Bruton v. United States/Concurrence Stewart

by Potter Stewart

United States Supreme Court

391 U.S. 123

Bruton  v.  United States

 Argued: March 11, 1968. --- Decided: May 20, 1968

Mr. Justice STEWART, concurring.

I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. Although I did not agree with the decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (see id., at 427), 84 S.Ct. 1774, at 1807, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, I accept its holding and share the Court's conclusion that it compels the overruling of Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278.

Quite apart from Jackson v. Denno, however, I think it clear that the underlying rationale of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause precludes reliance upon cautionary instructions when the highly damaging out-ofcourt statement of a codefendant, who is not subject to cross-examination, is deliberately placed before the jury at a joint trial. A basic premise of the Confrontation Clause, it seems to me, is that certain kinds of hearsay (see, e.g., Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923; Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934) are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give. See the Court's opinion, ante, at 136, n. 12. It is for this very reason that an out-of-court accusation is universally conceded to be constitutionally inadmissible against the accused, rather than admissible for the little it may be worth. Even if I did not consider Jackson v. Denno controlling, therefore, I would still agree that Delli Paoli must be overruled.

Mr. Justice WHITE, dissenting.

Notes