Bihn v. United States/Dissent Black

by William O. Douglas

United States Supreme Court

328 U.S. 633

BIHN  v.  UNITED STATES.

 Argued: March 26, 1946. --- Decided: June 10, 1946

Mr. Justice BLACK dissenting.

The jury found this defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after the trial judge had charged that: 'A defendant is not required to establish his innocence but the Government must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the case are as consistent with innocence as with guilt, he is not guilty.' Six other times the judge explicitly charged the jury to the same effect: The defendant's innocence is presumed; she need not prove it; the burden is on the Government to prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet the Court now reverses on the ground that the jury might conceivably have taken three sentences in the trial judge's charge to mean that the defendant must prove innocence, which conceivably might have led the jury to believe that the court might have intended to withdraw his seven explicit instructions to the contrary. The three sentences were: 'Did she steal them? Who did if she did not? You are to decide that.' Instructions such as these as to who stole the coupons were necessary because of the petitioner's defense that somebody else had taken them. The trial judge was obviously telling the jury not to ignore the petitioner's defense. No reference was made to burden of proof and no ordinary juror, unskilled in legal dialectics, would have suspected the latent ambiguity which the Court has discovered. Of course, hypercritical scrutiny of each word and sentence in every charge when considered alone would always reveal dual meanings. The sentences here in question, like the sentences in every charge, should be given a common sense interpretation in their relationship to all instructions and the issues raised. When so considered, it is impossible for me to believe that the jury was confused as to burden of proof. Seven correct explicit instructions should not be considered neutralized by legalistic inferences established by purely formal analysis.

Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice BURTON join in this dissent.

Notes