Allied Agents in Soviet Russia

by René Marchand

Allied Agents

in

Soviet Russia

 

Complete Text of the

Letter of M. René Marchand,
Petrograd Correspondent of "Le Figaro"

To M. POINCARÉ,
President of the French Republic,

September, 1918

 

PRICE: ONE PENNY

 

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PUBLISHED BY
THE PEOPLE'S RUSSIAN INFORMATION BUREAU,
152, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.4

Allied Agents in Soviet Russia

 

Moscow, August 22nd/September 4th, 1918.

M. le Président,

Encouraged by the goodwill you have been pleased to show me, and by the request you made of me upon a former occasion—to send you information from time to time on the situation in Russia—I have the honour to send you a copy of the letter recently written by me to M. Albert Thomas, and dealing more particularly with the question of Allied intervention. Since the despatch of that letter, as I foresaw, events have almost inevitably taken a course which I regard as unfavourable to the interests both of Russia and of the Allies.

You have taught us, M. le Président, that, under certain circumstances, an honest man ought at the critical moment to satisfy his conscience, whatever may be the cost. That was my reason for writing to M. Albert Thomas the letter you are reading. You know me, M. le Président; you know with what ardent faith I supported the Franco-Russian alliance before and during the war, and with what enthusiasm I devoted myself, with all my heart and soul, with all my energy, to the struggle so odiously provoked and imposed by imperialist, brutal Germany upon my dear Motherland, defender of justice and of oppressed peoples, represented by you with such loyal and essentially pacific dignity!

There is no need for me to tell you, therefore, that to-day, as yesterday, if I saw in the efforts made by the Allies in Russia a supplementary, though weak, means of increasing our chances of victory, or of advancing them—were it by a single hour—not for a solitary moment would the idea have come into my head, notwithstanding my great love for Russia and my poignant sorrow at her sufferings, of writing to M. Albert Thomas the enclosed letter or of taking the extreme liberty of addressing these lines to yourself.

I believe I have been one of those who have criticised with the deepest conviction Bolshevism in its character of violent demagogy. I believe I have been from the day that the idea of intervention was mooted, one of the most ardent, if most modest, partisans of that intervention, without the Bolsheviks and in spite of them, for the purpose of helping the Russian people directly to shake off the German yoke, to reconstruct Russian unity, and to obtain a drastic revision of the abominable treaty of Brest-Litovsk, so fatal to the interests of Russia, so detrimental to those of the Allies.

It is in this sense that I have always understood the word "intervention": it is in this sense that it has always been explained to me, that I have always been authorised to explain it to our Russian friends. I am sure that such, above all, are the ends pursued by the Entente Governments; but I observe with anguish that in the course of these last months we have let ourselves become entangled in the particular meshes of the struggle against Bolshevism; that is to say, of Russian internal affairs. This gradually makes us lose sight of our first principal aim, and apply ourselves, without any benefit to the interests of the Entente, to a task which can only have one result:—To increase in vain the sufferings and the distress of the Russian people, in all classes without distinction; to aggravate anarchy and famine; to accentuate civil war, White Terror and Red Terror; to sharpen the dissensions between parties; finally, to enfeeble the national powers of resistance at a moment when they were so vigorously raising their head that they had to be taken into account at last by the Soviet Government—whose extraordinary energy in State administration, in face of the most formidable difficulties, I must in all honesty recognise—Such will be the result. Those powers of resistance were openly beginning to prepare for a struggle which could not and cannot, whatever is said or thought, but be directed against the only definite enemy of Russia—that is to say, against Germany, the Germany of Brest, or, in other words, the Germany of Wilhelm and Scheidemann.

This most regrettable distraction of our activity, little by little and, as it were, insensibly leaving the ground of national defence for the barren and in any case subsidiary ground of internal politics, has been manifested gradually. But more and more clearly as time went on one sees from July onwards, after the painful incidents at Jaroslave, where the fight carried on by the White Guards of Savinkoff against the Soviet Government produced in the end no practical result but the massacre of several thousands of Russians, the destruction of numerous churches and considerable artistic treasures, an old city running with blood, the parties whom we were supposed to be supporting discouraged, increased hatred of the Bolsheviks, increased distrust of the bourgeoisie.

I know the particularly painful impression which those unfortunate events left at the time in the mind of the venerable head of the Orthodox Church, the patriarch Tikhon. In this connection, I cannot too heavily underline the fact that, in all the conversations which I had the honour of holding with this eminent man, every time I raised the question of his moral support in the ultimate event of intervention by the Allies, he did not cease to repeat (always putting off his final reply), that the preliminary condition, the sine qua non, of any moral support from the Church must be a solemn engagement on the part of the Allied Powers to do nothing which might menace the unity of the Russian State, to take energetic measures against the German enemy, and to take practical steps that there might be no increase in the sufferings of the Russian people, especially as regards the famine, which, thanks to German activities in the Ukraine, was already making itself terribly felt in the districts of Central Russia.

