United States Supreme Court
Beauharnais v. Illinois
Argued: Nov. 28-29, 1951. --- Decided: April 28, 1952
MR. Justice JACKSON, dissenting.
An Illinois Act, construed by its Supreme Court to be a "group libel" statute, has been used to punish criminally the author and distributor of an obnoxious leaflet attacking the Negro race. He answers that, as applied, the Act denies a liberty secured to him by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. What is the liberty which that clause underwrites? The spectrum of views expressed by my seniors shows that disagreement as to the scope and effect of this Amendment underlies this, as it has many another, division of the Court. All agree that the Fourteenth Amendment does confine the power of the State to make printed [343 U.S. 250, 288] words criminal. Whence we are to derive metes and bounds of the state power is a subject to the confusion of which, I regret to say, I have contributed - comforted in the acknowledgment, however, by recalling that this Amendment is so enigmatic and abstruse that judges more experienced than I have had to reverse themselves as to its effect on state power. The assumption of other dissents is that the "liberty" which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against denial by the States is the literal and identical "freedom of speech or of the press" which the First Amendment forbids only Congress to abridge. The history of criminal libel in America convinces me that the Fourteenth Amendment did not "incorporate" the First, that the powers of Congress and of the States over this subject are not of the same dimensions, and that because Congress probably could not enact this law it does not follow that the States may not. I. As a limitation upon power to punish written or spoken words, Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" in its context of state powers and functions has meant and should mean something quite different from "freedom" in its context of federal powers and functions. 1 This Court has never sustained a federal criminal libel Act. One section of the Sedition Act of 1798 was close to being a "group libel" Act. 2 While there were convictions [343 U.S. 250, 289] under it, no attack on its validity reached this Court. I think today's better opinion regards the enactment as a breach of the First Amendment and certainly Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis thought so. 3 But even in the absence of judicial condemnation, the political disapproval of the Sedition Act was so emphatic and sustained that federal prosecution of the press ceased for a century. It was resumed with indictment of The Indianapolis News and The New York World for disclosures and criticisms of the Panama Canal acquisition. Both were indicted in the District of Columbia and under the District Code, on the ground that some copies circulated there. That prosecution collapsed when Judge Anderson refused the Government's application to remove the Indiana defendants to the District of Columbia for trial. 4 The World, circulated at West Point, was indicted in New York on the theory that an 1825 Act to protect [343 U.S. 250, 290] fortifications assimilated the New York State law punishing criminal libel. That venture likewise came to grief when Judge Hough rejected that construction of the federal statute and was upheld by this Court. United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1 (1911). While there has been a demand from official sources for a resumption of criminal libel prosecution, it has not been acceded to. 5 Thus, while the jeopardy of such federal prosecutions has never been removed by any decision of this Court, I should think the validity of a federal enactment such as this would be extremely doubtful, to say the least. The effect of the First Amendment on congressional power to make seditious utterance criminal did receive consideration in the aftermath of the First World War. In such a case, Mr. Justice Holmes formulated for the Court as "the question in every case" the "clear and present danger" test. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 . He and Mr. Justice Brandeis adhered to it as a "rule of reason," dissenting when they thought the rest of the Court apostate. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 , 628; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 . Only after research and deliberation in these cases had sharpened their perception did these Justices face the free-speech issue as to state power which Mr. Justice Holmes first adverted to, but left undecided, in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 . In 1922 they joined the Court's first decision on the subject, which declared that ". . . neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of [343 U.S. 250, 291] the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restrictions about `freedom of speech' . . . ." Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 . However, these two Justices, who made the only original contribution to legal thought on the difficult problems bound up in these Amendments, soon reversed and took the view that the Fourteenth Amendment did impose some restrictions upon the States. But it was not premised upon the First Amendment nor upon any theory that it was incorporated in the Fourteenth. What they wrote, with care and circumspection, I accept as the wise and historically correct view of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was: "The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word `liberty' as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States." (Emphasis supplied.) Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 . That reasoning was echoed so recently as 1937, when the Court explicitly rejected the theory of incorporation and, through Mr. Justice Cardozo, announced a view, unanimous except for Mr. Justice Butler, that the Fourteenth did not deflect against the States the literal language of amendments designed to circumscribe federal power but qualified state power only by such general restraints as are essential to "the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 -325. It is clear that these do not proscribe state criminal libel Acts. Justices Holmes and Brandeis in 1931 joined Chief Justice Hughes, who spoke for the Court, in striking down a state Act because it authorized restraint by injunction [343 U.S. 250, 292] previous to publication. He said: "For whatever wrong the appellant has committed or may commit, by his publications, the State appropriately affords both public and private redress by its libel laws." This was amplified: "But it is recognized that punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press is essential to the protection of the public, and that the common law rules that subject the libeler to responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the private injury, are not abolished by the protection extended in our constitutions. . . . The law of criminal libel rests upon that secure foundation." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 . So recently as 1942, a unanimous Court, speaking of state power, said that punishment of libelous words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" has never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 -572. More than forty State Constitutions, while extending broad protections to speech and press, reserve a responsibility for their abuse and implicitly or explicitly recognize validity of criminal libel laws. 6 We are justified [343 U.S. 250, 293] in assuming that the men who sponsored the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress, and those who ratified it in the State Legislatures, knew of such provisions then in many of their State Constitutions. Certainly they were not consciously canceling them or calling them into question, or we would have some evidence of it. Congresses, during the period while this Amendment was being considered or was but freshly adopted, approved Constitutions of "Reconstructed" States that expressly mentioned state libel laws, 7 and also approved similar Constitutions for States erected out of the federal domain. 8 [343 U.S. 250, 294] Certainly this tolerance of state libel laws by the very authors and partisans of the Fourteenth Amendment shows either that they were not intending to incorporate the First Amendment or that they believed it would not prevent federal libel laws. Adoption of the incorporation theory today would lead to the dilemma of either confining the States as closely as the Congress or giving the Federal Government the latitude appropriate to state governments. The treatment of libel powers corroborates the conclusions against the incorporationist theory reached by the most comprehensive and objective studies of the origin and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The inappropriateness of a single standard for restricting State and Nation is indicated by the disparity between their functions and duties in relation to those freedoms. Criminality of defamation is predicated upon power either to protect the private right to enjoy integrity of reputation or the public right to tranquillity. Neither of these are objects of federal cognizance except when necessary to the accomplishment of some delegated power, such as [343 U.S. 250, 295] protection of interstate commerce. When the Federal Government puts liberty of press in one scale, it has a very limited duty to personal reputation or local tranquillity to weigh against it in the other. But state action affecting speech or press can and should be weighed against and reconciled with these conflicting social interests. For these reasons I should not, unless clearly required, confirm to the Federal Government such latitude as I think a State reasonably may require for orderly government of its manifold concerns. The converse of the proposition is that I would not limit the power of the State with the severity appropriately prescribed for federal power. As the principle by which to judge the constitutionality of this statute, I accept the dissent in Gitlow and the decision in Palko. II. What restraints upon state power to punish criminal libel are implied by the "concept of ordered liberty"? Experience by Anglo-Saxon peoples with defamation and laws to punish it extends over centuries and the statute and case books exhibit its teachings. If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression. Oppressive application of the English libel laws was partially checked when Fox's Libel Act of 1792 allowed the jury to determine whether an accused publication was libelous in character and more completely when Lord Campbell's Libel Act of 1843 allowed truth to be proved as a defense. American experience teaches similar lessons. The leading state case is People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 337. [343 U.S. 250, 296] Since, as the opinion of this Court now points out, the Jeffersonian's objection to federal sedition prosecutions was largely fear of federal usurpation of state powers over the subject, it was consistent for them to prosecute libels under state law. Croswell, publisher of the aptly named Wasp, was indicted for libeling Thomas Jefferson by representing him as unworthy of the confidence, respect, and attachment of the people. The trial judge pronounced his statements libelous as a matter of law and allowed the jury to decide no question except whether the accused had published them. The defendant was convicted and on his appeal, argued by Alexander Hamilton, the appellate court divided equally. Justice Kent, however, filed a characteristically learned and vigorous opinion that the trial court must submit the libelous character of the article and libelous intent of its printer to decision by the jury, which was entitled to determine both law and fact. The public response was such that an early session of the Legislature substantially enacted Kent's contentions. Inasmuch as no judgment had been entered upon the earlier equal division, the court at its August 1805 Term, "in consequence of this declaratory statute," unanimously awarded a new trial. 