Brown v. Tucker, 330 Ark. 435 (1997)
the Arkansas Supreme Court
2784686Brown v. Tucker, 330 Ark. 435 (1997)1997the Arkansas Supreme Court

Supreme Court of Arkansas

330 Ark. 435

LARRY DOUGLASS BROWN  v.  JIM GUY TUCKER

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court

No. 96-1379.---Opinion delivered: November 6, 1997. 

Court Documents
Opinion of the Court

  1. APPEAL & ERRORMOTION TO DISMISSSTANDARD OF REVIEW.—In reviewing the denial of a dismissal granted pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the supreme court treats the facts alleged in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint; when the trial court decides Rule 12(b)(6) motions, it must look only to the complaint.
  2. PLEADINGFACT PLEADING REQUIREDDISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE FACTS.—Arkansas has adopted a clear standard to require fact pleading; Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) requires that a pleading setting forth a claim for relief contain a statement in ordinary and concise language of facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a com.plaint for "failure to state facts upon which relief can be granted"; these two rules must be read together in testing the sufficiency of the complaint; facts, not mere conclusions, must be alleged.
  3. MOTIONSMOTION TO DISMISSTEST FOR SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.—In testing the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and pleadings are to be liberally construed; where the complaint states only conclusions without facts, the appellate court will affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
  4. APPEAL & ERRORABSTRACTING REQUIREMENT.—The supreme court's rules require the abstracting of such material parts of the pleadings, proceedings, facts, documents, and other matters in the record as are necessary to an understanding of each issue presented to the court for review.
  5. APPEAL & ERRORRECORDAPPELLANT'S BURDEN.—It is the appellant's burden to demonstrate reversible error and to present a record evidencing such error.
  6. APPEAL & ERRORRECORDRESTRICTIONS ON USE.—It is fundamental that the record on appeal is confined to that which is abstracted and cannot be contradicted or supplemented by statements made in the argument portions of the brief.
  7. APPEAL & ERRORRECORDIMPRACTICAL TO REQUIRE SEVEN JUSTICES TO EXAMINE ONE TRANSCRIPT.—A citation in an argument to the place in the record where all the factual allegations can be found is not an adequate substitute for a complete abstract; it is impractical to require all seven members of the supreme court to examine one transcript in order to decide an issue on appeal.
  8. TORTSINTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPELEMENTS.—The elements of tortious interference that must be proved are (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or a business expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expec.tancy on the part of the interfering party; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.
  9. TORTSDEFAMATIONELEMENTS.—The following elements must be proven to support a claim of defamation, whether it be by the spoken word (slander) or the written word (libel): (1) the defamatory nature of the statement of fact; (2) that statement's identification of or reference to the plaintiff; (3) publication of the statement by the defendant; (4) the defendant's fault in the publica.tion; (5) the statement's falsity; and (6) damages.
  10. TORTSDEFAMATIONSTATEMENT IMPLYING ASSERTION OF FACTFACTORS.—To determine whether a statement may be viewed as implying an assertion of fact, the following factors must be weighed: (1) whether the author used figurative or hyperbolic language that would negate the impression that he or she was seriously maintaining implied fact; (2) whether the general tenor of the publication negates this impression; and (3) whether the published assertion is susceptible of being proved true or false.
  11. TORTSOUTRAGEELEMENTS.—To establish an outrage claim, it must be shown that (1) the actor intended to inflict emo.tional distress or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of decency, and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiffs distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
  12. APPEAL & ERRORAPPELLANT FAILED TO STATE SUFFICIENT FACTS FOR RELIEFTRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING COMPLAINT.—Construing the complaint liberally, the supreme court concluded that appellant had failed to state sufficient facts upon which any relief could be granted and that the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); the supreme court modified the trial court's ruling to be a dismissal with prejudice.

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division; John Ward, Judge; affirmed as modified.

Tona M. DeMers, for appellant.

Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by: Kay J. Jackson DeMailly, Asst. Att'y Gen., for appellee.

[Opinion of the court by Justice DONALD L. CORBIN. Special Justices WILLIAM RANDALL WRIGHT, MICHELE HARRINGTON, and RICHARD LUSBY join the Court's opinion. Justices ROBERT L. BROWN, ANNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, and RAY THORNTON not participating.]

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