You will understand therefore, M. le Président, that in such circumstances the marked and rapid deviation from our policy, during these last months, could not but make a profound impression upon me. Nevertheless, I was constantly expecting, with the most sincere confidence, a return to our original point of view.

Unfortunately, the latest events were to ruin these vain illusions. An official meeting at which I chanced to be present recently revealed to me, in a manner I least expected, a secret activity of the most dangerous character, in my opinion, and, in any case, completely in opposition to the whole work with which I had been associated up to that day. I allude here to a private meeting held at the former Consulate-General of the United States on August 23rd or 24th, if I remember rightly, though the exact date is of no importance. The Consul-General of the United States, Mr. Poole, and our own Consul-General were present. Allied agents whose names I do not remember, but who were not personally known to me, were also present.

Doubtless, I hasten to state, neither the American Consul-General nor the Consul-General of France made the least mention at any time of some secret task of destruction; but incidentally I was made acquainted with this task by the conversation of the agents among themselves.

I learnt thus that an English agent was arranging to destroy the railway bridge across the river Volkoff, before the station of Zvanka. Now, it requires but a glance at the map to see that the destruction of this bridge would mean the complete starvation of Petrograd; the city would find itself practically cut off from all communication on the East, whence comes all the corn on which it is existing so miserably, even at present. Moreover, the author of the project stated himself all the gravity of the consequences of such action, and remarked that he was not yet certain whether he would be able to put his plan into execution.

A French agent added to this that he had already attempted to blow up the bridge of Tcherepovetz, which, as far as the provisioning of Petrograd is concerned, would have the same effect as the destruction of the bridge of Zvanka, Tcherepovetz being on the only line which connects Petrograd with the Eastern districts. Subsequently there was discussion of the question of derailing trains on various lines. One agent even explained that he was assured of help from amongst the railwaymen; which was very useful, but precluded the use of certain methods of destruction, as the railwaymen won over would agree to operations directed only against trains bearing military material.

I do not labour this point, I think I have said enough to justify with concrete facts the grave fears I have outlined above. I remain deeply convinced that it is a question of the isolated activities of irresponsible agents. But it is none the less certain that such activities can only have the fatal result of convulsing Russia with a most bloody and hopeless political struggle, as well as with the inhuman tortures of a famine without precedent. I would add, in this connection, that these tortures will necessarily and almost exclusively be felt by the poor and middle classes, that is to say, by that part of the population, which is now suffering most cruelly and most unjustly in the present crisis—the lower middle classes, the employees, the workmen; because the upper and the richer middle classes have always the means left of escaping to the Ukraine and other countries (an exodus that in any case has commenced very largely already), and the popular elements in the service of the Soviet Government are assured of being relieved, at least to a certain extent, of the most intolerable privations; which, on the face of it, cannot be accomplished except more and more to the detriment of others.

I will not labour the point, but must add that during the whole of the assembly in question, not a word was said about the war against Germany.

Naturally I shall not draw arguments from this fact to sustain the hypothesis that these plans had the object of striking at Russia herself—especially at an inoffensive and toiling Russian population; it was unfortunately nevertheless a fact.

I understand perfectly that if these plans are—I do not think I have the right to say approved, but only "tolerated"—this can only be the case when it has been admitted, in the first place, that the Soviet Government has bound its interests with those of Germany. Also I am aware that this is actually what is currently said, and that certain Allied agents even live for the search—an atmosphere, I will add in parenthesis, morally dangerous and disturbing—of "documents" which will establish the "alliance."

On different occasions I have been myself led, relying on a concurrence of circumstances and appearances, to suspect complicity between certain Bolshevist leaders and Berlin, especially at the time of the arrival of Lenin in Russia, at the time of the abortive insurrection in July, and, finally, at the time of the definite disruption of the Army and the opening of pourparlers at Brest. The Allied Governments and their authorised representatives did not consider then that they could base either their attitude or their decisions on impressions which were supported subsequently by no positive facts, beyond violent controversies in the Press. Since then the international situation, has, in many respects, been greatly modified, and to-day it is difficult seriously to suppose that the Soviet Government has decided to bind its fortunes with those of the Central Empires; whose victory, whose mere continued existence, indeed, could not bring it any benefit, but would signify, on the contrary, the suppression of all revolutionary movements in Russia, in short its own destruction. That is why, whatever should be the future development of military events, I consider it unlikely that the Soviet Government would ever resolve to call Germany to its aid; it would be an alliance infinitely too dangerous to itself, and one which, moreover, would compromise it in the eyes of international Socialism—and, one must remember, of the Russian masses on whom it relies. It cannot be disputed that the Germans have succeeded in creating in this country, in the bosom of a people so little capable of hatred, a most profound and serious feeling of hostility.

One of the principal arguments commonly invoked to support the theory of the secret "alliance" between the Soviet Government and Germany is the complete inaction of the latter on the eastern front at a moment when it is particularly desirable for the Soviet Government to have its hands free militarily, and to be delivered of any German menace. This argument should not be considered. For any onlooker, however little attentive or informed he be, must realise that, if Germany leaves the Bolsheviks in power, it is not by choice—(she has to fear in her midst too great eventual repercussions)—it is by necessity, because she is materially deprived of the opportunity of doing otherwise.