10 The New York Constitution at that time contained no free speech provision but the case led to a provision included in the Constitution of 1821 which both followed Fox's Libel Act and anticipated Lord Campbell's Act and has remained in the several Constitutions of that State since: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments [343 U.S. 250, 297] for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact." 11 It would not be an exaggeration to say that, basically, this provision of the New York Constitution states the common sense of American criminal libel law. Twenty-four States of the Union whose Constitutions were framed later substantially adopted it. 12 Twelve States provide that press and speech shall be free but there shall be responsibility for the abuse. 13 Five others provide substantially the same but add that truth may be given in evidence in a libel prosecution. 14 Only five States, whose Constitutions were framed earlier, were content with the generality about the free press similar to that of Massachusetts. 15 But all of these States, apart from constitutional [343 U.S. 250, 298] provision, have by decisional law recognized the validity of criminal libel prosecutions. 16 Because of these safeguards, state libel laws have presented no threat to a free press comparable to that from federal sources and have not proved inconsistent with fundamental liberties. Attacks on the press by States which were frustrated by this Court in Near v. Minnesota, supra, and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 , were not by libel laws. For near a century and a half this Court's decisions left state criminal libel prosecutions entirely free of federal constitutional limitations. It is a matter of notoriety that the press often has provoked hostility, that editors have been mobbed and horse-whipped, but criminal libel prosecutions have not been frequent and, as safeguarded by state law, they have been so innocuous that chronicles of American journalism give them only passing mention. 17 This Court, by construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, has imposed but one addition to the safeguards voluntarily taken upon the States by themselves. It is that where expression, oral or printed, is punished, although it has not actually caused injuries or disorders but is thought to have a tendency to do so, the likelihood of such consequence must not be remote or speculative. That is the "clear and present danger" test which Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, eventually with support of the Court, thought implied in both the First 18 and Fourteenth Amendments, 19 although the former was [343 U.S. 250, 299] not bodily bound up in the latter. Any superficial inconsistency between applying the same standard but permitting a wider range of action to the States is resolved upon reference to the latter part of the statement of the formula: clear and present danger of those substantive evils which the legislature has a right to prevent. The evils at which Congress may aim, and in so doing come into conflict with free speech, will be relatively few since it is a government of limited powers. Because the States may reach more evils, they will have wider range to punish speech which presents clear and present danger of bringing about those evils. In few subjects so much as libel does local law, in spite of varying historical influences, afford a consensus of American legal opinion as to what is reasonable and essential to the concept of ordered government. The boundaries are roughly outlined, to be sure, and cannot be stated or applied with mathematical precision, but those widely accepted state constitutional provisions on which is superimposed the "clear and present danger" test for "tendency" cases seem to be our best guide. I agree with the Court that a State has power to bring classes "of any race, color, creed, or religion" within the protection of its libel laws, if indeed traditional forms do not already accomplish it. 20 But I am equally clear that in doing so it is essential to our concept of ordered liberty that the State also protect the accused by those safeguards the necessity for which is verified by legal history. III. The Illinois statute, as applied in this case, seems to me to have dispensed with accepted safeguards for the accused. Trial of this case ominously parallels the trial of [343 U.S. 250, 300] People v. Croswell, supra, in that the Illinois court here instructed the jury, in substance, that if it found that defendant published this leaflet he must be found guilty of criminal libel. Rulings of the trial court precluded the effort to justify statements of fact by proving their truth. The majority opinion concedes the unvarying recognition by the States that truth plus good motives is a defense in a prosecution for criminal libel. But here the trial court repeatedly refused defendant's offer of proof as to