CHAPTER XXV.

FALL OF KHARTOUM—1885.

It has been stated elsewhere that Mohammed Ahi Pasha began the conquest of the Soudan in order to increase the possessions of Egypt. In 1822 he sent his son, Ismail Pasha, to Shendy, then the capital of the Soudan country, to demand the submission of Mek Nemr, the king of Ethiopia, who was surnamed "The Leopard," on account of his ferocity. Ismail Pasha made his camp outside the walls of Shendy, and sent for the king to come and see him. The king came, and the visitor demanded hay for his horses and camels and food for his troops.

The king said it was impossible to meet the demand, as his people were poor and the season had been very bad. The Egyptian became furiously angry, and struck the king over the head with the stem of his chibouk. The king bowed his head as if in submission, and said the Egyptians should have all they had asked for, and more besides.

All night long his people were busy piling hay around the Egyptian camp, the largest piles being in front of the pasha's tent and the tents of his officers. Suddenly, at daybreak, the whole circle of hay was in a blaze, having been fired by orders of the king. As the Egyptians endeavored to save themselves, they were speared by the Ethiopian warriors, and not one of Ismail Pasha's expeditionary force escaped.

When Mohammed AH heard of the occurrence, he sent an army to destroy Shendy, not leaving one stone upon another. The "Leopard" fled at the approach of the avengers and was not captured, but the town was razed to the ground. Mohammed Ali ordered the establishment of a town at the junction of the Blue and White Niles, which should be the capital of the Soudan country in place of Shendy. His orders were carried out, the new town (Khartoum) gained rapidly in importance, and from an insignificant village of a few dozens of people it became a commercial centre, with a population of more than 20,000 in less than a quarter of a century. Its later history, as well as that of its origin, has been written in blood.

Immediately after the destruction of Hicks Pasha's army, the Mahdi's forces advanced upon Khartoum, and laid siege to it. Khartoum is on the tongue of land between the Blue and White Niles; it fronts upon the Blue Nile, where there are several stone enbankments which form landing-places for the steamers, at the edge of a low bluff. Towards the south there is a mud wall, which separates the city from the plain, and there is a similar wall on the eastern side. Against modern artillery the walls of Khartoum could offer little resistance, but they are an important defence against the small-arms of the Arabs. The Mahdi's forces were held at bay by the walls, though they vastly exceeded in numbers the garrison within. They had a few small cannon, captured from the Egyptians, but they were short of ammunition, and even with an abundance of it they did not have the necessary skill for its proper utilization. They contented themselves with firing occasional shots at the town; but what was more serious, they cut off the supplies of provisions, so that the garrison and inhabitants were on very short rations.

The Egyptian government had appealed to England for assistance in re-conquering the Soudan, but that country refused its aid, though it had been ready enough to bombard Alexandria and suppress Arabi Pasha's revolt, which was almost identical with the Mahdi's rebellion.

Lord Granville stated in Parliament that "the government was in no way responsible for the operations which had been undertaken on the authority of the Egyptian government, or for the appointment of General Hicks." When the news of the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's army reached England there was great excitement, and the government felt called upon to do something to extricate the garrisons of Khartoum, Kassala, Berber, and other places that were besieged by the Mahdi's forces, as his fanatical followers would not be likely to spare any lives in case of success, and, least of all, the lives of any foreigners in the Egyptian service. In its emergency the government appealed to General Charles G. Gordon, better known as "Chinese" Gordon, to aid in the solution of the difficult problem.

Gordon had been living in the Holy Land for several months, and had just been invited by the king of the Belgians to go to the Congo and assume command of the Congo Free State, which Stanley had organized. He reached Brussels on New Year's day, 1884, completed his arrangements with King Leopold, and then started for the Congo. On the 16th January, while on his way, a telegram from London called him to start at once for Khartoum, to settle the affairs there. He reached London on the morning of the 18th, and left on the evening of the same day for Egypt.

The Soudan was familiar ground to General Gordon, as he had been its governor-general from 1877 to 1880, in the service of Ismail, Khedive of Egypt. From 1874 to 1877 he was Governor-General of the Equator, so that he passed altogether six years in the regions of the Upper Nile. During the period of his administration, he did much to improve the condition of the people, and their regard for him was so great, that the British government had good reason to believe that he could make terms with the Mahdi, and secure the safe retreat of the garrisons of Khartoum and other points. Accordingly he was sent to Khartoum to arrange for the evacuation of the Soudan. During the voyage from Brindisi to Port Said, he prepared a report, in which he carefully reviewed his instructions, and called attention to some of the difficulties and complications which would probably arise in carrying out the policy of the British government. He asked for the support and consideration of the Foreign Office, in the event that he should be unable to fulfil their expectations in every respect. Colonel Stewart wrote at the same time, and suggested that the wisest course would be to rely on General Gordon's discretion and his knowledge of the country and people.

