MR. MONROE'S OBJECTIONS
to
"AN ACT FOR THE PRESERVATION AND REPAIR OF THE CUMBERLAND ROAD."
Having duly considered the bill, entitled "An Act for the Preservation and Repair of the Cumberland Road," it is with deep regret, approving as I do the policy, that I am compelled to object to its passage, and to return it to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, under a conviction that Congress do not possess the power, under the Constitution, to pass such a law.
A power to establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection of tolls by penalties, implies a power to adopt and execute a system of internal improvement. A right to impose duties, to be paid by all persons passing a certain road, and on horses and carriages, as is done by this bill, involves the right to take land from the proprietor, on a valuation, and to pass laws for the protection of the road from injuries; and if it exist as to one road, it exists as to any other, and to as many roads as Congress may think proper to establish. A right to legislate for one of these purposes, is a right to legislate for the others. It is a complete right of jurisdiction and sovereignty, for all the purposes of internal improvement, and not merely the right of appropriating money, under the power vested in Congress to make appropriations,—under which power, with the consent of the states through which the road passes, the work was originally commenced, and has been so far executed. I am of opinion that Congress do not possess this power; that the states, individually, cannot grant it; for, although they may assent to the appropriation of money within their limits for such purposes, they can grant no power of jurisdiction or sovereignty by special compacts with the United States. This power can be granted only by an amendment to the Constitution, and in the mode prescribed by it.
If the power exist, it must, either because it has been specifically granted to the United States, or that which is incidental to some power which has been specifically granted. If we examine the specific grants of power, we do not find it among them nor is it incidental to any power which has been specifically granted.
It never has been contended that the power was specifically granted. It is claimed only as being incidental to one or more of the powers which are specifically granted. The following are the powers from which it is said to be derived:—
1st, from the right to establish post-offices and post-roads; 2d, from the right to declare war; 3d, to regulate commerce; 4th, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare; 5th, from the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof; 6th, and lastly, from the power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory and other property of the United States.
According to my judgment, it cannot be derived from either of those powers, nor from all of them united; and, in consequence, does not exist. * * *
Washington, May 4, 1822.
On the evening of the 24th, President Monroe also transmitted his "views," in support of his veto, in an elaborate argument, which is the exposition quoted in President Jackson's objections.
OBJECTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ON RETURNING TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THE ENROLLED BILL, ENTITLED
"AN ACT AUTHORIZING A SUBSCRIPTION OF STOCK IN THE MAYSVILLE, WASHINGTON, PARIS, AND LEXINGTON TURNPIKE ROAD COMPANY."
The constitutional power of the federal government to construct or promote works of internal improvement presents itself in two points of view—the first, as bearing upon the sovereignty of the states within whose limits their execution is contemplated, if jurisdiction of the territory which they may occupy be claimed as necessary to then preservation and use; the second, as asserting the simple right to appropriate money from the national treasury in aid of such works when undertaken by state authority surrendering the claim of jurisdiction. In the first view, the question of power is an open one, and can be decided without the embarrassment attending the other, arising from the practice of the government.
Although frequently and strenuously attempted, the power, to this extent, has never been exercised by the government in a single instance. It does not, in my opinion, possess it, and no bill, therefore, which admits it, can receive my official sanction.
But, in the other view of the power, the question is differently situated. The ground taken at an early period of the government was, "that, whenever money has been raised by the general authority, and is to be applied to a particular measure, a question arises whether the particular measure be within the enumerated authorities vested in Congress. If it be, the money requisite for it may be applied to it; if not, no such application can be made." The document in which this principle was first advanced is of deservedly high authority, and should be held in grateful remembrance for its immediate agency in rescuing the country from much existing abuse, and for its conservative effect upon some of the most valuable principles of the Constitution. The symmetry and purity of the government would, doubtless, have been better preserved, if this restriction of the power of appropriation could have been maintained without weakening its ability to fulfil the general objects of its institution—an effect so likely to attend its admission, notwithstanding its apparent fitness, that every subsequent administration of the government, embracing a period of thirty out of the forty-two years of its existence, has adopted a more enlarged construction of the power.
