Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas/Pressure Tactics
Conflicts were reported between the negotiators and the tactical elements regarding the strategy to be used with the Davidians.[1] On several occasions tactical pressure was exerted on the Davidians either without consulting the negotiators or over the negotiators' objections. The negotiators believed the timing of these tactical activities disrupted the progress of the negotiations unnecessarily. Additionally, negotiators complained that the HRT engaged in tactical maneuvers before the negotiators had an opportunity to use the maneuvers to further the bargaining process.
At the outset of the crisis FBI behavioral scientists recommended against confronting David Koresh. The negotiators specifically recommended that the Bradley vehicles should not be brought up to the compound. Despite the negotiators' advice, the Bradleys were run up and down in front of the compound in what negotiators believed was a show of force.
On March 12 after two Davidians had exited the compound the decision was made to turn off the electricity in the compound. The negotiators objected to the decision arguing that the Davidians should be rewarded for releasing two people. The power was turned off. No one was released for the next seven days.
On March 21 after seven Davidians had exited the compound the negotiators were advised that the Davidian vehicles would be cleared from the left side of the compound. The negotiators opposed this action, pointing out that once again the FBI would be answering a positive move on the part of the Branch Davidians by a negative action. Nonetheless, the bulldozing was implemented. The negotiators received conflicting justifications for the action being told both that the items were being moved as a safety measure and to harass the Davidians.
Loudspeakers were initially used to provide information to Koresh's followers still inside the compound, but contrary to the negotiators' advice the loudspeakers were used to broadcast Tibetan chants, other annoying music and the sounds of dying rabbits. The negotiators objected to playing music as a harassment tactic, advising that such "psychological warfare" would only make the FBI look bad.
Some negotiators believe that as a result of these actions the Davidians concluded that the negotiators had no influence over the decision makers and that the FBI was not trustworthy. Several negotiators and behavioral scientists expressed the opinion that although David Koresh and his core lollowers may never have come out through negotiation, more people might have exited the compound voluntarily during the stand-off if the negotiation strategy had been followed more rigorously.
The negotiators recognized that a traditional negotiation tactic is to put pressure on the subject at times through tactical activities choreographed with a more gentle negotiating approach. However, a memorandum dated March 5, 1993 from FBI behavioral scientists stated that "[i]n traditional hostage situations, a strategy which has been successful has been negotiations coupled with ever increasing tactical presence. In this situation however, it is believed this strategy, if carried to excess, could eventually be counter productive and could result in loss of life."(emphasis added)
Despite these conflicts, I am not confident that more members would have left the compound if the negotiating strategy had been followed more rigorously. Even though in hindsight the behavioral assessment of Koresh proved extremely accurate, the most compelling evidence of the resolve
of the Davidians to follow Koresh was their willingness to take their own lives and the lives of their
children in obedience to Koresh. It is this total allegiance to Koresh that was unpredictable. Even those who left the compound before the fire seemed to remain committed to him. Several expressed regret that they could not join him in death. Koresh could not be pressured into leaving the compound, and whatever bound Koresh and his followers was apparently stronger than either force or reason.
Footnotes edit
- ↑ In addition to the negotiators reporting these conflicts, an ATF representative assigned to work in the FBI command post also observed that the negotiators and the FBI tactical people had growing disagreements and tension. In addition the FBI special agent assigned as the liaison for communications between the negotiation team and the HRT advised that he felt that "an adversarial relationship had developed" between the negotiating and tactical components and that this was divisive and unnecessary. He attributed the problem to a basic lack of understanding and appreciation for the overall mission and strategy. In addition, negotiators from the Austin Police Department who were assigned to the negotiation team also noted the conflict with the tactical teams.