Contradictions: but, in the Way that we affirm it, where is the Absurdity? For, if what hath been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the Essence of Good and Evil consists in the Use of the Appearances; and that Things independent on Choice, are not of the Nature either of Good or Evil; what Paradox do the Philosophers assert, if they say: "Where Things are not dependent on Choice, be courageous: where they are, be cautious?" For in these only, if Evil consists in a bad Choice, is Caution to be used. And if Things independent on Choice, and not in our Power, are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of Courage. Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous: and, indeed, courageous on the Account of this very Caution; for by using Caution with regard to things really evil, we shall gain Courage, with regard to what are not so.

§. 2. But we are in the same Condition as [hunted] Deer: when these, in a Fright, fly from the Feathers^[1], where do they turn, and to what do they retire for Safety? To the Toils And thus they are undone, by inverting the Objects of Fear and Confidence. Thus we, too, In what Instances do we make use of Fear? In Things independent on Choice. In what, on the other hand, do we behave with Courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded? In Things dependent on Choice. To be deceived then, or to act rashly or impudently, or to indulge an ignominious Desire, is of no Importance to us, if we do but take a good Aim, in Things independent on Choice. But where Death, or Exile, or Pain, or Ignominy, are concerned, there is the Retreat, there, the Flutter and Fright. Hence, as it must be with those who err in Matters of the greatest Importance, what is naturally Courage, we render bold, desperate, rash, and impudent: and what is naturally Caution, timid and base, and full of Fears and Perturbations. For if a Person was to transfer Caution to Choice, and the Actions of Choice, by a Willingness to be cautious, he will, at the same time, have it in his Power to avoid [what he guards against:] but if he transfers it to Things not in our Power, or Choice, by fixing his Aversion on what is not in our own Power, but dependent on others, he will necessarily fear; he will be hurried; will be disturbed. For it is not Death, or Pain, that is to be feared; but the Fear of Pain, or Death. Hence we commend him who says:

Death is no Ill, but shamefully to die.

Courage, then, ought to be opposed to Death, and Caution to the Fear of Death: whereas we, on the contrary, oppose to Death, Flight; and to our Principle concerning it, Carelessness, and Desperateness, and Indifference.

§. 3. Socrates used, very properly, to call these Things Vizards: for, as Masks appear shocking and formidable to Children, from their Inexperience; we are affected in like manner, with regard to Things, for no other Reason, than as Children are, with regard to Vizards. For what is a Child? Ignorance. What is a Child? Want of Learning: for, so far as the Knowledge of Children extends, they are not inferior to us. What is Death? A Vizard. Turn it, and be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little body and Spirit must be separated (as they formerly were) either now, or hereafter: why, then, are you displeased if it be now? For if not now, it will be hereafter. Why? To complete the Revolution of the World: for that hath need of some Things present, others to come, and others already completed. What is Pain? A Vizard. Turn it, and be convinced.

This paultry Flesh is sometimes affected by harsh, sometimes by smooth Impressions. If suffering be not worth your while, the Door is open; if it be, bear it: for it was fit the Door should be open, against all Accidents. And thus we have no Trouble.

§. 4. What, then, is the Fruit of these Principles? What it ought to be; the most noble, and the most becoming the Truly Educated^[2], Tranquillity, Security, Freedom. For in this Case, we are not to give Credit to the Many, who say, that none ought to be educated but the Free; but rather to the Philosophers, who say, that the Well-educated alone are free.

How so?

Thus: Is Freedom any thing else, than the Power of Living as we like?

Nothing else.

Well tell me then, do you like to live in Error?

We do not. No one, sure, that lives in Error^[3], is Free.

Do you like to live in Fear? Do you like to live in Sorrow? Do you like to live in Perturbation?

By no means.

No one, therefore, in a State of Fear, or Sorrow, or Perturbation, is free: but whoever is delivered from Sorrow, Fear, and Perturbation, by the same means is delivered likewise from Slavery. How shall we believe you, then, good Legislators, when you say; "We allow none to be educated but the Free?" For the Philosophers say; "We allow none to be free, but the Liberally-educated:" that is, God doth not allow it.

What, then, when any Person hath turned his Slave about before the Consul, hath he done nothing?

Yes, he hath.

What?

He hath turned his Slave about, before the Consul.

Nothing more?

Yes. He pays a^[4] Fine for him.

Well then: is not the Man, who hath gone through this Ceremony, rendered free?

No more than [he is rendered] exempt from Perturbation. Pray, have you, who are able to give this Freedom to others, no Master of your own? Are not you a Slave to Money? To a Girl? To a Boy? To a Tyrant? To some Friend of a Tyrant? Else, why do you tremble when any of these is in question? Therefore, I so often repeat to you, Let this be your Study; have this always at hand; in what it is necessary to be courageous, and in what cautious: courageous, in what doth not depend on Choice; cautious, in what doth.