In the administration of Mr. Jefferson, we have two examples of the exercise of the right of appropriation, which, in the consideration that led to their adoption, and in their effects upon the public mind, have had a greater agency in marking the character of the power, than any subsequent events. I allude to the payment of fifteen millions of dollars for the purchase of Louisiana, and to the original appropriation for the construction of the Cumberland Road; the latter act deriving much weight from the acquiescence and approbation of three of the most powerful of the original members of the confederacy, expressed through their respective legislatures. Although the circumstances of the latter case may be such as to deprive so much of it as relates to the actual construction of the road of the force of an obligatory exposition of the Constitution, it must, nevertheless, be admitted that, so far as the mere appropriation of money is concerned, they present the principle in its most imposing aspect. No less than twenty-three different laws have been passed through all the forms of the Constitution, appropriating upwards of two millions of dollars out of the national treasury in support of that improvement, with the approbation of every President of the United States, including my predecessor, since its commencement.
Independently of the sanction given to appropriations for the Cumberland and other roads and objects, under this power, the administration of Mr. Madison was characterized by an act which furnishes the strongest evidence of his opinion extant. A bill was passed through both houses of Congress, and presented for his approval, "setting apart and pledging certain funds for constructing roads and canals, and improving the navigation of watercourses, in order to facilitate, promote, and give security to internal commerce among the several states; and to render more easy, and less expensive, the means and provision for the common defence." Regarding the bill as asserting a power in the federal government to construct roads and canals within the limits of the states in which they were made, he objected to its passage, on the ground of its unconstitutionality, declaring that the assent of the respective states, in the mode provided by the bill, could not confer the powers in question; that the only cases in which the consent and cession of particular states can extend the power of Congress are those specified and provided for in the Constitution; and superadding to this avowal his opinion, that "a restriction of the power 'to provide for the common defence and general welfare,' to cases which are to be provided for by the expenditure of money, would still leave within the legislative power of Congress all the great and most important measures of government, money being the ordinary and necessary means of carrying them into execution." I have not been able to consider these declarations in any other point of view than as a concession that the right of appropriation is not limited by the power to carry into effect the measure for which the money is asked, as was formerly contended.
The views of Mr. Monroe upon this subject were not left to inference. Durirg his administration, a bill was passed through both houses of Congress, conferring the jurisdiction, and prescribing the mode by which the federal government should exercise it in the case of the Cumberland road. He returned it, with objections to its passage, and, in assigning them, took occasion to say that, in the early stages of the government, he had inclined to the construction that it had no right to expend money, except in the performance of acts authorized by the other specific grants of power, according to a strict construction of them; but that, on further reflection and observation, his mind had undergone a change; that his opinion then was, "that Congress have unlimited power to raise money, and that, in its appropriation, they have a discretionary power, restricted only by the duty to appropriate it to purposes of common defence, and of general, national, not local, or state, benefit;" and this was avowed to be the governing principle through the residue of his administration. The views of the last administration are of such recent date as to render a particular reference to them unnecessary. It is well known that the appropriating power, to the utmost extent which had been claimed for it, in relation to internal improvements, was fully recognized and exercised by it.
This brief reference to known facts will be sufficient to show the difficulty, if not impracticability, of bringing back the operation of the government to the construction of the Constitution set up in 1798, assuming that to be its true reading, in relation to the power under consideration; thus giving an admonitory proof of the force of implication, and the necessity of guarding the Constitution, with sleepless vigilance, against the authority of precedents which have not the sanction of its most plainly-defined powers; for, although it is the duty of all to look to that sacred instrument, instead of the statute-book,—to repudiate, at all times, encroachments upon its spirit, which are too apt to be effected by the conjuncture of peculiar and facilitating circumstances,—it is not less true that the public good and the nature of our political institutions require that individual differences should yield to a well-settled acquiescence of the people and confederated authorities, in particular constructions of the Constitution, on doubtful points. Not to concede this much to the spirit of our institutions would impair their stability, and defeat the objects of the Constitution itself.
The only remaining view which it is my intention to present at this time, involves the expediency of embarking in a system of internal improvement, without a previous amendment of the Constitution, explaining and defining the precise powers of the federal government over it. Assuming the right to appropriate money, to aid in the construction of national works, to be warranted by the contemporaneous and continued exposition of the Constitution, its insufficiency for the successful prosecution of them must be admitted by all candid minds. If we look to usage to define the extent of the right, that will be found so variant, and embracing so much that has been overruled, as to involve the whole subject in great uncertainty, and to render the execution of our respective duties in relation to it replete with difficulty and embarrassment. It is in regard to such works, and the acquisition of additional territory, that the practice obtained its first footing. In most, if not all, other disputed questions of appropriation, the construction of the Constitution may be regarded as unsettled, if the right to apply money, in the enumerated cases, is placed on the ground of usage.