General Gordon reached Khartoum on February 18th to carry out the instructions of the British government for the safe evacuation of the country. But it occurred to him to make provision for the government of the country after the retirement of the Egyptian troops, as he foresaw anarchy and general ruin in case the country went into the control of the Mahdi and his fanatics. His plan was to restore the rule of the petty sultans who were in power at the time of Mohammed Ali's conquest, and whose families still existed, and in places where there were no ruling families, he proposed that the people should choose their own sultans. It was hardly to be expected that the Mahdi would approve this plan and, therefore it would be necessary to defeat him. His defeat would require a larger expeditionary force than England was prepared to send, and consequently the government declined the scheme.

General Gordon roused the antagonism of the anti-slavery party in England by issuing a proclamation, in which he promised non-interference with the slave-trade, after he had done every thing in his power, during his six years of authority, for its suppression. Zubair Pasha, the king of the slave-traders in that region, had been sent to reside in Cairo, and forbidden to return to the Soudan; Gordon asked the Khedive to send this man to him, with the next position in rank, and explained that Zubair had vast influence over the people of the Soudan, and could do more than any other man to bring about the desired result. The Khedive refused to do as Gordon wished in this matter, and Zubair remained in Cairo. Gordon was greatly disappointed at the Khedive's refusal, and also at that of the British government to send the necessary forces to crush the Mahdi.

Things went wrong elsewhere in the Soudan. Colonel Valentine Baker, who, under the title of Baker Pasha, had been sent with a Turkish force to Tokar, was severely defeated on February 4th; and a week or two later the garrison of Sinkat was slaughtered almost to a man, while trying to cut its way through the lines of Osman Digma, the Mahdi's commander in the region bordering the Red Sea. Another small force, under command of Colonel Stewart, had been massacred, and, altogether, the whole sky was gloomy. Naturally, General Gordon grew impatient and despondent, as is very evident from his diary. He avowed his intention not to leave the country until order was restored, and he deprecated the coming of an English expedition, except for the purpose of saving all the garrisons and establishing some form of government.

When it was fully realized in England that Gordon was in danger, there was a great clamor for his relief. It grew day by day, and finally became so loud that the government was forced to act. On the 5th August an appropriation of £300,000 was made for his relief, and Lord Wolseley was appointed to command the expedition. Messengers were immediately sent out to inform Gordon that help was near, but unfortunately these messengers were unable to reach him, and hence came his belief that he had been altogether abandoned by his country.

It was resolved to use the railway around some of the cataracts of the Nile, and for this purpose material was sent out. A portion of the proposed line had been made several years before by the Egyptian government, in its endeavors to improve communication with the Soudan, but had never received its equipment. The advance was to be along the Nile valley, and 400 boats of light draft were ordered for the expedition. Preparations were pushed for the departure of troops from London, and orders were sent for troops from India to go to Egypt. The expedition included 8,000 British troops, 2,500 Egyptians, and a flotilla of over 900 boats. A contingent of 600 Canadian boatmen was enlisted by the Marquis of Lansdowne, Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada, and sent to Egypt as speedily as possible.

On the 10th September Lord Wolseley arrived at Cairo, 1,500 miles from Khartoum. He ordered the relieving army to ascend the Nile by steamers to Wady-Halfa; the 1st battalion of the Sussex regiment arrived there November 2d, and then the actual advance on Khartoum may be said to have begun. There were some delays on the way connected with the difficulties of the transport department, and the movement to Ambukol, and thence to Korti, was slow. From Korti General Wolseley determined to march by two roads. One column under General Earle was to follow the river, while the other, under General Herbert Stewart, would go straight across the Bayuda Desert, 178 miles, and reach the Nile again at Metemneh. Scattered on the desert were several oases where water could be obtained; the most difficult part of the route was from the Gadkul Wells to the Abu Klea Wells, a distance of 45 miles, where no water could be procured, and therefore it was necessary to carry a supply for horses and men.

