An Antidote Against Atheism/Appendix/Chapter I

An Appendix to An Antidote against Atheism
by Henry More
Chapter I
1184978An Appendix to An Antidote against Atheism — Chapter IHenry More

An

Appendix

To the foregoing

Antidote

against

Atheism.




Chap. I.

1. The Author's reason of adding this Appendix to his Antidote. 2. An Enumeration of the chief Objections made against the First Book, thereof.


1.Suspected Innocency and misdoubted Truth can win no greater credit then by strictest examination: For the world is thereby more fully ascertain'd of the unblameableness of the one and of the solidity of the other, then it can be possibly without so publick a Trial. Wherefore that so great an advantage may not be wanting to that weighty Cause we have in hand, I was not contented onely to set down such Reasons for the Existence of God which in my own judgement I conceiv'd to be irrefutably firm; but that the firmness of them may appear more conspicuous to all men, I have brought into view the chiefest and most material Objections I could meet with, whether raised by those that of themselves have excepted against any Argument I have made use of, or by such as have been invited more curiously to search and discover, where they could, any weakness or inconsequency in any Argumentation throughout the whole Treatise. And the chiefest Exceptions and Objections against the First Book are these:

2. First, That the Ground of our Demonstration of the Existence of God from his Idea is, That there ate Innate Ideas in the Mind of Man; which, say they, is false.

Secondly, That there is no such Idea of God at all as we have describ'd, neither Innate nor Acquisititious or Transcriptitious; because it involves in it the Notion of a Spirit, which again consists of such particular Notions as are utterly unconceivable.

Thirdly, That Existence is no Term of Perfection, and therefore is not so inseparably involved in the Notion of a Being absolutely Perfect, or of God.

Fourthly, That though Necessary Existence be included in the Idea of God, yet our inferring from thence that he does exist, is but a Sophism; because a Being absolutely Evil, as well as absolutely Perfect, includes necessary Existence in the Idea thereof.

Fifthly, That if there be any necessary Existent, it is plain that it is Matter, which we unadvisedly call Space, which we cannot imagine but did ever and will ever necessarily exist.

Sixthly, That God did not put this Idea of himself into the Mind of Man, but the subtiler sort of Politicians, that have alwaies used Religion as a mere Engine of State.

Seventhly, That Fear and Hopes of Natural Conscience are nothing indeed but these Passions rais'd upon a belief of a God which men have had by Tradition or Education.

Lastly, That these Arguments whereby we prove the Incorporeity of the Soul of Man, will also conclude the Incorporeity of the Soul of a Beast; and that therefore they are Sophistical.

To these I shall answer in order with as little Pomp and Luxuriancy of words, and as much Plainness and Perspicuity, as I may, in so subtile and difficult a matter.