If it be the desire of the people that the agency of the federal government should be confined to the appropriation of money, in aid of such undertakings, in virtue of the state authorities, then the occasion, the manner, and the extent of the appropriations, should be made the subject of constitutional regulation. This is the more necessary, in order that they may be equitable among the several states; promote harmony between sections of the Union and their representatives; preserve other parts of the Constitution from being undermined by the exercise of doubtful powers, or the too great extension of those which are not so; and protect the whole subject against the deleterious influence of combinations to carry, by concert, measures which, considered by themselves, might meet but little countenance.
That a constitutional adjustment of this power, upon equitable principles, is, in the highest degree, desirable, can scarcely be doubted; nor can it fail to be promoted by every sincere friend to the success of our political institutions. In no government are appeals to the source of power, in cases of real doubt, more suitable than in ours. No good motive can be assigned for the exercise of power by the constituted authorities; while those, for whose benefit it is to be exercised, have not conferred it, and may not De willing to confer it. It would seem to me that an honest application of the conceded powers of the general government to the advancement of the common weal presents a sufficient scope to satisfy a reasonable ambition. The difficulty and supposed impracticability of obtaining an amendment of the Constitution, in this respect, is, I firmly believe, in a great degree, unfounded.
In presenting these opinions, I have spoken with the freedom and candor which I thought the occasion for their expression called for; and now respectfully return the bill which has been under consideration, for your further deliberation and judgment.
[General Jackson, in addition to the above, has exercised the veto power on several bills.—See Appendix.]
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE VETO.[1]
Upon the proceedings of the American colonial assemblies, there existed a double negative or veto—one vested in the royal governor, the other in the king. By the royal governors the right was often exercised, and the king frequently signified his disallowance of acts which had not only passed the colonial assemblies, but even been sanctioned by the governor. This feature was one strongly set forth as a prime grievance, in recounting the injuries and usurpations of the British monarch, in the Declaration of Independence, and its exercise was highly repugnant to the interests of America.
Dr. Franklin, in the Debates of the federal Convention, thus shows the influence of the veto power under the proprietary government of Penn:—
"The negative of the governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An increase of salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till, at last, it became the regular practice to have orders in his favor on the treasury presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former before he should sign the latter. When the Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the governor in the means of self-defence could not be got, until it was agreed that his estate should be exempted from taxation; so that the people were to fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to have no share of the burdens of taxation."
At first sight, then, it appears strange that the framers of our Constitution, when they were originating a new government, which should combine the experience of the past, without borrowing any of its defects, should bring in such a power, the operation of which had proved so baneful, and which had already been so strongly reprobated. But such was the fact. The war of the revolution over, the Articles of Confederation alone bound the states together, and the reaction which took place in several places urgently demanded some new form of compact more adequate for the purposes of government, and more consonant with the altered condition of affairs. Upon the 25th May, 1787, the Federal Convention met in the city of Philadelphia. Having organized themselves by the choice of proper officers, and the adoption of necessary rules, Mr. Randolph, of Virginia, opened the business of the Convention by proposing, on the 29th May, a series of resolutions, imbodying his views as to what the crisis required; and on the same day General Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, laid before the delegates the draught of a federal government, to be agreed upon between the free and independent states of America. The veto power entered into the schemes of both these gentlemen, though centred by them in different points. The 8th resolution of Mr. Randolph says:—
"Resolved, That the executive and a convenient number of the national judiciary ought to compose a council of revision, with authority to examine every act of the national legislature before it shall operate, and every act of a particular legislature before a negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said council shall amount to a rejection, unless the act of the national legislature be again passed, or that of a particular legislature be again negatived by ——— of the members of each branch."
The article embracing this feature, in the draft of Mr. Pinckney, reads thus:—
"Every bill which shall have passed the legislature shall be presented to the President of the United States for his revision. If he approve it, he shall sign it; but if he does not approve it, he shall return it, with his objections, to the house it originated in; which house, if two thirds of the members present, notwithstanding the President's objections, agree to pass it, shall send it to the other house, with the President's objections; where, if two thirds of the members present also agree to pass it, the same shall become a law. And all bills sent to the President, and not returned by him within ——— days, shall be laws, unless the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent their return, in which case they shall not be laws."