General Stewart, with his detachment of 1,150 men, 350 Guards and marines, 300 native soldiers, and 2,000 camels, began his march at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, Dec. 30th, and reached the Gadkul Wells, 97 miles from his starting-point, in 65 hours, during which time the camels were not once watered. Owing to the terrific heat of the daytime the marching was done at night. As the column approached Abu Nafki, after the first stage of marching, there was some excitement among the troops, owing to the uncertainty of their whereabouts and the anticipation of hostility. Finding a very scanty supply of water at the Hasheen Wells, the advance continued after a brief halt. On Thursday, the second night's march, being New Year's day, the troops gave a ringing cheer, which drew another cheer, and following it was the cry of "Wells ahead!" At eight o'clock the men again mounted their camels and continued their march to the Gadkul Wells, capturing on their way a quantity of spoil, and making prisoners of all the natives they found. Friday morning at seven o'clock they reached Gadkul Wells and found that all the natives had disappeared. The Arabs had been there a few days before, but left hastily on learning of the advance of the British.

It was now considered wise to strengthen the number of fighting men, as it was positively ascertained that the Mahdi's force in front of them was from 8,000 to 10,000 strong. To ensure the greatest despatch, General Stewart went back to Korti, and in a few days had about 2,000 fighting men under his command. There was now a long march of 45 miles across the waterless desert to the Abu Klea Wells, and on Friday, Jan. 16th, the head of the column was within a few miles of the wells. The exhausted troops were hoping for a halt and rest at the wells, after which they would have only two short marches to Metemneh.

Suddenly the Hussars, who were scouting ahead, brought the news that the enemy were in possession of the Wells. The whole column was immediately formed in close fighting order, the Guards camel corps on the left, the heavy division in the centre, and the mounted infantry on the right. Thus arrayed the column advanced until within three miles of the Wells. As the Arabs gave no indication of advancing or retiring, the troops were halted, and immediately went to work to make a zareba, or entrenchment, which should protect them in case of a night attack, and serve as a stronghold, where the camels and baggage would be left under guard, when the main body advanced to battle in the morning. An abattis was formed around the camels and baggage, and a breastwork of stone and earth was thrown up some hundreds of yards in front, sufficient to check the first rush of the Arabs. The enemy's camp could be plainly seen about four miles away; it contained several tents, and appeared to be fortified. While the English were entrenching they were watched by mounted Arabs, who were stationed on some high hills on the left front.

About six o'clock in the evening the enemy fired from a distance; but immediately retired when the artillery replied with a few rounds from the light guns. During the night a few shots were fired into the camp, killing nobody and wounding one man slightly. On Saturday, January 17th, the Arabs advanced in two divisions; each division numbered about 5,000 men, who had been gathered from Berber, Metemneh, and Omdurman. They moved forward, with drums beating and flags flying, halting occasionally to see what the English troops were going to do. General Stewart remained for a while in the position he had entrenched, hoping to induce the enemy to attack him there; but finding that they would not attack, he formed his line of battle, and advanced to meet the Arabs. The British troops were dismounted, the camels being left in the inclosure under guard of a portion of the Sussex regiment and some mounted infantry.

The English advanced in square, with the mounted infantry, the artillery, and a portion of the Guards in the front line. Another detachment of Guards and a part of the Sussex regiment formed the right flank, and a portion of the heavy cavalry and some mounted infantry were on the left. The naval brigade and the rest of the heavy corps formed the rear, while the Gardner machine-guns were in the centre, so that they could be used in any direction. The fighting force thus formed in square included about 1,500 men. As the British advanced, the Arabs manœuvred until the British had reached a position which the enemy deemed favorable for their attack. Then, leaving their standards waving to mask their movements, they disappeared from view, and, advancing under cover of some depressions of the ground, suddenly charged upon the square.

The destructive fire poured in by the front line checked the Arabs, but did not drive them back; sweeping round, they assaulted the rear of the square, where the heavy cavalry were in position. For a moment the English could not withstand the furious attack. Their formation was broken and the Arabs began to pour into the interior of the square. But the heavy cavalry rallied quickly, and then followed a desperate hand-to-hand fight. The troops on the other faces maintained their formation, and poured a tremendous fire upon the masses of the Arabs, which prevented the latter from following up the advantage they had gained. The Guards, the mounted infantry, and the naval brigade concentrated their fire on the Arabs, covering the ground with dead and wounded, and driving away the survivers, so that the square again closed up.

