All the Works of Epictetus, Which Are Now Extant/Book 4/Chapter 6

by Epictetus

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CHAPTER VI.

Concerning Those who grieve at being pitied.

§. 1.It vexes me, say you, to be pitied. Is this your Affair then, or theirs, who pity you? And further: How is it in your Power to prevent it?——"It is, if I show them, that I do not need Pity."——But are you now in such a Condition, as not to need Pity, or are you not?——"I think I am. But these People do not pity me for what, if any thing, would deserve Pity, my Faults; but for Poverty, and want of Power, and Sicknesses, and Deaths, and other Things of that Kind."——Are you then prepared to convince the World, that none of these Things is in reality an Evil: but that it is possible for a Person to be happy, even when he is poor, and without Honours, and Power? Or are you prepared to appear to them, rich and powerful? The last of these is the Part of an arrogant, silly, worthless Fellow. Observe too, by what Means this Fiction must be carried on. You must hire some paultry Slaves, and get possessed of a few little Pieces of Plate, and often show them in public; and, though they are the same, endeavour to conceal that they are the same: you must have gay Clothes, and other Finery; and make a Show of being honoured by your great People; and endeavour to sup with them, or be thought to sup with them; and use some vile Arts with your Person, to make it Person, to make it appear handsomer and genteeller than it really is. All this you must contrive, if you would take the second Way not to be pitied. And the first is impracticable, as well as tedious, to undertake the very Thing, that Jupiter himself could not do: to convince all Mankind what Things are really good and evil. Is this granted you? The only Thing granted you is, to convince yourself: and you have not yet done that: and do you, notwithstanding, undertake to convince others? Why, who hath lived so long with you, as you have with yourself? Who is so likely to have Faith in you, in order to be convinced by you, as you in yourself? Who is a better Wisher, or a nearer Friend to you, than you to yourself? How is it then, that you have not yet convinced yourself. Should not you^[1] now turn these Things every way in your Thoughts? What you were studying was this: to learn to be exempt from Grief, Perturbation, and Meanness, and to be free. Have not you heard then, that the only way that leads to this is, to give up what doth not depend on Choice: to withdraw from it; and confess, that it belongs to others? What kind of Thing then is another's Opinion about you?——"Independent on Choice."——Is it nothing then to you?——"Nothing."——While you are still piqued and disturbed about it then, do you think, that you are convinced concerning Good and Evil.

§. 2. Letting others alone then, why will you not be your own Scholar and Teacher? Let others look to it, whether it be for their Advantage to think and act contrary to Nature: but no one is nearer to me than myself. What then is the Meaning of this? I have heard the Reasonings of Philosophers, and assented to them: yet, in fact, I am never the more relieved. Am I so stupid, and yet in other Things, that I had an Inclination to, I was not found very stupid: but I quickly learned Grammar, and the Exercises of the Palæstra, and Geometry, and the Solution of Syllogisms. Hath not Reason then convinced me? And yet there is no one of the other Things, that I so much approved or liked from the very first. And now I read concerning these Subjects, I hear Discourses upon them, I write about them, and I have not yet found any Reasoning of greater Strength than this. What then do I want? Is it not, that the contrary Principles are not removed out of my Mind? Is it not, that I have not strengthened these Opinions by Exercise, nor accustomed them to occur in Action; but, like Arms thrown aside, they are grown rusty, and do not fit me? Yet neither in the Palæstra, nor writing, nor reading, nor solving Syllogisms, am I contented with mere Learning: but I turn the Arguments every way, which are presented to me, and I compose others; and the same of convertible Propositions. But the necessary Theorems, by which I might become exempted from Fear, Grief, Passion, unrestrained and free, I neither exercise, nor study, with a proper Application. And then I trouble myself, what others will say of me; whether I shall appear to them worthy of Regard; whether I shall appear happy.——Will you not see, Wretch, what you can say of yourself? What sort of Person you appear to yourself, in your Opinions, in your Desires, in your Aversions, in your Pursuits, in your Preparation, in your Intention, in the other proper Works of a Man? But, instead of that, do you trouble yourself, whether others pity you?——"Very true. But I am pitied improperly."——Then are not you pained by this? And is not he who is in Pain to be pitied.——"Yes."——How then are you pitied improperly? For you render yourself worthy of Pity by what you suffer upon being pitied.