Mr. Randolph's views were evidently based on the suggestions of Mr. Madison; for that gentleman, in a letter to Mr. Randolph, a few weeks previous, urged the same idea of a negative by the national government, "in all cases whatsoever, on the legislative acts of the states, as the king of Great Britain heretofore had."
The resolutions of Mr. Randolph became the basis on which the proceedings of the Convention commenced, and, as Mr. Madison says, "to the developments, narrations, and modifications of which the plan of government proposed by the Convention may be traced."
Let us, then, follow out the discussions of this body until the suggested joint revision by the executive and judiciary became altered to the single negative of the President. On the 4th of June, the first clause of Mr. Randolph's eighth resolution was taken up; but Mr. Gerry, from Massachusetts, doubting whether the judiciary ought to have any thing to do with it, moved to postpone the clause, and introduced the following amendment:—
"That the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act which shall not afterwards be passed by ——— parts of each branch of the national legislature."
Rufus King, from Massachusetts, seconded the motion, and the proposition of Mr. Grerry was taken up. Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, and Alexander Hamilton, of New York, wished to strike out the latter clause, so as to give the executive an absolute negative on the laws; but, though supported by these gentlemen, it was opposed by Dr. Franklin, Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, Madison, Butler, of South Carolina, and Mason, of Virginia; and was therefore negatived.
Mr. Butler and Dr. Franklin then wished to give a suspending instead of a negative power; but this was overruled, and the blank of Mr. Gerry's resolution was filled up, sub silentio, with two thirds; and the question being taken on the motion, as thus stated, it received the votes of eight states, Connecticut and Maryland voting in the negative. On the 6th June, according to previous notice, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison moved to reconsider the vote excluding the judiciary from a share in the revision and negative of the executive, with the view of reënforcing the latter with the influence of the former. But though Mr. Madison urged the plan of associating the judges in the revisionary function of the executive, as thereby doubling the advantages and diminishing the dangers, and as enabling the judiciary better to defend itself against legislative encroachments, it was as eloquently opposed by Mr. Gerry, and others, who thought that the executive, while standing alone, would be more impartial than when he could be covered by the sanction and seduced by the sophistry of the judges; and it was finally rejected. Two days after, at the conclusion of an animated debate, the subject of giving the national legislature a negative on the several state laws, which was first suggested to the convention by Mr. Randolph's resolutions, and subsequently brought up for reconsideration by Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Madison, was also voted down,—three states in the affirmative, seven in the negative, Delaware divided.
On the 18th of June, Mr. Hamilton offered to the Convention a plan of government, in the fourth article of which the veto power was unqualifiedly conferred on the executive. The next day, Mr. Gorham, from Massachusetts, reported from the committee appointed to reconsider the various propositions before the Convention, and the tenth resolution of that report says: "That the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed, unless by two thirds of each branch of the national legislature." The Convention proceeded to take up the several articles and clauses of this report, and it was not till the 18th July, that the tenth resolution became the order of the day; it was then passed nem. con. On the 21st, however, Mr. Wilson, still entertaining his original views, as to the union of the judiciary with the executive on the veto power, moved an amendment to the resolution, which gave rise to a most interesting debate, in which Mr. Ellsworth, from Connecticut, Mr. Mason, from Virginia, and Mr. Madison and Mr. Gouverneur Morris, of Pennsylvania, sustained the views of Mr. Wilson; and Messrs. Gorham, Gerry, and Strong, of Massachusetts, Mr. Martin, of Maryland, and Mr. Rutledge, of South Carolina, opposed them, and the amendment was lost. The original resolution, therefore, was again passed.
Having gone critically through with the report of the committee, the various resolutions which had been agreed to were, on Thursday, 26th July, referred to a committee of detail, to report on Monday, August 6th, a draft of the Constitution. This committee, of which Mr. Rutledge was chairman, reported on the day assigned, and the veto power was conferred by the 13th section of the sixth article. This paragraph, as reported by the committee, came under discussion on Wednesday, 15th August, when Mr. Madison moved an amendment, which revived the previously agitated question of uniting the judges of the Supreme Court with the President in his revision and rejection of laws passed by Congress. Much debate followed. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Mercer supported Mr. Madison, and Mr. Pinckney opposed. The amendment was lost—three states voting for it, and eight against it. Having thus surveyed the subject in all its bearings, the Constitution, amended, altered, and perfected, was, on the 17th September, 1787, signed by the Convention, and constitutes to this day the basis of our government. The veto power in this Constitution is thus expressed, article 1, section 7:—
"Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it."
