Divine Selection or The Survival of the Useful/Chapter 2
CHAPTER II
in the
Cosmic Process
MR. HUXLEY, in his address at Oxford in 1893, says that "the cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends." In commenting upon this Mr. Fiske says: "Most assuredly survival of the fittest, as such, has no sort of relation to moral ends."[1]
That Mr. Huxley should fall into this error is not surprising, but that Mr. Fiske should pass over its fatal conclusions without bringing to the surface its self-stultifying fallacy is difficult to understand.
The position is rightly taken that, if the moral motive is not found in Evolution, it does not exist in its products, consequently the moral motive does not exist in man. Or, if the moral motive does not exist in Evolution and does exist in man, Evolution is fundamentally a fallacy, for that which has no moral motive in itself could never produce one out of itself. The least knowledge of the relation of cause and effect prohibits one holding at the same time that there is a moral motive in any created thing and none in the cosmic process that produces it.
Yet Mr. Huxley clearly sees that there is a moral motive in man, though he designates it by so superficial a word as "ethical." He admits the selfishness in "natural selection" and the moral in man, and explains the existence of the two by saying that "the social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process."
The fallacy of such a theory lies in the fact that there would then be two processes of development in nature that are fundamentally and diametrically opposed. And need we go further in unfolding this illogical proposition than to say that the second process is even evolved out of the first?
If God made nature and man, and God be good, the moral motive is as fully present in all natural processes as it is in man. It may not be so evident; it may not be so quick in operation; but it is there as surely and fully.
A right view of nature forbids that we draw conclusions from superficial observations, and requires that we look deeply into it and broadly upon it. In its mode of growth a tree may be said to be selfish, because it regards only itself. But the tree has no power over its growth. It is absolutely a thing of condition, receiving and swelling with life over which it has no control. In determining its relation to selfishness we must look to the source of its life and observe whether selfishness is there. This is determined by inquiring into the uses to which a tree is put. Are its uses all for itself, or are they all for other things? When we search this question deeply the appearance changes entirely, for we come into the reality. The tree is of no use to itself except that it may grow, which self-use is fundamental to all use. Further, the tree spends its whole energy in forming alluvium, in providing shelter and food for animals, and in multiform uses to man. The greater law of usefulness to others comprehends the law of self-use, and makes the existence of a tree absolutely unselfish.
We may look at the subject in another way. As a matter of fact the tree regards nothing, neither its own growth nor its unselfish uses, for it has no mind essential to conscious thought, from which comes regard. The selfishness or unselfishness is in the Creator who made it and propagates it. Since the tree serves itself only that it may serve others, that is, its existence is wholly one of service to other things, we are forced to conclude that the Creator is unselfish, and the law of the tree's existence is unselfish.
The same reasoning applies to animals. Though they are of a higher order of life, they are as bound to their instincts as a tree is to its roots. They can no more transcend their instincts than vegetation can its order. Their self-love simply perpetuates their existence, which is fundamental to their unselfish uses. The greater law of use here also nullifies selfishness, and makes nature, because of her universal service, as unselfish as her uses are general.
It ought not to be difficult to perceive that an infinitely good Creator can make neither nature nor man selfish in their broader and essential relations, and that no unperverted power or law that is from Him is other than unselfish.
There is nothing clearer to rational intelligence than that, if the moral motive cannot be seen in nature struggling as in man for the ascendancy and step by step securing its purpose, we may know our view of nature is yet superficial and its language an unknown tongue. For the reason that compels the acknowledgment of a Divine Being as the Supreme Architect, equally forces upon us that when creation was finished, "God saw that it was good." And good can be predicated of nothing that is without a moral motive, or essentially selfish.
The doctrine of the "unity of plan" in creation, which Mr. Huxley and other Evolutionists have urged and illustrated, and which is generally accepted, cannot be true if man is developed by a process contrary to that under which other things are developed. Creation is not then essentially a unit, but a dual. Not only is it double at the foundation, but being double and antagonistic, there is no such thing as a cosmic process, giving "cosmic" its right meaning of harmonious.
It seems that Mr. Huxley has finally worked out two antagonistic yet fundamental elements in nature, quite in keeping with the old notion of a personal Devil from eternity and a personal God, which to the serious can be none the less ludicrous.
- ↑ "Through Nature to God," page 77.