§. 5.^[5] But have not I read my Papers to you? Do not you know what I am doing?

In what?

In my Essays.

Show me in what State you are, as to Desire and Aversion. Whether you do not fail of what you wish, and incur what you would avoid but, as to these common-place Essays, if you are wise, you will take them, and obliterate them.

Why, did not Socrates write?

Yes: who^[6] so much? But how? As he had not always one at hand, to argue against his Principles, or be argued against in his Turn, he argued with, and examined, himself; and always treated, at least, some one natural Notion, in a manner fitted for the Use of Life. These are the Things which a Philosopher writes: but for such^[7] common-place Essays as those I am speaking of, he leaves to the Insensible, or to the happy Creatures whom Idleness^[8] furnishes with Leisure; or to such as are too weak to regard Consequences. And will you, when you are gone from hence^[9], which the Time now calls for, be fond of showing, and reading, and be ridiculously conceited, of these Things?

Pray see, how I compose Dialogues.

Talk not of that, Man; but rather be able to say; See, how I avoid being disappointed of my Desire: see, how I secure myself against incurring my Aversion. Set Death before me; set Pain, set a Prison, set Ignominy, set Condemnation before me; and you will know me. This is the [proper] Ostentation of a young Man come out from the Schools. Leave the rest to others. Let no one ever hear you utter a Word about them: nor suffer it, if any one commends you for them: but think that you are nobody, and that you know nothing. Appear to know only this, how you may never be disappointed of your Desire; never incur your Aversion. Let others study Causes, Problems, and Syllogisms. Do you study Death, Chains, Torture, Exile^[10]: and all these, with Courage, and Reliance upon Him, who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a Post, in which you may show, what the rational governing Faculty can do, when set in Array, against Powers independent on the Choice. And thus, this Paradox becomes neither impossible, nor a Paradox, that we must be at once cautious and courageous: courageous, in what doth not depend upon Choice; and cautious, in what doth.

Footnotes

1. This was a Kind of Scare-crow, formed of different coloured Feathers, by which the Animal was terrified, and so driven into the Net: which was the ancient Manner of Hunting.
2. Παιδεια, in Greek, means nearly the same Thing, as what we now call liberal Education. It was that Sort of Education peculiar to Gentlemen; that is, such as were free; and of which the Slaves, or lower Sort of People, were forbid to partake, according to the Systems of some Legislators. Such (as well as I can remember) was the Case among the Lacedemonians, and amongst the ancient Persians, till the Time of Cyrus.
   It must be observed, that the Words Educated, Free, King, and many others, were taken by the Stoics from common Life; and by them applied solely to the Character of their wise, and perfect Man.
   The Translator is obliged for this Note, as well as for many other valuable Hints, to Mr. Harris; so well known for many Works of Literature and Genius.
3. And ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth shall make you free. John viii. 32. This is one, among many other Passages to the same Purpose, in that perfect Law of Liberty, the New Testament.
4. When a Slave was to be presented with his Freedom, he was brought before the Consul; and his Master, taking him by the Hand, pronounced a certain Form of Words, and then turned the Slave about, who was thus rendered free. The Fine which the Master was to pay on this Occasion, was applied to the public Use. Upton.
5. This seems to be spoken by one of the Scholars.
6. No other ancient Author mentions Socrates, as having written any Thing, except a Hymn to Apollo, and a Translation of some Fables of Æsop into Verse. Many Authors of Credit affirm, that he wrote nothing. Therefore Wolfius doubts, whether some other Name should not be put here, instead of Socrates. Yet the Description most properly belongs to him. And, perhaps, Epictetus doth not mean to intimate here, that Socrates had published any thing: but that he wrote, when he had no Opportunity of discoursing, for his own Improvement. But still, living constantly at Athens, the Seat of philosophical Disputation, he cannot be supposed, often to have had that Reason for Writing.
7. The Original here seems corrupt, or inaccurate. I hope the Translation is not far from the true Sense.
8. The Greek is Αταραξία, Tranquillity: but it seems to be false Reading for Απραξία. Αταραξία is the very Thing which Epictetus had been recommending through the whole Chapter, and which makes the Subject of the next; and, therefore, cannot be well supposed to be the true Reading in a Place, where it is mentioned with Contempt.
9. For επελθων, perhaps, the Reading should be απελθων and it is so translated. The Person to whom Epictetus speaks, was a young Man just leaving the philosophical School.
10. Some English Readers, too happy to comprehend how Chains, Torture, Exile, and sudden Executions, can be ranked among the common Accidents of Life, may be surprized to find Epictetus so frequently endeavouring to prepare his Hearers for them. But it must be recollected, that he addressed himself to Persons, who lived under the Roman Emperors; from whose Tyranny, the very best of Men were perpetually liable to such Kind of Dangers.