The first use of this constitutional power was by Washington, who, on the 5th April, 1792, vetoed the "Representation Bill," which originated in the House of Representatives. As this, from its priority, is an event worthy of extended notice, we give the circumstances of the case, as briefly related by Jefferson, then secretary of state:—
"April 6th. The President called on me before breakfast, and first introduced some other matter, then fell on the Representation Bill, which he had now in his possession for the 10th day. I had before given him my opinion, in writing, that the method of apportionment was contrary to the Constitution. He agreed that it was contrary to the common understanding of that instrument, and to what was understood at the time by the makers of it; that yet it would bear the construction which the bill put; and he observed that the vote for and against the bill was perfectly geographical—a northern against a southern vote—and he feared he should be thought to be taking side with a southern party. I admitted the motive of delicacy, but that it should not induce him to do wrong, and urged the dangers to which the scramble for the fractionary members would always lead. He here expressed his fear that there would, ere long, be a separation of the Union; that the public mind seemed dissatisfied, and tending to this. He went home, sent for Randolph, the attorney-general, desired him to get Mr. Madison immediately, and come to me; and if we three concurred in opinion, that he would negative the bill. He desired to hear nothing more about it, but that we would draw up the instrument for him to sign. They came;—our minds had been before made up;—we drew the instrument. Randolph carried it to him, and told him we all concurred in it. He walked with him to the door, and, as if he still wished to get off, he said, "And you say you approve of this yourself?" "Yes, sir," says Randolph; "I do, upon my honor." He sent it to the House of Representatives instantly. A few of the hottest friends of the bill expressed passion, but the majority were satisfied, and both in and out of doors it gave pleasure to have at length an instance of the negative being exercised. Written this, the 9th April."
LIST OF THE VETOES.
1. Returned to the House of Representatives, by George Washington, April 5, 1792—"An Act for an apportionment of representatives among the several states, according to the first enumeration."
2. Returned to the House of Representatives, by George Washington, March 1, 1797—"An Act to alter and amend an act, entitled, An Act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States."
3. Returned to the House of Representatives, by James Madison, February 21, 1811—"An Act for incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia."
4. Returned to the House of Representatives, by James Madison, February 28, 1811—"An Act for the relief of Richard Tervin, William Coleman, Edwin Lewis, Samuel Mims, Joseph Wilson, and the Baptist Church at Salem meeting-house, in the Mississippi territory."
5. Returned to the House of Representatives, by James Madison, April 3, 1812—"An Act providing for the trial of causes pending in the respective District Courts of the United States, in case of the absence or disability of the judges thereof."
6. Bill not approved, nor returned with objections, for want of time; retained, and notice thereof sent to Congress, by James Madison, November 5, 1812—"An Act supplementary to the acts heretofore passed on the subject of a uniform rule of naturalization."
7. Returned to the Senate, by James Madison, January 30, 1815—"An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States of America."
8. Returned to the House of Representatives, by James Madison, March 3, 1817—"An Act to set apart and pledge certain funds for internal improvement."
9. Returned to the House of Representatives, by James Monroe, May 4, 1822—"An Act for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road."
10. Returned to the House of Representatives, by Andrew Jackson, May 27, 1830—"An Act authorizing a subscription of stock in the Maysville, Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company."
11. Returned to the Senate, by Andrew Jackson, May 31, 1830—"An Act authorizing a subscription of stock in the Washington Turnpike Road Company."
12. Returned to the Senate, by Andrew Jackson, July 10, 1832—"An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States."
13. Returned to the Senate, by Andrew Jackson, December 6, 1832—"An Act providing for the final settlement of the claims of states for interests on advances to the United States, made during the last war."
14. Returned to the House of Representatives, by Andrew Jackson, December 6, 1832—"An Act for the improvement of certain harbors, and the navigation of certain rivers."
15. Bill not approved, nor returned with objections, for want of time; retained, and notice sent to the Senate, by Andrew Jackson, December 5, 1833—"An Act to appropriate, for a limited time, the proceeds of the sales of the public lands of the United States, and for granting lands to certain states."
