Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Company/Dissent Holmes
United States Supreme Court
Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Company
Argued: Nov. 10-14, 1921. --- Decided: Jan 3, 1922
Mr. Justice HOLMES dissenting.
There are obvious limits of propriety to the persistent expression of opinions that do not command the agreement of the Court. But as this case presents a somewhat new field-the determination of what is unfair competition within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act-I venture a few words to explain my dissent. I will not recur to fundamental questions. The ground on which the respondent is held guilty is that its conduct has a dangerous tendency, unduly to hinder competition or to create monopoly. It is enough to say that this I cannot understand. So far as the Sherman Act is concerned I had supposed that its policy was aimed against attempts to create a monopoly in the doers of the condemned act or to hinder competition with them. Of course there can be nothing of that sort here. The respondent already has the monopoly of its own goods with the full assent of the law and no one can compete with it with regard to those goods, which are the only ones concerned. It seems obvious that the respondent is not creating a monopoly in them for anyone else, although I see nothing to hinder its doing so by conveying them all to one single vendee. The worst that can be said, so far as I see, is that it hinders competition among those who purchase from it. But it seems to me that the very foundation of the policy of the law to keep competition open is that the subject-matter of the competition would be open to all but for the hindrance complained of. I cannot see what that policy has to do with a subject-matter that comes from a single hand that is admitted to be free to shut as closely as it will. And to come back to the words of the statute I cannot see how it is unfair competition to say to those to whom the respondent sells and to the world, you can have my goods only on the terms that I propose, when the existence of any competition in dealing with them depends upon the respondent's will. I see no wrong in so doing, and if I did I should not think it a wrong within the possible scope of the word unfair. Many unfair devices have been exposed in suits under the Sherman Act, but to whom the respondent's conduct is unfair I do not understand.
Mr. Justice McKENNA and Mr. Justice BRANDEIS concur in this opinion.
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This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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