Under the influence of our magnificent victories in the West, the effect of which is considerable, the anti-German animus amongst the Russian masses is becoming more and more active. In order to fight it, Germany is obliged to extend her occupation to fresh districts, or to reinforce her Army in the districts already held. She cannot think of this in face of the events in the West; and she can think of it the less because, in certain occupied regions, she can no longer rely on certain of her Landsturm units, which have been permeated little by little by Bolshevist propaganda.

That is why not only is she not going to strengthen her action in Russia, but, on the contrary, I am convinced that she is about to be forced to evacuate, between now and the winter, an important part of the occupied territories. Doubtless she is, and probably will continue some months, engaged in saving appearances, in huckstering and haggling. But for any keen observer it is beyond doubt that her days in Ukraine—the region of most interest to her—are numbered henceforth, in spite of the atrocities she is committing there. Her detachments, as I have definite proof in many cases, frequently reduce whole villages to ashes. And, as far as the Ukraine is concerned, everyone can discover for himself that, as a matter of fact, the Bolsheviks do not cease supporting in a more and more active manner the peasants' and workmen's revolts in that territory, and especially that they transmit munitions and money to the insurgents. This fact, which I have been able to verify from various anti-Bolshevist sources, seems to me absolutely incompatible with the existence of a hidden alliance between the Soviet Government and Berlin.

I will not return to the subject with which I have attempted to deal in my letter to M. Albert Thomas; I wish to speak of the situation actually created in Russia by the latest events.

Of course, more than ever, I long for the day when the revolutionary and dictatorial procedure of the present Government makes way for normal methods, and when another Government will be able at length to put an end to the prostitution and street licence, to the uncontrolled rule of irresponsible adventurers, to the current corruption of administrative officials, to the odious abuses of Demagogy (inseparable, alas, from every revolution), to the legalised pillage of churches and the gratuitous insulting of religion when it will be able to recreate, in the breasts of the masses, the great principle of human fraternity!

These excesses, so deeply painful, so cruelly unworthy of our age, are, all the same, in large measure the inevitable result of the state of anarchy which has spread little by little throughout the country. I am, however, profoundly convinced that, in any case, what we are actually witnessing here is purely transitory, and that, by revolution or evolution—for an evolution of Bolshevism itself, at a certain moment, is not a priori an impossibility—we shall proceed to new forms.

But, contrary to what I had thought, Bolshevism is not the artificial government of one city (Petrograd, Moscow), thrown up by the hazard of a revolt and destined to disappear again in a revolt; it is a government which, if supported only by one part of the population against the other, thrives on the revenge of the party which supports it not only in a centre, at a given point in the country, but throughout its territory. Moreover, it is a government which, precisely because hitherto all the attacks which it has had to withstand have come exclusively from the right and not from the left which may yet happen some day—has become, in the eyes of part of the elements it has assembled under its banner, the synonym and the symbol of The Revolution. These two facts explain, it seems to me, why it is that, in spite of the hatred accumulated amongst those whom it persecutes, wherever its power is overthrown, Bolshevism is reborn in the shape of popular insurrections. These circumstances also explain why every attempt to overthrow Bolshevism by means of revolt at given points or fixed centres—which is what has happened so far—has the effect only of aggravating anarchy, increasing the general disorder and the extreme confusion of the country; creating, that is to say, an artificial intensification, profitable to none, of the sufferings of the unhappy Russian people, AND ABSORBING, IN A DISORDERED AND AIMLESS CIVIL WAR, ENERGIES WHICH COMBINED MIGHT ALREADY PERHAPS HAVE BEEN TURNED VICTORIOUSLY against an enfeebled and increasingly powerless Germany. On the other hand, the Soviet Government is indirectly finding itself temporarily strengthened in actual proportion to the effort directed against it; for it is being driven, by the very force of circumstances, to increase its energy tenfold, in order to make head against both the external danger and the internal anarchy which, insensibly but steadily, were spreading in every direction. Thus, by that very necessity it is raising itself to the level of a GOVERNMENT—a revolutionary government without doubt, but no longer anarchically or helplessly so: really revolutionary in the classic, administrative sense.

I apologise, M. le Président, for having at such length detained your gracious attention, otherwise absorbed by such numerous and weighty affairs; but, being deprived of all means of direct communication with our ambassador, and mindful, moreover, of the kind benevolence with which you have been pleased to honour me in the past, I resolved, after long and repeated hesitation, to address myself to you, considering that it was my duty, in face of the events unfolding themselves before my eyes, to place these different facts and considerations before you for your, high deliberation in the interests of our dear and well-beloved France.

Accept, M. le Président, the offer of my deepest respect and whole-hearted devotion.

(Signed) RENÉ MARCHAND.

 

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