the truth of the matter published. Where an offer to prove the dominant element of a defense is rejected as immaterial, we can hardly refuse to consider defendant's constitutional question because he did not go through the useless ceremony of offering proof of a subsidiary element of the defense. If the court would not let him try to prove he spoke truth, how could he show that he spoke truth for good ends? Furthermore, the record indicates that defendant was asked to state what he had meant by the use of certain phrases, and the reason for forming the White Circle League - statements which apparently bore on the issue of motive and ends. But the trial court sustained a sweeping objection "to this whole line of examination." The Supreme Court of Illinois noted the offer of proof of truth and its exclusion, and apparently went on to rule as a matter of law that the statement was not published for justifiable ends. At all events, it is clear that the defense was ruled out as matter of law and defendant was never allowed to present it for decision by either court or jury upon the facts, a practice which I think is contrary to the overwhelming verdict of Anglo-Saxon history and practice. I do not intimate that this defendant stood even a remote chance of justifying what impresses me, as it did the trial court, as reckless and vicious libel. But the point is that his evidence, proffered for that purpose, was excluded instead of being [343 U.S. 250, 301] received and evaluated. Society has an interest in preserving truth as a justification, however obnoxious the effort may be. A publication which diffuses its attack over unnamed and impersonal multitudes is likely to be harder to justify than one which concentrates its attack on named individuals, but the burden may properly be cast on an accused and punishment follow failure to carry it. The same may be said of the right to comment upon matters of public interest insofar as the statement includes matters of opinion, a point, however, which the defense may have inadequately raised. When any naturally cohesive or artificially organized group possesses a racial or sectarian solidarity which is or may be exploited to influence public affairs, that group becomes a legitimate subject for public comment. Of course, one can only deplore the habitual intemperance and bitter disparagement which characterizes most such comment. While I support the right of a State to place decent bounds upon it, I am not ready to hold that group purposes, characteristics and histories are to be immunized from comment or may be discussed only at the risk of prosecution free of all usual safeguards. Another defense almost universally recognized, which it seems the jury were not allowed to consider here, is that of privilege. Petition for redress of grievances is specifically privileged by many State Constitutions. I do not think we should hold this whole document to be constitutionally privileged just because, in part, it simulates a petition for redress of grievances. A court or jury could have found that its primary purpose was not to petition but to appeal for members and contributions to the White Circle League. If some part of it were privileged, that, so it has been held, does not extend constitutional protection to unprivileged matter. Cf. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 . But the question of privilege seems [343 U.S. 250, 302] not to have been specifically passed on by the court and certainly was not submitted for the jury's consideration. In this case, neither the court nor jury found or were required to find any injury to any person, or group, or to the public peace, nor to find any probability, let alone any clear and present danger, of injury to any of these. Even though no individuals were named or described as targets of this pamphlet, if it resulted in a riot or caused injury to any individual Negro, such as being refused living quarters in a particular section, house or apartment, or being refused employment, certainly there would be no constitutional obstacle to imposing civil or criminal liability for actual results. But in this case no actual violence and no specific injury was charged or proved. The leaflet was simply held punishable as criminal libel per se irrespective of its actual or probable consequences. No charge of conspiracy complicates this case. The words themselves do not advocate the commission of any crime. The conviction rests on judicial attribution of a likelihood of evil results. The trial court, however, refused to charge the jury that it must find some "clear and present danger," and the Supreme Court of Illinois sustained conviction because, in its opinion, the words used had a tendency to cause a breach of the peace. Referring to the clear and present danger doctrine in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568 , I said: "I would save it, unmodified, for application as a `rule of reason' in the kind of case for which it was devised. When the issue is criminality of a hot-headed speech on a street corner, or circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets, or parading by some zealots behind a red flag, or refusal of a handful of school children to salute our flag, it is not beyond the capacity of the judicial process to gather, comprehend, and weigh the necessary materials for decision whether it is a clear and present danger of [343 U.S. 250, 303] substantive evil or a harmless letting off of steam. It is not a prophecy, for the danger in such cases has matured by the time of trial or it was never present. The test applies and has meaning where a conviction is sought to be based on a speech or writing which does not