16. Returned to the Senate, by Andrew Jackson, March 3, 1835—"An Act to authorize the secretary of the treasury to compromise the claims allowed by the commissioners under the treaty with the king of the Two Sicilies, concluded October 14, 1832."
17. Bill not approved, nor returned with objections, for want of time; retained, and notice thereof sent to Congress, by Andrew Jackson, December 2, 1834—"An Act to improve the navigation of the Wabash River."
18. Returned to the Senate, by Andrew Jackson, June 10, 1836—"An Act to appoint a day for the annual meeting of Congress."
19. Returned to the Senate, by John Tyler, August 16, 1841—"An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Fiscal Bank of the United States."
20. Returned to the House of Representatives, by John Tyler, September 9, 1841—"An Act to provide for the better collection, safe keeping, and disbursement, of the public revenue, by means of a corporation, to be styled the 'Fiscal Corporation of the United States.'"
21. Returned to the House of Representatives, by John Tyler, June 29, 1842—"An Act to extend, for a limited period, the present laws for laying and collecting duties on imports;" (containing a proviso about distribution of proceeds of lands.)
22. Returned to the House of Representatives, by John Tyler, August 9, 1842—"An Act to provide revenue from imports, and to change and modify the existing laws imposing duties on imports, and for other purposes." (This bill was afterwards revived, with alterations and modifications; and, thus amended, finally passed, and received the President's signature.)
Recapitulation of Vetoes
| By George Washington, | 2 |
| " James Madison, | 6 |
| " James Monroe, | 1 |
| " Andrew Jackson, | 9 |
| " John Tyler, | 4 |
| Total, | 22 |
Such is a plain history of the veto power. As it respects the several stares, the executives in some have the power, in others not. Those which possess the negative power, such as is given to the President, are New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Maine. The other states do not have it at all, or the bill, when returned by the governor, may be repassed by a mere majority.
Of the ten Presidents, five have made use of the veto power and five have not.
Number of acts approved, upwards of 6,000.
- ↑ Historical Memoranda of the Veto.
The veto power originated with the ancient Romans, and was the first essay of the common people of the republic towards the securing of their proper liberties. The Plebeians, having long been oppressed by the Patricians, at the instigation of Sicinius, 200 years after the founding of the city, made secession to a mountain three miles distant from Rome, (ever after termed Mons Sacer,) and would not return to the city until they had received from the Patricians compliance with their demand, and the solemn assurance, that the common people should elect magistrates, whose persons should be sacred and inviolable, to whom they could commit the protection of their rights. These magistrates were called tribunes; a name given by Romulus to the three military officers in chief, selected from the three tribes into which he had divided the city. The civic tribunes were originally chosen from the Plebeians, and no Patrician could hold the office, unless he had been first adopted into a Plebeian family. Their power was at first limited, but at the same time extraordinary. It was preventive, rather than enforcing; it was to interpose and protect the people from the oppressions and tyranny of their superiors; to assist them in redressing their wrongs, and in maintaining their liberties; and consisted in the utterance of but one word, and that one, "Veto," (I forbid.) These officers could prevent the discussion of any question, the passage of any law, the execution of any sentence, the levying of any taxes, the enlisting of any troops, and almost arrest the entire machinery of government, by standing up and speaking that one word, Veto. No reasons were required of them; no one dared oppose them; their Veto was supreme! As originally designed, it was emphatically the people's measure, for the people's protection; the necessary balance-wheel, to equalize the powers of the government, which had hitherto been engrossed by the rich, and give the people that interposing check, which the alarming tyranny of the Patricians made necessary. It was the first attempt at a democratic, i.e. a people-ruling institution, and in all its features, save that of unlimited power, shewed the humility of its origin. The tribunes must be not only of the Plebeian order, but they had no insignia of office, save a kind of beadle, who went before them; were not allowed to use a carriage, had no tribunal, but sat on benches. Their doors were open night and day for the people to prefer their requests or complaints. They were not allowed to enter the senate, and were not even dignified with the name of magistrate. As designed by Sicinius, it was the mere unadorned majesty of the people's voice, assimilated to the lowly pretensions of the people—the visible exponent of their will. These popular traits did not, however, long remain. The grasping ambition of some, the restlessness for change in others, soon abused the power; the tribunes became themselves a greater evil than they remedied, and their authority was more tyrannous than the edicts of those they were created to oppose.