By this time the enemy were fully defeated, and were soon in full retreat. The wells were now open to the troops, who immediately advanced and took possession. The loss of the English were: 9 officers and 65 men killed, and 9 officers and 85 wounded. The enemy left 800 dead around the square, and prisoners reported the number of their wounded to be very large.

General Stewart established a strong post at Abu Klea Wells and left there about 4 p.m. the next day (Jan. 18th). Avoiding the wells at Shebacut, he moved to the right, to establish himself on the Nile between Metemneh and Khartoum. About 7 a.m. Jan. 19th, when the British were 3 or 4 miles from the river, the Arabs again appeared in force. A halt was made for breakfast, and a strong zareba was constructed. During the fight at this point General Stewart was mortally hit by a bullet, and a heavy fire was encountered. Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, as senior officer, assumed the command. The force, leaving wounded and impedimenta in the zareba, marched about 3 p.m. to the gravel ridge which overlooks the Nile, where a large force of the enemy waited to meet them. Led by several emirs on horseback the Arabs charged, but none were able to get nearer than within about 30 yards of the square. They were repulsed with severe loss, 5 emirs and about 250 other dead being left on the ground.

The British reached the Nile at Gubat, 2 miles above Metemneh and 98 miles below Khartoum. They fortified the camp and prepared to rest and wait for General Earle's column, which was advancing by the river route. Three steamers with 500 soldiers and a message from General Gordon came down the river from Khartoum. On the 24th January Sir Charles Wilson, with two steamers carrying 20 English soldiers and 320 Soudanese (some of those who came down from General Gordon), started for Khartoum.

All the way up the river the boats were fired upon from both banks. On nearing Khartoum, General Wilson found that every point was in possession of the enemy, and when the steamers approached within 800 yards of the town a dozen cannon opened upon them, followed by a thousand or more rifles in the hands of the Arabs, who everywhere covered the walls. It was evident that Khartoum had fallen, and as it was impossible to land in face of the artillery and small-arms in the hands of the Arabs, General Wilson reluctantly gave the order to return to Gubat. On the way down the river both the steamers were wrecked through the treachery of the pilots, but the men escaped.

The relief expedition reached Khartoum two days too late. The city had fallen into the hands of the Mahdi, and General Gordon was dead. Many stories have been told concerning the capture of Khartoum, but the full details are not and probably never will be known. The stories are contradictory of each other, but they generally concur in the assertion that the surrender was due to treachery.

An Arab servant of General Gordon stated that Khartoum was delivered to the rebels by Faragh Pasha, the commander of Gordon's Soudanese troops, who early on January 27th treacherously opened the gate in the southern wall. By previous arrangement the Mahdi's fighting men were waiting outside, and immediately rushed into the city. General Gordon, hearing the noise, went out armed with a sword and an axe, and accompanied by Ibrahim Bey, the chief clerk, and 20 men. On his way to the palace he met a party of the Mahdi's men, who fired a volley that killed General Gordon. The Arabs then rushed on with their spears and killed the chief clerk and 9 of the men; the rest escaped. The greater number of the inhabitants fraternized with the Mahdi's men, and there was no fighting elsewhere in the city. No women or children were killed, and all who surrendered and gave up their valuables were allowed to leave without further molestation. The Mahdi's troops were too much engaged with the looting of the town to think of moving against Gubat. The Mahdi did not enter Khartoum until three days after its capture, and then only made a brief stay.

Another story is that Gordon was not shot, but was killed with swords and spears, the soldiers having consulted among themselves whether to take him alive or not. They decided to kill him, because, as they said, if they took him alive to the Mahdi he would be spared, and, as he was the cause of all the trouble, he ought to be killed. There is another story, that the Mahdi allowed Gordon to escape to the southward, and on more than one occasion it has been asserted that this remarkable soldier of fortune is yet living in the equatorial region of Central Africa, but so closely watched that he cannot communicate with the outer world.

After the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon, the English made no attempt to advance farther up the Nile. The troops were slowly withdrawn, the construction of the Suakim-Berber railway was suspended, and the British forces in Egypt contented themselves with retaining possession of such portions of the country as were not embraced in the conquests of Mohammed Ali and his successors. By the fall of Khartoum, the Soudan was restored to its former independence and relieved from the misrule and oppression of the pashas. The dominion of Egypt has been driven from the region of the equatorial lakes to that of the lower Nile, and the time is probably far distant when it will be restored.