directly or explicitly advocate a crime but to which such tendency is sought to be attributed by construction or by implication from external circumstances. The formula in such cases favors freedoms that are vital to our society, and, even if sometimes applied too generously, the consequences cannot be grave. . . ." Not the least of the virtues of this formula in such tendency cases is that it compels the prosecution to make up its mind what particular evil it sought or is seeking to prevent. It must relate its interference with speech or press to some identifiable evil to be prevented. Words on their own account are not to be punished in such cases but are reachable only as the root of punishable evils. Punishment of printed words, based on their tendency either to cause breach of the peace or injury to persons or groups, in my opinion, is justifiable only if the prosecution survives the "clear and present danger" test. It is the most just and workable standard yet evolved for determining criminality of words whose injurious or inciting tendencies are not demonstrated by the event but are ascribed to them on the basis of probabilities. Its application is important in this case because it takes account of the particular form, time, place, and manner of communication in question. "The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself . . . ." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 . It would consider whether a leaflet is so emotionally exciting to immediate action as the spoken word, especially [343 U.S. 250, 304] the incendiary street or public speech. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13 ; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 . It will inquire whether this publication was obviously so foul and extreme as to defeat its own ends, whether its appeals for money - which has a cooling effect on many persons - would not negative its inflammatory effect, whether it would not impress the passer-by as the work of an irresponsible who needed mental examination. One of the merits of the clear and present danger test is that the triers of fact would take into account the realities of race relations and any smouldering fires to be fanned into holocausts. Such consideration might well warrant a conviction here when it would not in another and different environment. Group libel statutes represent a commendable desire to reduce sinister abuses of our freedoms of expression - abuses which I have had occasion to learn can tear apart a society, brutalize its dominant elements, and persecute, even to extermination, its minorities. While laws or prosecutions might not alleviate racial or sectarian hatreds and may even invest scoundrels with a specious martyrdom, I should be loath to foreclose the States from a considerable latitude of experimentation in this field. Such efforts, if properly applied, do not justify frenetic forebodings of crushed liberty. But these acts present most difficult policy and technical problems, as thoughtful writers who have canvassed the problem more comprehensively than is appropriate in a judicial opinion have well pointed out. 21 No group interest in any particular prosecution should forget that the shoe may be on the other foot in some prosecution tomorrow. In these, as in other matters, our [343 U.S. 250, 305] guiding spirit should be that each freedom is balanced with a responsibility, and every power of the State must be checked with safeguards. Such is the spirit of our American law of criminal libel, which concedes the power to the State, but only as a power restrained by recognition of individual rights. I cannot escape the conclusion that as the Act has been applied in this case it lost sight of the rights. [ Footnote 1 ] First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." Fourteenth Amendment: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." [ Footnote 2 ] 1 Stat. 596 (1798) 2: "And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, [343 U.S. 250, 289] or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute . . . such person . . . shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years." Section 3: ". . . it shall be lawful for the defendant . . . to give in evidence in his defense, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases." [ Footnote 3 ] Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 . [ Footnote 4 ] United States v. Smith, 173 F. 227. In discharging the defendants, Judge Anderson said: "To my mind that man has read the history of our institutions to little purpose who does not look with grave apprehension upon the possibility of the success of a proceeding such as this. If the history of liberty means anything, if constitutional guaranties are worth anything, this proceeding must fail. "If the prosecuting officers have the authority to select the tribunal, if there be more than one tribunal to select from, if the [343 U.S. 250, 290] government has that power, and can drag citizens from distant states to the capital of the nation, there to be tried, then, as Judge Cooley says, this is a strange result of a revolution where one of the grievances complained of was the assertion of the right to send parties abroad for trial." 