Veto became a word of despotic power. The decrees of the senate, the ordinances of the people, the entire arrangements of government, bowed to its supremacy; and such was the force of the word, that not only could it stop the proceedings of all the magistrates, which Cæsar well calls "extremum jus tribunorum," but whoever, senator or consul. Patrician or Plebeian, dared oppose it, was immediately led to prison to answer for his crime. And so sacred were the persons of the tribunes, that whoever hurt them was held accursed, and his goods were confiscated. Sylla was the first who resisted the gross encroachments of the tribunes; but on his death they regained their influence, and henceforth it became but the tool of ambitious men, who used it almost to the ruin of the state. Such was its abuse, that, as Cicero says, the popular assemblies became the scenes of violence and massacre, in which the most daring and iniquitous always prevailed. The perversion of the original design of the veto was now completed by the arts of the emperor Augustus, who got the tribuneship conferred on himself, which concentrated in his person the entire and uncontrolled disposition of the state. This was the first instance of the combination of royal and veto power, and its assumption was all that was wanting to make the king a tyrant. From this time it was conferred upon the emperors, though the tribunes still continued to be elected, without, however, the exercise of tribunitian power, until the time of Constantine, when the office was abolished.
The early operation of the veto power in Rome was good, the subsequent disastrous. At first, it protected the people, gave them a voice in the legislative assemblies, and secured their liberties; ultimately, it oppressed the lower orders, excluded them from the councils of the nation, and made them the passive instruments of power-lusting demagogues. The first civil blood shed at Rome was the blood of Tiberius; the tribune battling, imprudently indeed, against the oppressions of the nobility. The last but closed the sanguinary series of intestine wars, created, continued, and tragically ended, by the very perversion of that power which was at first designed to give peace and unity to the Roman nation. So true has it ever been, that the delegated power of the people, when abused, has always reverted to their own destruction. Having traced the veto power, from the simple word of the tribune to the imperial exercise of its rights in Rome, we are -prepared to come down to modern times, and cite a few instances of its adoption and influence in European states.
The king of Great Britain possesses the veto right, upon the resolutions of parliament, though no instance of its exercise has occurred since 1692. In fact, constituted as the British government is, the veto is entirely unnecessary. Such is the powerful agency of money and influence, that they will prevent the passage of any law obnoxious to the crown, and the king can, through his ministers, so trim and shape the proceedings of those bodies, as to accommodate them to his views; while, on the other hand, the taking away responsibility from the monarch, and resting it with the cabinet, which varies with the changes of public sentiment, never creates an emergency for the exercise of the royal negative. The same power is also vested with the king of Norway; but if three successive storthings or diets repeat the resolution or decree, it becomes a law without the king's assent, though he may have negatived it twice before. As the storthing, however, sits only every third year, the veto of the king, though it may not eventually be ratified, has yet a prohibitory operation on any given law for six years. It was thus that nobility was abolished in Norway in 1821. The king had twice vetoed the law, passed by the storthing, against the further continuance of the nobility; but the third diet confirmed the resolutions of the two former, and the law became established, notwithstanding the royal negative.
The constituent assembly of France conferred the veto power on the king in 1789, but the very first exercise of it proved his ruin. It was preposterous for such a body, and at such a time, to make such a provision in the constitution they were then passing, and as affairs then stood, when judicious temporizing, and not royal prerogative, was required. It was equally preposterous in Louis to employ it. It but showed the waywardness of the popular will, which could at one time grant such a right, and at another punish the exercise of it. The negative is, however, held by the present king, though it has never yet been put into requisition.
By the constitution of the cortes, the king of Spain was vested with the same power, and it still forms a provision of the Spanish government. In Poland, the veto power assumed another shape. It was centred, not in the king, but in the former republic. Each member of the diet could, by his "Nie Pozwalam," (I do not permit it,) prevent the passage of any resolution, and defeat the operations of the rest. On the partition of Poland, Russia confirmed this liberum veto to the Polish assembly, with the sinister design of thereby frustrating any effective or independent legislation; well knowing that, in its then distracted state, the continuance of this individual veto, would be, as it proved, destructive to harmony of action and unity of design, and the "Nie Pozwalam" of the Polish representative has been but an apple of discord to that noble but suffering people.