§. 3. What says Antisthenes then? Have you never heard? "It is kingly, O Cyrus, to do well, and to be ill spoken of." My Head is well, and all around me think it akes. What is that to me? I am free from a Fever; and they compassionate me, as if I had one. "Poor Soul, what a long while have you had this Fever!" I say too, with a dismal Countenance, Ay, indeed, it is now a long time that I have been ill.——"What can be the Consequence then?"——What pleases God. And at the same time I secretly laugh at them, who pity me. What forbids then, but that the same may be done in the other Case? I am poor: but I have right Principles concerning Poverty. What is it to me then, if People pity me for my Poverty? I am not in Power, and others are: but I have such Opinions as I ought to have concerning Power, and the want of Power. Let them see to it, who pity me. But I am neither hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold. But, because they are hungry and thirsty, they suppose me to be so too. What can I do for them then? Am I to go about, making Proclamation, and saying, Do not deceive yourselves, good People, I am very well: I regard neither Poverty, nor want of Power, nor any thing else, but right Principles. These I possess unrestrained. I care for nothing farther.——But what trifling is this? How have I right Principles, when I am not contented to be what I am; but am out of my Wits, how I shall appear?——But others will get more, and be preferred to me.——Why, what is more reasonable, than that they who take pains for any thing, should get most in that Particular, in which they take pains? They have taken pains for Power; you, for right Principles: they, for Riches; you, for proper Use of the Appearances of things. See whether they have the Advantage of you in that, for which you have taken pains, and which they neglect: if they assent better, concerning the natural Bounds and Limits of Things; if their Desires are less disappointed than yours, their Aversions less incurred; if they take a better Aim in their Intention, in their Purposes, in their Pursuits: whether they preserve a becoming Behaviour, as Men, as Sons, as Parents, and so on in respect of the other Relations of Life. But, if they are in Power, and you not^[2]: why will you not speak the Truth to yourself; that you do nothing for the sake of Power; but that they do every thing? And it is very unreasonable, that he who carefully seeks any thing, should be less successful than he who neglects it.——"No: but since I take Care to have right Principles, it is more reasonable that I should have Power."——Yes, in respect to what you take Care about, your Principles. But give up to others the Things, in which they have taken more Care than you. Else it is just as if, because you have right Principles, you should think it fit, that when you shoot an Arrow, you should hit the Mark better than an Archer, or that you should forge better than a Smith. Therefore let alone taking pains about Principles, and apply yourself to the Things which you wish to possess, and then fall a crying, if you do not suceeed; for you deserve to cry. But now you say, that you are engaged in other Things; intent upon other Things: and it is a true Saying, that one Business doth not suit with another. One Man, as soon as he rises and goes out, seeks to whom he may pay his Compliments; whom he may flatter; to whom he may send a Present; how he may please the Dancer [in vogue]; how, by doing ill-natured Offices to one, he may oblige another. Whenever he prays, he prays for nothing like these: whenever he sacrifice, he sacrifices for Things like these. To these he transfers the Pythagorean Precept;

Let not the stealing God of Sleep surprise, &c.

^[3]Where have I failed in Point of Flattery? What have I done? Any thing like a free, brave-spirited Man? If he should find any thing of this Sort, he rebukes and accuses himself. "What Business had you to say that? For could not you have lied? Even the Philosophers say, there is no Objection against telling a Lye."

§. 4. But on the other hand, if you have in reality been careful about nothing else, but to make a right Use of the Appearance of Things; as soon as you are up in a Morning, consider, what do I want in order to be free from Passion? What, to enjoy Tranquillity? What am I? Am I mere worthless Body? Am I Estate? Am I Reputation? None of these. What then? I am a reasonable Creature. What then is required of me? Recollect your Actions. Where have I failed, in any Requisite for Prosperity? What have I done, either unfriendly, or unsociable? What have I omitted, that was necessary in these Points?

§. 5. Since there is so much Difference then in your Desires, your Actions, your Wishes, would you yet have an equal Share with others in those Things, about which you have not taken Pains, and they have? And do you wonder, after all, and are you out of Humour, if they pity you? But they are not out of Humour, if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced, that they are in Possession of their proper Good; but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not contented with your own Condition; but desire theirs: whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not desire yours. For, if you were really convinced, that it is you who are in Possession of what is good, and that they are mistaken, you would not so much as think what they say about you.

Footnotes

1. The Text here is either corrupt, or very elliptical and obscure; and the Translation conjectural. Ανω κατα hath the same Sense in the next Page but one, which is assigned to it here. The και before μανθανειν is omitted, as being probably a Corruption of the last Syllable of the preceding Word, written twice over. Mr. Upton's MS. cuts the Difficulty short, by leaving out several Words; in consequence of which, the Translation would be; How is it then, that you have not yet brought yourself to learn to be exempt, &c.
2. I have translated thus, on the Supposition, that ου in the Original ought to be repeated.
3. See the Pythagorean Verses (quoted in B. III. c. 10.) of which these Questions are a Parody.