173 F., at 232. [ Footnote 5 ] Riesman, Group Libel, 42 Col. L. Rev. 727, 748. See also 87 Cong. Rec. 5830-5841. [ Footnote 6 ] The following is a list of such state constitutional provisions, coupled with the year of the adoption of the Constitution in which they are contained: Alabama (1901), Art. I, 4, 12; Arizona (1912), Art. II, 6; Arkansas (1874), Art. II, 6; California (1879), Art. I, 9; Colorado (1876), Art. II, 10; Delaware (1897), Art. I, 5; Florida (1887), Decl. Rts., 13; Georgia (1877), Art. I. 1, par. 15; Idaho (1890), Art. I, 9; Illinois (1870), Art. II, 4; Indiana (1851), Art. I, 9; Iowa (1857), Art. I, 7; Kansas (1861), Bill Rts., 11; Kentucky (1891), 8, 9; Louisiana (1921), Art. I, 3; Maine (1876), Art. I, 4; Maryland (1867), Decl. Rts., Art. 40; Michigan (1909), Art. II, 4; Minnesota (1857), Art. I, 3; Mississippi (1890), Art. III, 13; Missouri (1945), Art. I, 8; Montana (1889), Art. III, 10; Nebraska (1875), Art. I, 5; Nevada (1864), Art. I, 9; New Jersey (1947), Art. I, 6; New Mexico (1912), Art. II, 17; New York (1938), Art. I, 8; North Carolina (1876), Art. I, [343 U.S. 250, 293] 20; North Dakota (1889), Art. I, 9; Ohio (1851), Art. I, 11; Oklahoma (1907), Art. II, 22; Oregon (1859), Art. I, 8; Pennsylvania (1874), Art. I, 7; Rhode Island (1843), Art. I, 20; South Dakota (1889), Art. VI, 5; Tennessee (1870), Art. I, 19; Texas (1876), Art. I, 8; Utah (1895), Art. I, 15; Virginia (1902), Art. I, 12; Washington (1889), Art. I, 5; West Virginia (1872), Art. III, 7; Wisconsin (1848), Art. I, 3; Wyoming (1889), Art. I, 20. [ Footnote 7 ] Congress required that Reconstructed States approve State Constitutions consistent with the Federal Constitution, and also that each State ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Examples of state constitutional provisions expressly referring to libel, but which Constitutions were nevertheless approved by Congress, follow: Arkansas: Const. 1868, Art. I, 2 provides that truth coupled with good motives shall be a complete defense to a criminal libel prosecution; Arkansas readmitted by 15 Stat. 72 (1868); Florida: Const. 1868, Art. I, 10 provides that truth coupled with good motives shall be a complete defense to a criminal libel prosecution; Florida readmitted by 15 Stat. 73 (1868); Mississippi: Const. 1868, Art. I, 4 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance; Mississippi readmitted by 16 Stat. 67 (1870); South Carolina: Const. 1868, Art. I, 8 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance, and provides that truth and good motives shall be a complete defense to a criminal libel prosecution; South Carolina readmitted by 15 Stat. 73 (1868); Texas: Const. 1868, Art. I, 6 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance; Texas readmitted by 16 Stat. 80 (1870). [ Footnote 8 ] In the case of States erected out of the public domain, one of two procedures was generally followed. Either Congress would itself enact a statute admitting a particular State, stating therein that the [343 U.S. 250, 294] Constitution of the State in question was consistent with the Federal Constitution; or else the Congressional Act would provide that the State would be admitted upon its adoption of a Constitution consistent with the Federal Constitution. In the latter case the actual admission occurred by proclamation of the President. Colorado: Art. II, 10 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance, and provides that truth and good motives shall constitute a complete defense in a libel prosecution; admitted by 18 Stat. 474 (1875), 19 Stat. 665 (1876); Montana: Art. III, 10 enacts Fox's Libel Act in substance; admitted by 25 Stat. 676 (1889), 26 Stat. 1551 (1889); New Mexico: Art. II, 17 provides that truth and good motives shall constitute a complete defense to a criminal libel prosecution; admitted by 36 Stat. 557 (1910), 37 Stat. 39 (1911); Utah: Art. I, 15 like Colorado provisions; admitted by 28 Stat. 107 (1894), 29 Stat. 876 (1896); Wyoming: Art. I, 20 like Colorado provisions; admitted by 26 Stat. 222 (1890). [ Footnote 9 ] See Fairman and Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5-173. [ Footnote 10 ] 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 337, 413. [ Footnote 11 ] Const. 1821, Art. VII, 8; Const. 1846, Art. I, 8; Const. 1894, Art. I, 8; Const. 1938, Art. I, 8. [ Footnote 12 ] Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For citations to article and section, see n. 6, supra. [ Footnote 13 ] Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington. The Georgia provision (Const. 1877, Art. I, 1, par. 15), representative of the rest, reads: ". . . any person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments, on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." For citations to article and section, see n. 6, supra. [ Footnote 14 ] Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. For citations to article and section, see n. 6, supra. [ Footnote 15 ] Connecticut, Const. 1818, Art. I, 6; New Hampshire, Const. 1784, Part I, Art. 22; South Carolina, Const. 1895, Art. I, 4; Vermont, Const. 1793, c. I, Art. 13. The Massachusetts provision (Const. 1780, Part I, Art. XVI) reads as follows: "The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state it ought not, therefore, to be restricted in this commonwealth." [ Footnote 16 ] State v. Gardner, 112, Conn. 121, 151 A. 349; Commonwealth v. Szliakys, 254 Mass. 424, 150 N. E. 190; Noyes v. Thorpe, 73 N. H. 481, 62 A. 787; State v. Gurry, 163 S. C. 1, 161 S. E. 191; State v. Colby, 98 Vt. 96, 126 A. 510. Decisional law of other States is collected in Note, 1 Bflo. L. Rev. 258. [ Footnote 17 ] Lee, A History of American Journalism (Garden City, 1923). [ Footnote 18 ] Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 . [ Footnote 19 ] Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 . [ Footnote 20 ] It appears that group libel was not unknown to common law. See Scott, Publishing False News, 30 Can. B. Rev. 37, 42-43. [ Footnote 21 ] Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 Cornell L. Q. 261; Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 Col. L. Rev. 727; see also Note, 1 Bflo. L. Rev. 258. [343 U.S. 250, 306]