Gent v. State/Dissent Robinson

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Case Syllabus
Opinion of the Court
Dissenting Opinion
Robinson

SAM ROBINSON, Associate Justice (dissenting). Not only is it the duty of the United States Supreme Court to uphold the Constitution, but it is the duty of this court, and every court in the land, to support and defend the Constitution. Of course, any document as important as the Constitution has to be construed. It would be utterly impossible to write a Constitution for a great nation that would need no construction by courts of competent jurisdiction, and no one now questions the jurisdiction of the U. S. Supreme Court to construe the Constitution.

The First Amendment, as construed by the U. S. Supreme Court, among other things, protects the freedom of speech and freedom the press. The Supreme Court has construed this Amendment many times but the majority of our court, in the case at bar, has cited only two cases on that point; neither of the cited cases sustain the majority opinion, and no other authority is cited sustaining the majority view. One of the cases cited by the majority is Roth v. U. S., 354 U. S. 476. The facts in the Roth case are not shown, therefore it is not known whether it is analogous with the case at bar.

The other case is Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184. There, Jacobellis was convicted in the Ohio courts on two counts of possessing and exhibiting an alleged obscene film in violation of Ohio Statutes. The picture was a French film called "Les Amants" ("The Lovers"). The conviction was reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court. Here, the majority makes no attempt to point out any distinction between the Jacobellis case and the case at bar. Otherwise, the majority has not shown how it can be said that the material in the case at bar is obscene and therefore not protected by the First Amendment, notwithstanding what the U. S. Supreme Court has said in the Jacobellis case.

In view of the fact that undoubtedly this case will go to the U. S. Supreme Court for a final decision, I see no point in elaborating on the construction placed on the First Amendment by the majority of our court, which is contrary to the construction of the Amendment by the U. S. Supreme Court in many cases, including Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, et al., 355 U. S. 35; One, Inc. v. Olesen, Postmaster of Los Angeles, 355 U. S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, Postmaster General, 355 U. S. 372; Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 360 U. S. 684; Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, Postmaster General, 370 U. S. 478.

All of the foregoing cases are directly in point with the case at bar. There was a conviction in each case of violating some statute prohibiting dissemination of obscene material. In each case the alleged obscenity involved was lewd, lascivious, and perhaps shocking. In each case the conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The majority has made no attempt whatever to distinguish the alleged obscene material in the case at bar from the material that was in issue in the foregoing cases. There is no effort to show that the material involved here is any more obscene than the material that the Supreme Court has held to be protected by the First Amendment.

In my opinion the decision in this case will be reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice George Rose Smith joins in this dissent.